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1INTRODUCTION
Climate scientists are predicting that weather variability and the probability of extreme weather
events will continue to increase. Societies will need to adapt to the consequences of these changes,
which include droughts, floods, and heat waves. Even though governments may invest in ma-
jor infrastructure projects, climate change adaptation will also lead to investments at the private
level. My dissertation compiles two essays that analyze household preferences and behavior to
help understand private adaptation decisions and outcomes. It highlights important challenges
for policymakers that want to encourage private adaptation investments, and explores the use of
resource-conserving technologies as a potential solution.
Since climate change adaptation requires a certain investment today in exchange for uncertain
benefits in the future, adaptation investments are strongly influenced by people’s preferences over
risk and time. To better understand these preferences and their influence on climate change adapta-
tion decisions and policy design, I conduct an artefactual field experiment with a rural population
in the western, arid part of Costa Rica. This study, which applies recent developments in experi-
mental designs and econometric estimation, is my first dissertation essay, entitled “Household Time
and Risk Preferences and Adaptation to Climate Change”. I find that people are predominantly
optimistic, in the sense that they tend to overweigh the likelihood of positive outcomes. And even
though people do not exhibit a present-bias, they exhibit high subjective discount rates (around
30% per annum). Furthermore, I connect households’ levels of impatience and optimism to their
private adaptation decisions in home water tanks, which some of them purchased to protect them-
selves against water variability over the year, and find a negative correlation in both cases. This
points to significant challenges for policymakers looking to encourage private adaptation decisions.
2One potential solution is to pursue policies that offer households short-term benefits, even in the
absence of weather variability. A prime example for such a measure could be resource-conserving
technologies, which I explore in my second essay.
To address water scarcity now and in the future, governments and multilateral agencies have
encouraged people to adopt technologies that increase the efficiency of water use. However, the
popularity of this technological solution is based on engineering estimates of demand reduction that
rely on many unverified assumptions about field conditions and household behavioral responses
to technology adoption. The actual effect of the adopted technologies could differ substantially
from these engineering estimates. For example, adoption can lead to an increase in water-using
activities, which blunts the impact of the technologies.
To generate more credible empirical evidence about the effectiveness of water-efficient tech-
nologies in reducing water demand among rural households, I design and implement a randomized
controlled trial in a drought-prone area in Costa Rica, whereby technologies are offered for free
to the population. To my knowledge, this is the first randomized controlled trial to test the impact
of water-efficient technologies under naturally occurring conditions. The results of this experi-
ment are analyzed in my second dissertation essay, entitled “Climate Change Adaptation through
Resource-Conserving Technologies”. I find that the technologies are significantly more effective in
reducing water consumption than other programs (10.8% compared to 3.5%-6.8% for social norm
message programs, for example). On the other hand, the actual reduction is only around half of
the comparable engineering estimate. This highlights the need for considering the households’ be-
havioral responses to the technologies. Moreover, I find that disadoption rates a constant concern
in the related literature are reduced with a monetary bonus payment that (random) households
3receive for keeping the technologies for at least four months.
Another advantage of water-conserving technologies is that due to the water savings these
technologies are self-financing for households over two to three years, even when applying the
large subjective discount rates elicited for the local population. This suggests that people might be
willing to purchase the technologies if they were available in the local markets, and if policymakers
succeed in communicating the estimated water savings to the target population.
The dissertation enhances our understanding of decision-making for married couples: by and
large, adaptation investment decisions appear to be made jointly by the couple rather than the head
of household. Differences in preferences between couples and individuals therefore suggest that
policymakers should target their messages and other interventions to both spouses instead of just
the head of household, where applicable. This also highlights the need for additional research on
the decision-making process within the household.
4Chapter 1
Household Time and Risk Preferences and Adapta-
tion to Climate Change
1.1 Introduction
Earth’s climate is expected to change considerably in the future. Although scientists do not yet
know with great certainty the full effects of climate change on human populations, most agree
that weather variability and the probability of extreme climate events will increase (Fischer &
Knutti, 2015). These changes increase the risk of water scarcity and damage to infrastructure and
crops, among other stresses. The costs of adapting to changes in risks will vary across regions and
populations, but every society will have to adapt to climate change in some way.
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Field, 2012), “adaptation is
the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects, in order to either lessen
or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities.” These adjustments can take many forms. For
example, individuals or households can acquire insurance, they can save money for the future,
5or they can invest in technologies (water storage, floating houses, water-conserving technologies,
efficient irrigations systems, change in crops, etc.). Moreover, communities and governments can
invest in collective infrastructure (e.g., sea walls) that also help people adapt to climate change.
Citizens in poor countries that depend heavily on natural resources are particularly vulnerable
to climate change. Their income, food, and water security are already precarious and they have
limited adaptive capacity. To help them adapt, policymakers need to not only develop large-scale
interventions, but also develop programs that encourage the citizens in poor nations to make private
adaptation investments. To develop policies and programs that encourage such investments, we
must understand the factors that shape household adaptation decisions.
Two factors that may play important roles in shaping adaptation decisions are time and risk
preferences. An investment in climate change adaptation requires a fixed payment today in ex-
change for uncertain payoffs at a later time. Adaptation is therefore fundamentally an inter-
temporal decision under risk. As a result, the parameters and forms of risk and time preferences
are likely to shape adaptation decisions. Drawing on recent advances in behavioral economics, I
clarify how adaptation decisions are shaped by time and risk preferences.
To empirically assess the role of these preferences in an adaptation context, I apply recent
developments in experimental designs and estimators in an artefactual field experiment with a
rural population in the western, arid part of Costa Rica that has been targeted by policymakers
for climate change adaptation investments. Because most adaptation decisions are intra-household
decisions, I elicit risk and time preferences for both individuals and married couples. I then connect
the variation in individual and couples’ preferences to the variation in an adaptation measure:
investment in private water-storage tanks that reduce intra-annual variability in water supply.
6My study makes three contributions. First, it assesses the relationship between preferences
and investment in climate change adaptation. The way in which adaptation decisions are affected
by risk aversion is ambiguous: more risk aversion can increase or decrease investment in adapta-
tion depending on the level of uncertainty surrounding the benefits of the investment (Koundouri,
Nauges, & Tzouvelekas, 2006). Although risk aversion is high in the study population, I find no
significant correlation between individual or couples’ degrees of risk aversion and my measure
of adaptation investment. However, probability weighting is common in this population: people
tend to overweigh the likelihood of the most favorable outcomes. Consistent with theory, more
“optimistic” households are significantly less likely to invest in adaptation.
The way in which adaptation decisions are theoretically affected by time preferences is un-
ambiguous: higher discount rates and greater time inconsistency (hyperbolic discounting) lead to
lower levels of investment. In the study population, I detect no evidence of time inconsistency.
Yet, even after adjusting for the curvature of the utility function, individual and couple discount
rates are high (> 30%). Consistent with theory, higher discount rates are associated with lower
adaptation investment.
The second contribution of my study is an examination of whose preferences – individuals’ or
married couples’ – best explain household adaptation decisions. My measure of adaptation invest-
ment is better described by the joint preferences of the couple than by the individual preferences
of the head of household. This result is consistent with household survey response about decision-
making. Couples have similar risk aversion and probability weighting to individuals, but they
are substantially less patient than individuals: their discount rates are an estimated 14 percentage
points higher than the rates of individuals. Were these findings to generalize to poor populations in
7other areas targeted for climate change adaptation programs, they strongly imply a need for poli-
cies that focus on incentivizing couple decision-making for climate change adaptation. We discuss
the full implications for policy design in the conclusions.
The third contribution of my study is to replicate, improve and extend prior empirical research
on risk and time preferences and on the difference in preferences between individuals and couples.
Some studies have estimated time preferences in developing nations (Duflo, Kremer, & Robinson,
2008; Pender, 1996; Tanaka, Camerer, & Nguyen, 2010). However, their elicitation designs assume
that subjects make decisions over nominal payouts rather than utilities, which implies subjects are
risk neutral. If subjects are risk averse, the estimator is biased. To eliminate this bias, I elicit
and estimate subjects’ risk and time preferences jointly (Andersen, Harrison, Lau, & Rutstro¨m,
2008, 2014). Accounting for risk aversion reduces the annualized discount rate substantially: from
500%, under a risk neutral specification, to 45%.
This joint estimator will be biased, however, if risk preferences are not well approximated
by Expected Utility Theory (EUT), introduced by Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), but rather
by Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU) framework, introduced by Quiggin (1982). Under RDU, risk
preferences are shaped not only by a coefficient of risk aversion but also by a (non-linear) transfor-
mation of objective probabilities. For my study population, I strongly reject the EUT framework in
favor of an RDU model with a Prelec probability weighting function (pwf) that reflects optimistic
probability weighting: subjects, on average, overweigh the probability of the best outcome. Ad-
justing for this weighting reduces estimate annualized discount rates by ten percentage points to
35%.
I also seek to detect another important feature of time preferences: “present-bias” or “hy-
8perbolic discounting”, which implies a discounting function where discount rates “decline as the
discounted event is moved further away in time” (Laibson, 1997). Such discounting leads an in-
dividual to overweigh present consumption so that investments, like adaptation investments, are
postponed or never occur. Were present-bias to be widespread in vulnerable populations, adap-
tation policy design may require certain “commitment device” to effectively encourage private
adaptation investments. In contrast to previous studies in developing countries (Bauer, Chytilova´,
& Morduch, 2012; Duflo, Kremer, & Robinson, 2011; Tanaka et al., 2010), I cannot detect evidence
of present bias.
Finally, I add to the inchoate literature that contrasts individual preferences to the preferences
of couples (mates). My study includes two innovations: (a) to differentiate a married effect from a
group effect (two people, rather than one person, making decision), the design uses both real and
“fake” couples (non-mates); and (b) to better characterize the couples’ decisions in a structural
model, I apply a household bargaining model under uncertainty, which estimates the spouses’
respective weights in the household decision process. For the risk preference tasks, a bargaining
process appears to take place, with the wife leading the decision. For the time preference tasks,
couples express significantly less patience than both husband and wife show individually, in line
with predictions that a preference shift occurs when decisions are made as a group (Eliaz, Ray, &
Razin, 2006). The results imply that one should not assume that the risk and time preferences of the
head of household is representative of the preferences of the married couple or reflect household
decision-making.
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following way. I commence with a review of
the literature on risk and time preferences and climate change adaptation decision in Section 2.
9Sections 3 to 6 describe the methodology, experimental design, econometric model, and experi-
mental procedure, respectively. Section 7 provides a descriptive analysis of the experimental data.
In Section 8, I present the results for individuals’ and couples’ time and risk preferences. In Sec-
tion 9, I assess the relationship between the estimated preferences and the households’ investments
in water tanks. Section 10 relates the findings to the existing literature, and Section 11 discusses
policy implications. Finally, Section 12 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
There is an extensive literature that discusses the appropriate framework to model decisions under
risk. The main contestants are EUT, which is the most commonly known framework, and RDU
when no losses are considered. Under EUT, the expected utility of any risky choice is the sum of
the utility of the possible outcomes, weighted by the known probabilities of each outcome. In this
framework, risk attitudes are formally characterized as individuals’ aversion to variability of final
outcomes and are characterized by the concavity of the utility function. Nevertheless, Quiggin
(1982) argues that subjects’ risk attitudes do not only come from the variability of payoffs. Under
RDU, risk aversion is formally characterized as aversion to variability of final outcomes, as well as
“pessimism” or “optimism” over probabilities, which is captured by the pwf. The pwf transforms
the cumulative distribution of the objective probabilities so that outcomes are weighted differently
than they are under EUT. RDU assumes that peoples’ decisions are affected not simply by the
objective probabilities of an event, but rather by peoples’ attitudes towards those probabilities.
Thus under RDU, risk aversion is explained by the properties of both the utility function and the
10
pwf (Harrison & Rutstrom, 2008).
The empirical relevance of RDU has been shown in several papers for developed and devel-
oping countries (Harrison, Humphrey, & Verschoor, 2010; Tanaka et al., 2010; Wu & Gonzalez,
1996). A priori, I do not know which framework applies to my data. Thus I consider both and test
which one is more appropriate for the data.
Regarding time preferences, the discounting utility (DU) model of Samuelson is the traditional
framework applied by economists to explain intertemporal decisions and is represented by the ex-
ponential discounting function. One of the key features of the DU model is a constant discount
rate for different time horizons. Nevertheless, there is some empirical evidence that shows that
discount rates are not constant and that they in fact decline over time. A declining discount rate
implies that intertemporal preferences are time-inconsistent and people exhibit preference rever-
sals. People who discount hyperbolically do not fulfill the plans they make today because when
the time to commit arrives present consumption seems more valuable than the future profits of the
new endeavor. This form of discounting is known as hyperbolic discounting and has been modeled
in different ways: quasi-hyperbolic model (Phelps & Pollak, 1968), fixed cost model (Benhabib,
Bisin, & Schotter, 2010), the Mazur discounting function (Mazur, 1984), the Weibull discounting
function (Read, 2001), etc.
The evidence of hyperbolic behavior in rigorous studies that elicit discounting functions is
scarce. Moreover, one of the main criticisms to the current studie s that test for the presence
of hyperbolic discounting is that they do not consider discounted utilities. In an intertemporal
decision, individuals compare a utility level today versus a utility level in the future. Thus, a
key feature of any good experimental design that seeks to elucidate discounting behavior is to
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consider the curvature of the utility function. Many experimental studies that test for the presence
of hyperbolic discounting, particularly earlier studies, fail to consider this curvature, which could
bias their results. Andersen et al. (2008, 2014); Andreoni and Sprenger (2012); Coller, Harrison,
and Rutstro¨m (2012) introduce the shape of the utility function in their estimation. In Coller et al.
(2012), the authors estimate exponential and quasi-hyperbolic models as well as a mixture model
of both discounting functions1. They find that the sample follows both discounting functions in
similar proportions. In contrast, neither Andersen et al. (2014) nor Andreoni and Sprenger (2012)
find hyperbolic discounting in their samples. Andersen et al. (2014) posit that one explanation for
the difference between their results and Coller et al.’s results is that they use a sample of Danish
individuals, whereas Coller et al. (2012) use students in the U.S. The authors suggest that more
studies should be done with a variety of populations. In my analysis, I include risk choices to
model the curvature of the utility function as in Andersen et al. (2014) and both exponential and
hyperbolic discounting functions are tested to see if people have constant or declining discount
rates.
Adaptation decisions are taken by individuals but also by collective entities, such as communi-
ties or households. Since adaptation decisions at the household level are sometimes taken by the
married couple and I do not know if couple decisions are similar to the spouses’ decisions, I elicit
couples’ preferences. Elicitation of risk preferences at the couple level has been done by Abdel-
laoui, L’Haridon, and Paraschiv (2013); Bateman and Munro (2005); Carlsson, Martinsson, Qin,
and Sutter (2013); De Palma, Picard, and Ziegelmeyer (2011). These studies use subjects from
developed countries, except for Carlsson et al. (2013) which elicits risk preferences for households
1Two well-cited studies that do not consider the shape of the utility function in their analysis find evidence of
hyperbolic discounting (Benhabib et al., 2010; Tanaka et al., 2010)
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in rural China. Bateman and Munro (2005) find that couples show more risk aversion when mak-
ing choices jointly rather than individually. Abdellaoui, L’Haridon, and Paraschiv (2013) find that
women show more risk aversion than couples and men. They also find that spouses have equal
weight in the household decision. The authors also test for joint and individual differences using
the RDU framework and find little differences: both individuals and couples overweight small
probabilities and underweight high probabilities but men seem to overweight small probabilities
more and underweight high probabilities less than women and couples. Carlsson et al. (2013)
conclude that the individual and joint decisions are not statistically different from each other, but
that the joint decisions are typically closer to the husbands’ decisions. So, the evidence regarding
differences between individuals’ and couples’ decision making under risk is inconclusive.
Regarding time preferences, there are two studies that elicit time preferences at the couple
level: Abdellaoui, L’Haridon, Paraschiv, et al. (2013); Carlsson, He, Martinsson, Qin, and Sutter
(2012). Carlsson et al. (2012) elicit time preferences using a sample of married couples in rural
China, while Abdellaoui, L’Haridon, Paraschiv, et al. (2013) use French couples. Carlsson et al.
(2012) find that none of the individual or joint decisions exhibit quasi-hyperbolic discounting,
joint decisions are in between the individual choices, and husbands have a stronger influence on
joint decisions than wives. Using longer time horizons than Carlsson et al. (2012) (1 month up
to 2 years, rather than 4 up to 8 days), Abdellaoui, L’Haridon, Paraschiv, et al. (2013) find that
couples are more patient than individuals and that couples discount rates cannot be expressed as a
convex combination of spouses’ rates. The authors also find increasing and then decreasing annual
discount rates over time for individual and joint decisions, contrary to hyperbolic behavior (and
thus contrary to time inconsistency). Only Abdellaoui, L’Haridon, Paraschiv, et al. (2013) takes
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into account the curvature of the utility function. In my study, I take into account the shape of the
utility function, use a structural model to estimate the spouses’ weight in the household decision,
control for the order in which individuals’ and couples’ decisions are taken, and differentiate a
married couple effect from a group effect using random pairs of individuals.
Few studies have analyzed the relationship between risk and time preferences and adaptation
to climate change. According to Mendelsohn (2012), adaptation to climate change is any change
in behavior that an agent does to reduce the costs or increase the gains from climate change. Adap-
tation can take many forms: people can buy insurance, keep savings or invest in a new technology.
In my study I focus on the last form of adaptation: technology adoption.
Although studies that seek to clarify the factors that determine technology adoption have a long
history, few empirical studies assess the role of risk aversion. Some studies elicit risk aversion
from survey data and correlate these measures with technology adoptions (Bozzola et al., 2014;
Koundouri et al., 2006), but experimental measures of risk aversion using salient incentives are
scarce. Moreover, not much attention has been put on the relationship between attitudes towards
probabilities captured by the pwf of RDU and adaptation decisions. The only study that we know
is Liu (2013). The author studies the case of Chinese cotton farmers who were offered the option to
adopt genetically modified cotton to deal with bollworms, the primary cotton pest. The author uses
survey questions and experiments to elicit risk preferences, and the econometric methodology of
Tanaka et al. (2010) to estimate aversion to variability in gains and losses and probability attitudes.
Liu finds that more risk-averse farmers and more loss-averse farmers adopt the new cotton variety
later, and that farmers with an inverted S shape pwf adopt the new cotton variety earlier. Liu argues
that farmers with an inverted S shape pwf overweight the small probability of severe bollworm
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infestation and thus adopt the technology earlier than other farmers.
We know of only one study that examines the relationship between time preferences and the
adoption of technologies relevant for climate change adaptation. Duflo et al. (2011) develop a
theoretical model that includes present-bias to predict fertilizer take-up by farmers in West Kenya.
In the model, naı¨ve hyperbolic farmers who plan to buy fertilizer in the future may procrastinate
and end up not buying it. The model predicts that a small, time-limited discount on the cost
of acquiring fertilizer increases the quantity of fertilizer that farmers buy, which increases crop
yields. In a randomized field experiment, this prediction is verified. Thus, the paper suggests that
present-biased behavior reduces fertilizer take-up.
1.3 Study Site and Sampling
The study takes place in the driest area of Costa Rica that covers the provinces of Guanacaste
and part of Puntarenas, close to the border with Nicaragua. The experiment is part of a larger
Canadian government-funded research project on climate change adaptation and water scarcity in
Central America. Climate modelers in the project have predicted that this area (like most of Central
America) will see more frequent and more extreme droughts in the next fifty years. Moreover, since
2014 the area has been experiencing higher temperatures and drought associated with a very strong
El Nin˜o-Southern Oscillation.
Around 85% of the communities in these provinces use underground water, which is pumped
to homes by a community system of pipes. In about half of the communities, water is managed by
the Costa Rican Water Agency “Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados” (AyA).
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The other communities manage their own water systems through community associations called
ASADAS. As part of the larger climate adaptation project, surveys were conducted in 2013 in
82 randomly chosen communities that met three conditions: 1) belong to the first decile of driest
communities in Costa Rica, 2) their water supply comes from one or more community wells and
3) water supply is managed by the ASADA. The survey teams interviewed a random sample of
households and the ASADA management committees. During the households’ survey, heads of
household were informed that as part of the water project my team would conduct workshops –
the experimental sessions – the following year. The survey team explained them that for their
participation people would obtain 5 000 Colones (around US$ 10) and have the opportunity to
win more. The team asked them if they were interested in participating in the workshops, and to
provide their contact numbers if that was the case.
Out of the 82 communities, I chose 30 that satisfy the following criteria: 1) had the lowest
number of hours per day with water availability; 2) community leaders were willing to provide a
place for the experimental session; 3) community had at least 25 individuals that showed interest
in participating in the experimental sessions in the 2013 household survey.
The communities are very small: on average they have 183 habitants. Most of the sessions took
place after 4 pm in the local school which is located in a very centric area and walking distance
from any house. This implies an advantage over having the session at home where the participants
are commonly distracted without the disadvantage of costly access to the session. The schedule of
the session was suggested by the community leaders to guarantee that most of the people interested
in participating were available. Sessions took place from Sunday to Thursday because banks do not
open during the weekend and my design established payments one and four days after the session.
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A month before the experimental sessions, the team invited the heads of household by phone.
Since I want to distinguish between the married effect and group effect, my original objective was
to take half of the married couples and pair them up randomly with other married or single individ-
uals, and be able to compare married couples with other different types of couples. Nevertheless,
in the pilots I realized that many couples would not be able to come together to the experimen-
tal session because of work or children. In order to have enough married couples working as a
couple, I decided to form the “fake” couples only with married individuals that came alone to the
session and with singles, and acknowledge that this could bias the difference between real and fake
couples.
1.4 Experimental Design
I conduct a risk aversion experiment and a discounting experiment. At the beginning of the session,
each person in the sample is assigned a partner and a group that indicates the order in which
decisions are taken. Real couples, who are composed by married couples or couples that cohabit,
are partnered with their spouses. Fake couples are composed by married people that came alone
to the session or singles that were paired up at random. All individuals have to solve discounting
tasks and risk aversion tasks individually and in pairs. So, in total each person participates in four
events: individual discounting (Di), individual risk aversion (Ri), couple discounting (Dc), couple
risk aversion (Rc). To control for order effects regarding the choices made individually and in
pairs, I introduce a within session treatment where half of the sample first make the choices in
pairs and then individually, while the other half start with the individual tasks.
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Figure 1.1: Example of Risk Aversion Decision (in Colones)
In the risk aversion experiment, I use a design with 30 binary lottery choices in the gain frame
with three prizes from Wakker, Erev, and Weber (1994). I choose to use these lotteries because they
are designed to distinguish between EUT and RDU. For each choice, individuals have to decide
between two lotteries A and B. Figure 1.1 shows the display for one of the decisions.
Each lottery is represented as a bag with twenty colored balls. We use three colors that represent
the three different prizes and the number of balls per color reflects the probability of that prize being
selected. For example, the lottery A in Figure 1.1 has two different balls: orange and green. The
orange ball stands for 12 000 Colones and has a probability of 50%. I use the exchange rate of 500
Colones per dollar.
In the discounting experiment, individuals are asked to choose between a sooner payment A
and a larger, later payment B in a Multiple Price List design (MPL). Payment A is the principal and
it is 8 000 Colones (US$16) which is approximately the official daily minimum wage of a worker
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out of high school in 2013 in Costa Rica2. Payment B changes depending on the annual interest
rate and the time horizon. There are 6 tasks that correspond to different time horizons. The time
horizons used are: 3 days, 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 3 months and 6 months. Each task contains
8 choices between a sooner and a later payment. The annual interest rates of each choice is 50%,
75%, 100%, 150%, 200%, 300%, 450% and 800%. In total, every subject has to solve 48 choices.
I use different periods because I want to be able to specify the discount rate function. Four out of
six horizons are in the very short run because I want to test for the presence of quasi-hyperbolic
behavior.
I introduce a between session treatment in which I display the horizons in an ascending order
in half of the community sessions while horizons are presented in a descending order in the other
half of the sessions.
One concern when estimating discount rates are the transaction costs associated with the future
payment. The literature has tried to deal with this problem by introducing front end delays and/or
by using the same payment procedure for both payments. The front end delay (FED) refers to the
fact that the sooner payment is not paid now but with a delay of some days, weeks or months. The
idea behind this procedure is to make the individual equally confident about the realization of both
payments by pushing the sooner payment into the future. The problem with the FED is that the
delay can also cover up quasi-hyperbolic behavior.
The transaction costs associated with the later payment are also reduced by using the same
payment procedure for sooner and later payments. The idea behind this is that the transaction costs
of a payment in cash at the end of the session are smaller than the transaction costs of a bank
2In Costa Rica, the government establishes minimum wages for many occupations. Daily wages go from 7 500 to
16 500 Colones for a computer analyst or an audio technician (de Trabajo y Seguridad Social de Costa Rica, n.d.)
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deposit where the individual requires going to the bank. Having both payments done in the same
way eliminates the effect of the payment procedure.
The experimental design deals with this problem by using the same method of payment for all
sooner and later payments, and introducing a FED for the earliest payment as a between community
treatment. The method of payment is a personal bank transfer where the individual withdraws the
money by presenting their Costa Rican id. Half of the communities faced a FED of one month
while the other half did not. Since all sessions took place in the afternoon or during the weekends
when banks were closed, No FED people were able to withdraw the money the next business day
in the morning.
Considering the order of horizons and the FED treatments, there are 4 types of community
sessions: 1A, 1D, 2A and 2D where the sessions 1A and 1D are NO FED sessions and horizons
are presented in an ascending and a descending order, respectively. In sessions 2A and 2D, I use
the 30 day FED and horizons are displayed in an ascending and descending order, respectively.
The choices are presented to the individuals in a table like the one in Figure 1.2, where only
the time period in days, weeks or months and the payoffs in options A and B are shown.
All the participants receive a participation fee of 5 000 Colones (US$ 10) and the additional
money they earn in the experiments. The participation fee is paid in cash after completion of the
survey and the money from the experiments is paid using a personal bank transfer. Besides an
individual survey, married couples also have to answer a brief couple survey.
To determine the amount of payment from the experiments for each individual, I use a “pay
one randomly” or POR payment design (Cox et al. 2015). One choice is selected randomly to be
played out for each of the experiments in which the subjects participated (Di, Ri, Dc, Rc). I divide
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the group randomly into four subgroups and each individual in each subgroup receives payment
for one of the selected choices. If the individual receives her payment for a decision made in a
couple, only she receives the money. For instance, if the husband is selected to get paid for a Dc
choice, only he gets paid for the couple’s decision in the selected question.
Under the independence axiom of EUT, the method of payment POR is suggested in the liter-
ature to avoid inconsistencies in the choices produced by the portfolio effect and the wealth effect.
Nevertheless, Cox, Sadiraj, and Schmidt (2015) argues that POR is not incentive compatible to
test other theories that do not assume the independence axiom, like RDU or CPT. In these cases,
the authors suggest other payment methods that are incentive compatible, like “pay all correlated”,
“pay all sequentially” or “one task”. I acknowledge that this implies a problem in my design since
the answers obtained with the POR method of payment are used to test both EUT and RDU. The
alternative would be to use the “one task” method that is always incentive compatible. This means
that I obtain only one decision from each subject. But this is a very costly procedure and only
allows between subjects-data. Since I need to use a within subject design for the main part of the
study (time preference elicitation, individual vs. couple decision), I decided to use POR and accept
that the RDU estimations may be biased.
1.5 Econometric Model
I apply maximum likelihood estimation to the structural model of the latent choice to characterize
risk and time preferences parameters, as in Andersen et al. (2008, 2014).
I estimate the risk preferences using only the answers of the risk tasks, and through the joint
21
Figure 1.2: Example of Discounting Choices for 2 Weeks Horizon and No FED (in Colones)
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estimation of time and risk preferences. Both procedures should provide similar results.
Using only the risk tasks, I pool all the individuals’ and couples’ answers and compare different
RDU models to determine the model that best fit the data. I focus on the RDU framework because
EUT model is embedded in it. The properties of the RDU framework are determined by the utility
function and the pwf. If the data fits best an EUT model, then the parameter estimates of the
pwf make it the identity function. I apply the CRRA and the Expo-power utility functions and
three different types of pwfs: the power pwf ω(p) = pγ , the Tversky - Kahneman or inverse-
S shaped pwf ω(p) = p
γ
(pγ+(1−p)γ ) 1γ
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), and the Prelec pwf ω(p) =
exp(−δ [− ln(p)]φ ) by Prelec (1998) where δ > 0, φ > 0. In order to compare among the different
RDU models, I use the Vuong and Clarke statistics (Clarke, 2003; Vuong, 1989).
In the risk tasks, the individual chooses between lottery A and lottery B. Under RDU, the
decision weights replace the probabilities provided by the experimenter. In the model, the decision
weights are represented in the following way. For each lottery, the outcomes are ranked and the
cumulative probability for each outcome is calculated starting with the highest outcome. The pwf
is applied to the cumulative probabilities, so that the decision weight for the best outcome is the
value of the pwf, and the decision weights for the rest of the outcomes are calculated by subtracting
the decision weights of the higher outcomes.
Under RDU, the expected utility of lottery i is the sum of the utilities for each outcome
weighted by the decision weights, as in equation (1.1).
RDUi = ωi1 ·U(Mi1)+ωi2 ·U(Mi2)+ωi3 ·U(Mi3) (1.1)
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M1, M2 and M3 are the outcomes; U(M1), U(M2) and U(M3) are the utilities of the outcomes;
and ω1, ω2 and ω3 are the decision weights.
As in Andersen et al. (2014), in order to calculate the log likelihood I use the logistic distribu-
tion g(.) of the difference of the expected utility of both lotteries divided by the contextual error
and the behavioral error µ . The contextual error is the difference of the highest and lowest utility
in the choice and normalizes the difference of the expected utility of both lotteries to lie between
0 and 1 for every choice. The behavioral error µ is the Fechner type error which assumes that
individuals might make mistakes when comparing the expected utilities of the lotteries. The log
likelihood per choice is:
lng(∆RDU) = ln exp(∆RDU)1+exp(∆RDU)
∆RDU = RDUB−RDUA(High−Low)·µ
(1.2)
The final log-likelihood is formed linking all observed risk choices and their likelihood.
lnL(r|x,w)RA =∑ lng(∆RDUi) · I(xi = 1)+ lng(−∆RDUi) · I(xi =−1) (1.3)
where I is an indicator function for choices B(xi = 1) and A(xi =−1) in the risk aversion tasks.
Once I determine the model that best fits the data, I estimate the individuals’ risk preferences,
the couples’ risk preferences and the differences between both, for all the couples and for real and
fake couples. In the individual estimation, decisions are clustered at the individual level. In the
couples’ estimation, decisions are clustered at the couple level. The methodology allows me to
explain all the individuals’ parameter estimates as a function of demographic variables like age,
gender, income, education and marital status.
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In the case of the time preferences, I pool individuals’ and couples’ answer to determine the
best model that fits the data. I compare different discounting functions and also consider the
RDU models from the previous analysis. I assume exponential discounting and different forms of
hyperbolic discounting: the Mazur discounting function, the Weibull discounting function and the
quasi-hyperbolic discounting function presented in equations (1.4), (1.5) and (1.6), respectively.
DM(t) =
1
(1+ r · t) (1.4)
DW (t) = exp(−r · t(1/s)) (1.5)
DQH(t) = 1 if t = 0
DQH(t) =
β
(1+δ )t if t > 0
(1.6)
The data shows quasi-hyperbolic behavior when β < 1 so that the discount rate is very high in
the first periods and then declines drastically and converges to δ . The quasi-hyperbolic discounting
function reduces to the exponential discounting when β = 1. The Weibull discounting function
shows decreasing discount rates over time for estimates of s > 1 and becomes the exponential
discounting when s = 1. The Mazur discount rate decreases over time for r > 0.
In the discounting decisions, individuals have to choose between receiving money in two dif-
ferent periods. In the model, the present value of the utility of money in the earliest period t is PVA
in equation (1.7), while the present value of the utility of money in the later period t + τ is PVB
in equation (1.8). Dt is the discount factor in period t. If we assume an exponential discounting
function, then Dt = 1/(1+δ )t and δ is the constant discount rate.
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PVA(t) = Dt ·U(Mt) (1.7)
PVB(t) = Dt+τ ·U(Mt+τ) (1.8)
The final log likelihood per choice is built using the logistic distribution of the difference PVB-
PVA divided by the behavioral error of the discounting choices µd , as in equation (1.9).
lng(∆PV ) = ln exp(∆PV )1+exp(∆PV )
∆PV = PVB−PVAµd
(1.9)
The log likelihood is formed linking all observed discounting choices and their likelihood.
lnL(δ |x,w)D =∑ lng(∆PVi) · I(xi = 1)+ lng(−∆PVi) · I(xi =−1) (1.10)
Finally, I create a vector that stacks both lnL(r|x,w)RA and lnL(δ |x,w)D and then I find the risk
and time preferences parameters that maximize the joint log-likelihood.
Once I determine the best model, I estimate the individuals’ and couples’ preferences. To
measure the difference between individuals and couples, I pool all their choices and add a dummy
variable couple that explain the difference in each parameter.
To estimate the spouses’ weight in the household risky decision, I extend on Andersen et al.
(2008) joint estimation. In a risky decision under EUT, the households expected utility of lottery
x=A, B is:
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EUH,x = ∑2i ρi ·EUxi
EUH,x = ∑2i ρi ·
[
p(Mx1) ·Ui(Mx1)+ p(Mx2) ·Ui(Mx2)
]
EUH,x = p(Mx1) ·UH,M
x




where ρi is the weight that each spouse i has in the decision and Ui() is the utility of each
spouse determined by the individual parameters. I measure the ratio ∆EUH that represents the
couple’s latent choice for outcome B.
The conditional log likelihood is built as before, where I is an indicator function for the couples’
choices A(x j = −1) and B(x j = 1) in the risk aversion tasks and J is the number of choices that
couples make.
lnL(r|x,w)RA,H =∑ lng(∆EUHj ) · I(x j = 1)+ lng(−∆EUHj ) · I(x j =−1) (1.12)
I build a vector that stacks lnL(r|x,w)RA,women, lnL(r|x,w)RA,men and lnL(r|x,w)RA,H and find
the utility parameter estimates for men and women, and the weights that maximize the joint log-
likelihood.
In order to estimate the relationship between the behavioral estimates and the adaptation mea-
sure, I only keep the observations of the married couples and add the variable water tank to look
at the correlation of this variable with each of the parameter estimates of the risk and time prefer-
ences. Since I do not know who takes the decision to buy a water tank, in the survey I ask married
couples whether the decision was taken by one of the spouses or together. If the decision is taken
as a couple, I would expect to see the theoretical relationships when I correlate the variable water
tank with the couples’ preferences.
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1.6 Experimental Procedures
The day of the experiments, the team of assistants and I welcomed participants and verified that
they had been invited. First, we identified the group of real couples and the group of fake couples.
During registration, I paired up the fake couples based on similarity of age and gender so that
couples were formed by a man and a woman if possible. Every individual received an id and every
couple received an id-couple. I divided the real and fake couples in two groups (A, B) that made
the individual and pair decisions in different order. In one side of the room, side A, I placed the real
couples and fake couples that make the couple decisions first. In the other side of the room, side B,
I placed the subjects that start with the individual decisions. Couples in side B were not seated next
to each other: a person from a different couple was seated in between them. Once all individuals
were seated, I read the informed consent. After the first round of risk and time preferences games,
participants took a short recess where we provided cookies and beverages.
In the second round, individuals in side A completed the tasks individually and couples were
seated apart from each other; individuals in side B completed the tasks with their respective cou-
ples. Once the experimental session was over, individuals completed a short survey. Real couples
completed a couple survey and an individual survey. Both spouses of the real couples fill out the
individual survey individually and separated from each other, and the couple survey together. Fake
couples just completed an individual survey. In the couple survey, real couples were asked, for
instance, how long they have been together, the number of members in the home, whether they





The final sample is comprised of 482 individuals. 24 individuals participated only in the indi-
vidual tasks mainly because we had sessions with an odd number of participants. There are 229
couples:124 are real couples and 105 are fake couples. Among the fake couples, 40 couples have
different gender, 64 couples are woman-woman couples and 1 couple is a man-man couple.
1.7.2 Risk Task Choices
In this section, I will describe the choices in the risk task of individuals and couples. Then, I follow
Wakker et al. (1994) to do a first analysis of the type of model that fits best the data, EUT or RDU.
The 30 choices used in the experiment are composed of 6 sets of 4 choices (the RDU choices)
and 6 additional choices or “fillers”. The RDU choices were designed by Wakker et al. (1994)
to distinguish between EUT and RDU choices. The fillers have lotteries with clearly different
expected values and thus, their goal is to motivate subjects to analyze the choices carefully. In all
the choices, lottery B is the risky one.
The individuals choose the risky lottery on average 16.62 times out of 30. The average does
not vary much by gender, age and marital status but varies by education level and income (rows
7 and 10 in column A of Table 1.1). “Age > p50” corresponds to individuals older than 44 years
old, which is the percentile 50 in the sample. “Income > p75” represents individuals with income
greater than the income range 150,000−250,000 colones, which is the percentile 75 in the sample.
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Individuals that have at least completed primary school choose less frequently the risky choices
than individuals that have not. Similarly, high income individuals select the risky choices less often
than individuals with lower income. Looking at the couples’ choices (row 2 in column A of Table
1.1), the difference between individuals’ and couples’ choices is not statistically significant. The
same occurs with the difference between real and fake couples (row 3). When I analyze separately
the sample with only the RDU choices and the sample with only the fillers, I find very similar
results between the complete sample and the RDU choices. In the case of the fillers, the sign of
the difference between the subsamples is the same in most of the variables, as shown in Table 1.1,
columns B and C.
Following the analysis of Wakker et al. (1994), I focus on the RDU choices arranged in 6 sets
of 4 choices and analyze the independence condition and the comonotonic independence condition
for a first examination of the EUT and RDU framework. In each set, there are four choices and in
each choice the probabilities of both lotteries are the same and do not change within a set. Each
lottery has two different prizes and one common prize. Within a set, this common prize is the only
one that changes. Take, for instance, the choices in the set in Table 1.2. In the first choice the com-
mon prize is 1000 colones, then it becomes 7000, 13000 and 19000 colones. The independence
condition of EUT implies that the preference should not change if a common prize changes. Thus,
within a set a violation of EUT occurs when the individual changes her preference. In each set,
there are two mutually comonotonic choices. Here, two choices are called mutually comonotonic
if the change in the common prize does not alter the ranking of the prizes within a lottery. Comono-
tonic independence holds when preferences are the same in the mutually comonotonic choices. A




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.2: One set of lotteries.
Choice Safe choice Risky choice
L1 L2 L3 R1 R2 R3
1 0.55 0.25 0.2 0.55 0.25 0.2
1,000 12,000 14,000 1,000 9,000 18,000
2 0.55 0.25 0.2 0.55 0.25 0.2
7,000 12,000 14,000 7,000 9,000 18,000
3 0.25 0.55 0.2 0.25 0.55 0.2
12,000 13,000 14,000 9,000 13,000 18,000
4 0.25 0.2 0.55 0.25 0.2 0.55
12,000 14,000 19,000 9,000 18,000 19,000
Violations to independence or comonotonic independence signal individuals’ behavior but peo-
ple can also make “errors”. Moreover, the lotteries in the RDU choices have similar expected
values and in some cases, individuals might be indifferent about the lotteries. The analysis ac-
knowledges the presence of these behavioral errors and assumes that they occur randomly across
the decisions.
First, I study whether there is evidence in favor of EUT or RDU. The null hypothesis is that
the data follows EUT. In each set like the one in Table 1.2, there is one test of comonotonic inde-
pendence and two tests of non-comonotonic independence. If we do not consider the possibility
of errors, under the null hypothesis there should be no violations of any type of independence.
However, if we do, the proportion of violations of comonotonic independence should the same as
the proportion of violations of non-comonotonic independence. Under the alternative hypothesis
that the data follows the RDU model, however, the latter is higher.
In my sample, there are 482 individuals that generate 8666 tests of independence: 2888 comono-
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tonic tests and 5778 non-comonotonic tests3. There were 2905 violations of independence4. Un-
der the null hypothesis, one third of the violations (969.3) should be violations of comonotonic
tests and two thirds (1936.7), of non-comonotonic tests. I find that 894 (30.8%) were violations
of comonotonic tests and 2011 (69.2%) were violations of non-comonotonic tests. These results
seem to favor RDU over EUT.
Using a similar analysis, I study the special cases of RDU: RDU with pessimism, RDU with
optimism, RDU with inverse-S shaped pwf and S shaped pwf. These cases prohibit violations of
comonotonic independence but also impose additional restrictions on the non-comonotonic tests
depending on the type of RDU. For instance, pessimistic individuals put more weight on the prob-
ability of the lowest prize. When the common prize changes from the lowest to the middle rank,
pessimistic individuals are more inclined to prefer the lottery whose lowest prize is now higher.
A change like that happens in the second and third choices of the set shown in Table 1.2. In the
second choice the common prize is the lowest prize in both lotteries and increases from 7000 to
13000 colones in the third choice. With such an increase, the common prize becomes the new
middle prize in both lotteries. In the third choice, the new lowest prize of the safe lottery is 12000
3With 482 individuals, there should be 482 · 3 · 6 = 8676 tests but I had 5 missing answers resulting in 10 fewer
tests.
4In Wakker et al. (1994), the authors ask the same 24 choices twice to test for consistency of answers. This
generates two types of violations of independence: weak and strong violations. A weak violation in an independence
test occurs when in a certain choice the individual selects a lottery consistently (selects the same lottery the two
times she is asked the same question) but in the adjacent question within a set changes her preference in one of the
opportunities. If 1 is a risky choice, 0 is a safe choice, 2 stands for consistently choosing the risky choice and 0, for
consistently choosing the safe choice, examples of weak violations are the pairs (0,1), (1,0), (1,2), (2,1). A strong
violation in an independence test occurs when the individual chooses consistently in two contiguous questions but
changes her preference. Examples of strong violations are the pairs (0,2) and (2,0). The authors find 6% of strong
violations and 41% of weak violations. In my study, I find 34% (2905/8666) of violations. Because there are two types
of violations and none of them correspond to the type of violation in my analysis, it is not possible to directly compare
the number of violations of Wakker et al. (1994) and the number of violations in my study. However, I can compare
the types that have a similar probability of violation if it were at random. When considering two choices, the chance
of weak violation in Wakker et al. (1994) is 44% (4 out of 9 possibilities) and the chance of violation in my study (2
out of 4) is 50%. Thus, it seems that the 34% of violations in my study is lower than the 41% of weak violations of in
the Wakker et al. (1994)’s sample.
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colones which is higher than the new lowest prize (9000 colones) of the risky lottery. Because the
new lowest prize is higher in the safe lottery, a change of preference from the safe to the risky lot-
tery is not expected in the case of a pessimistic individual. The converse applies for the optimistic
RDU individuals.
When the common prize changes from the middle to the highest rank, pessimistic individuals
prefer the lottery with the highest new middle prize. Such a change occurs in decisions three
and four in Table 1.2. In decision three the common prize is the middle prize 13000 colones
and it increases to 19000 colones. The new middle prize in the safe lottery is 14000 colones and
in the risky lottery is 18000 colones. Because the new middle prize is higher in the risky lottery,
pessimistic individuals are not expected to change their preference from the risky to the safe lottery.
The converse is true for the optimistic RDU individuals.
In the case of the inverse-S shaped probability weighters, they overweight the probability of
the extreme lottery outcomes. Thus, the restrictions for an inverse-S shaped pwf match those of an
RDU-pessimist when the common prize changes from the lowest to the middle rank, and match
those of an RDU-optimist when the common prize changes from the middle to the highest rank.
The opposite holds true for an S-shaped pwf.
Within each set of four lotteries like the one in Table 1.2, there are six types of possible vi-
olations of independence: from the safe to the risky lottery and from the risky to the safe one in
each of the three independence tests. From these six violations of independence, four correspond
to violations of RDU with pessimism (RDU with optimism, RDU with inverse-S shaped pwf or
RDU with S shaped pwf). Under the null hypothesis, two thirds of the violations are expected to
be violations of RDU with pessimism. The same logic applies to the other types of RDU.
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I find 1939 violations of RDU with pessimism, which correspond to two thirds of the violations.
There are 1860 violations of RDU with optimism that correspond to 64% of the total violations.
Regarding RDU with inverse S shape pwf, while I find 1750 (60%) violations, there are 2049
(71%) violations of RDU with S shaped pwf. So, the data seem to fit RDU with optimism and
inverse-S pwf rather than EUT. As expected, results are very similar when I only consider the
individuals that participated in the couples’ experiments.
I do the same type of analysis using the data of couples. There are 229 couples that generate
4120 tests5. I find 1405 violations of independence6. Under the null hypothesis, one third should
be violations of comonotonic tests and two thirds of non-comonotonic tests. There were 400
violations of comonotonic tests which represent 28.5% of the total violations, a lower proportion
than the case of the individuals. So, the data seems to fit the RDU model. For the special cases
of RDU, there are less than two thirds of the violations for RDU with optimism (64%) and I find
similar results for RDU with pessimism (65%) and RDU with inverse-S shaped pwf (57%). The
only special case that exceeds the two thirds condition is the RDU with S shaped pwf (72%). So,
all the RDU types except RDU with S shaped seem to be preferable than the EUT model.
The data allows another type of analysis where I compare the proportion of risky choices in
each decision across individuals. If the difference in the proportion of risky choices is statistical
significant, it provides evidence against independence. In the six sets of four choices, the common
prize increases eighteen times (6∗3). In the sample of individuals, I find eight statistically signifi-
cant differences. Of these, two (25%) correspond to comonotonic tests and this proportion is less
5I should have 4122 tests (229 ·6 ·3) but I ended up with less tests due to missing values.
6This is almost the same percentage as in the individuals. Thus, the sample of couples violates the independence



























































































































































































































































Table 1.4: Number of Statistically Significant Differences in the Proportion of Risky Choices.
Number of Differences Individuals Indiv. in couples† Couples
Total 8 7 5
In mutually comonotonic choices 2 1 1
Against RDU with optimism 2 2 2
Against RDU with pessimism 4 4 2
Against RDU with S shaped pwf 6 6 4
Against RDU with inverse-S shaped pwf 0 0 0
† Individuals that also participated in couples’ tasks.
than the one third dictated by the null hypothesis which indicates RDU behavior. Of the other six
statistically significant changes, four were evidence against RDU with pessimism (in favor of RDU
with optimism) and the other two show evidence against RDU with optimism (in favor of RDU
with pessimism). All the six significant changes were in line with RDU with inverse S shaped pwf
(against S-shaped pwf). So, the results of this analysis support once again RDU with inverse S
shaped pwf and RDU with optimism to a small degree. I find very similar results when I consider
only the choices of individuals that take decisions in pairs.
In the case of the couples’ answers, I find five statistically significant differences and one of
them is a comonotonic test. Under the null hypothesis of EUT, this proportion (20%) provides
some evidence for the RDU model. Two of the differences are against RDU with optimism and
the other two are against RDU with pessimism. All the changes are in line of RDU with inverse-S
shaped pwf and against the S shaped pwf. RDU with inverse-S shaped pwf seems to be the model
supported by the data.
In summary, in the descriptive analysis I do not find statistically significant differences between
the number of risky choices selected by individuals and couples and between the real and fake
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couples’ choices. More educated and higher income people choose less often the risky choices.
The analysis of the RDU choices shows that individuals are better described by the RDU model
rather than by EUT model, specifically the RDU model with inverse-S shaped pwf and RDU with
optimism to a small degree. Couples’ choices show similar results.
1.7.3 Discounting Task Choices
I use local polynomial regressions (LPR) and probit estimations for a descriptive exploration of
the discounting behavior and the effect of the treatments: the FED, the order in which horizons are
displayed and the order in which couples and individual decisions are presented to the participants.
The LPR estimates the conditional distribution of the later payment choices given the implied
annual interest rate (AIR). The relationship of both variables is expected to be positive. Figure 1.3
shows the LPR with the individual choices. The interception between the curve and the dashed
line at 50% of the later payment choices gives the median discount rate 163% for the individual
sample, as shown in Table 1.5. This is the level at which subjects jump to the choice B on average
and it does not take into account any correction for the curvature of the utility function.
Looking at the effect of the demographic variables, I do not find any difference in the fitted
lines by gender, income, age or marital status. However, education seems to be an important
source of heterogeneity in the sample. Individuals that have not completed primary school show
lower discount rates (99%) than the ones that did (168%). Looking at the different horizons, I find
that the discount rate seem to decrease the longer the horizon, as shown in Figure 1.4 and Table
1.5.
Figure 1.5 shows the graphs for the FED and no FED groups. Individuals that face no FED
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Table 1.5: Median Discount Rate for Different Subsamples.
Results are stated in percentages.
Variables Median 95% Conf. Interval
All individuals 163 134 166
Individual characteristics
women 160 138 165
men 144 134 164
married 158 143 167
not married 139 131 163
age >p50 150 136 161
age <p50 162 136 167
at least primary school 168 165 171
no primary school 99 68 112
at least high school 157 147 171
no high school 139 134 165
income >p75 158 145 169
income <p75 161 137 166
Time horizon
3,4,5 day horizon 185 168 196
7 day horizon 156 145 177
14 day horizon 159 152 171
30 day horizon 141 124 163
90 day horizon 139 128 151
180 day horizon 123 115 138
Treatment variables
couples’ decisions first 164 139 169
individual decisions first 143 130 156
30 day FED 175 171 179
no FED 122 116 132
ascendant order 129 121 140
descendant order 172 168 176
ascendant order if no FED 111 103 121
descendant order if no FED 147 128 153
ascendant order if 30 day FED 151 142 165


























0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
AIR(%)
95% CI Local polynomial regression

























0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
AIR(%)
3,4,5 days 7 days
14 days 30 days
90 days 180 days


























0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
AIR(%)
95% CI − no FED no FED
95% CI − 30 day FED 30 day FED
Figure 1.5: LPR by FED using Individuals’ Decisions
are more willing to choose later payments than the individuals with a 30 day FED, which indicates
lower discount rate levels for the no FED group.
Regarding the order in which horizons are presented, Figure 1.6 shows that the fraction of later
payment choices is higher when horizons are presented in an ascending order. This result holds
when I analyze the data by FED, as shown in Figure 1.7. With respect to the order in which couple
and individual decisions are taken, the order does not seem to affect the willingness to wait for a
later payment.
Next, I use probit estimations to explore the discounting behavior in the individual decisions
(Table 1.6). The dependent variable is the variable choice and the independent variables are so-
ciodemographic and treatment variables. Results are in line with the previous graphical analysis.
Calculating the marginal effects at the means, I find that a 30 day FED decreases the probability
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Figure 1.7: LPR by Order of Horizons and FED using Individuals’ Decisions
42
Table 1.6: Marginal Effects at Means Using Individual Decisions.
Variables dy/dx Std.Err. P>z 95% Conf. Interval
30 day FED -0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.08 -0.06
couples’ decisions first -0.01 0.01 0.08 -0.02 0.00
ascendant order 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.09
gender 0.01 0.01 0.31 -0.01 0.02
age >p50 0.00 0.01 0.74 -0.02 0.01
married -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.02
primary school -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.07 -0.04
income >p75 0.00 0.01 0.51 -0.02 0.01
ing order increases the odds of choosing the later payment by 8 percentage points. Presenting
the couples’ decisions first decreases the probability of choosing a later payment by 1 percentage
point. The effect of gender, age and income are not statistically significant but the effects of being
married and primary school are. Both, being married and having at least finished primary school
decrease the percentage of later payments by 3 and 6 percentage points, respectively.
The LPR with couples’ decisions shows no clear difference between real and fake couples’
decisions. The same happens when I compare individuals’ and couples’ decisions, as shown in
Figure 1.8. However, the median discount rate for couples is slightly higher than the one for
individuals. As in the case of the individual decisions, the average discount rate seems to be lower
the longer the horizon. The difference between no FED and 30 day FED almost disappear in the
couples’ decisions, as shown in Figure 1.9.
As in the case of individuals, the order in which the horizons are presented to the couples
does affect couples’ willingness to wait for a later payment. When horizons are presented in an
ascending order, couples show a higher fraction of later payment choices, which implies lower






























Figure 1.8: LPR using Individuals’ and Couples’ Decisions
Looking at the probit estimation, I find a statistically significant difference between individuals’
and couples’ choices. Couples seem to be less patient than individuals. There is no statistically
significant difference between real and fake couples’ choices. Facing a 30 day FED reduces the
probability of choosing a later payment by 2 percentage points, a smaller effect than in the case of
the individuals. Presenting the couples’ decisions first increases the probability of later payments
by 5 percentage points. Finally, displaying the horizons in an ascending order increases the chances
of choosing a later payment by 8 percentage points, a similar result than the one of individuals.
Figure 1.10 shows that couples’ decisions show more patience when they are completed before
the individual decisions but only for lower levels of the AIR. The difference in the median discount
rate in Table 1.7 supports this finding.
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Table 1.7: Couples’ Median Discount Rate by Subsamples.
Results are stated in percentages.
Variables Median 95% Conf. Interval
Individuals vs. couples
Individuals in couples 165 137 168
couples 170 168 172
real couple 163 137 169
fake couple 171 166 177
Time horizon
3,4,5 day horizon 191 159 243
7 day horizon 201 153 247
14 day horizon 157 150 177
30 day horizon 144 133 175
90 day horizon 156 130 171
180 day horizon 161 135 168
Treatment variables
couples’ decisions first 139 130 158
individual decisions first 177 173 181
30 day FED 171 167 176
no FED 161 137 168
ascendant order 142 129 153
descendant order 173 160 187
ascendant order if no FED 146 122 159
descendant order if no FED 181 175 186
ascendant order if 30 day FED 138 128 159
descendant order if 30 day FED 177 173 181
Table 1.8: Marginal Effects at Means using Couples’ Decisions.
Variables dy/dx Std. Err. P>z 95% Conf. Interval
couple -0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.02 0.00
real 0.01 0.01 0.29 -0.01 0.03
30 day FED -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.01
couples’ decisions first 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.07
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In this section I analyze the risk preferences of individuals and couples using only the risk tasks.
First, I determine the model that fits best the data. Then I analyze the risk preferences of the
different subsamples: individuals, couples, real and fake couples.
Selection of the Model
The most common model applied to estimate risk preferences is the EUT framework and the CRRA
utility function. I test the appropriateness of different models of EUT and RDU using all obser-
vations in the data, the choices from all individuals and couples. I consider two different utility
functions, the CRRA and the expo-power utility functions, and three different probability weight-
ing functions: the power pwf, the inverse-S shaped pwf and the Prelec pwf. In all the RDU models,
the t-test rejects the null hypothesis that the pwf parameters are equal to one. This means that the
hypothesis that individuals behave as in a EUT framework is rejected in all the models. The results
are presented in Table A.1.
To compare the different RDU models I use the Vuong and Clarke statistics for non-nested
models. The results of the Vuong and Clarke statistics appear in Table 1.9. I compare models by
pairs where the number on top is the value of the Vuong (part A) or Clarke statistic (part B) and
the number at the bottom is the p-value of the test. For instance, I compare model 1 (the RDU
model with CRRA utility and power pwf) with model 2 (RDU model with CRRA utility function
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and inverse-S pwf). If the value of the Vuong test is positive and statistically significant, model
1 is better than model 2. If the value of the Clarke statistic is greater than a fixed value7 and
statistically significant, model 1 is better than model 2. According to both statistics, the model that
best describes the data is the RDU framework with expo-power utility function and Prelec pwf.
The parameter estimates of Prelec pwf show that the sample in general overweighs the extreme
values but overweighs more the best outcomes, which show optimism behavior.
Individuals’ Decisions
First, I analyze the individual decisions. For comparison, I will present the results of the constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) model in the EUT framework which is the model assumed in most
studies of individual risk preferences. The CRRA coefficient for the individual decisions is 0.38.
In order to study the heterogeneity of the sample, I include one treatment variable and the socioe-
conomic variables. The treatment variable order is 1 when the individual completed the couples’
tasks first and 0, otherwise. The socioeconomic variables are: gender, age, primary school, mar-
ried, and income. Age is a binary variable that is 1 if individual is older than 44 years old, which
is the percentile 50 in the sample. Primary school is 1 if the individual has at least completed
primary school. Married is 1 if the individual is currently married. Income takes the value of 1
if the household income is greater than the income range 150,000− 250,000 colones (percentile
75). None of the variables are statistically significant. Looking at the total effects of these vari-
ables, order, age, primary school and income are statistically significant. While older individuals
show lower relative risk aversion, individuals that have at least finished primary school and high
7This value is half the total number of questions in the risk task for all the sample (10 662).
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Table 1.9: Clarke and Vuong Statistics for RDU Models.
Values below are p-values.
CRRA EP
Inverse-S Prelec2 Power Inverse-S Prelec2
A. Vuong Statistic
CRRA Power 6.378 -6.37 -8.023 -2.617 -8.185
0.000 1.000 1.000 0.996 1.000
CRRA Inverse-S -11.446 -6.988 -15.274 -14.268
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
CRRA Prelec2 5.258 1.402 -8.326
0.000 0.081 1.000





CRRA Power 11,797 9,557 10,222 10,126 10,132
0.000 1.000 1.000 0.996 1.000
CRRA Inverse-S 9,645 9,527 8,572 9,472
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
CRRA Prelec2 11,204 10,523 10,502
0.000 0.972 0.986





household income show higher levels of CRRA coefficient. Individuals that completed the couple
tasks first show higher levels of CRRA coefficient.
However, the EUT framework with CRRA utility function is not the suitable model for this
sample. The best model is the RDU model with expo-power utility function and Prelec pwf (A.2).
Because the sign of the parameter is negative, individuals show decreasing relative risk aversion
(DRRA). In Figure 1.11, I present the Prelec pwf function for the individual sample, using the
coefficients of the homogenous model. The graph on the left shows the pwf. It looks like an
inverse-S shaped pwf that is mostly concave. The graph on the right shows with an example the
effect of the pwf on the weights. In a lottery of four prizes (red) where each objective probability is
25%, the Prelec pwf transforms the weights so that individuals overweight the extreme outcomes
but overweight more the best outcomes. Thus, individuals can be described as optimistic.
I add covariates to analyze the heterogeneity of the sample. I find that the individuals that
completed the couple tasks first show more risk aversion. Women show less risk aversion than men
and older individuals show less risk aversion than younger individuals. People that have finished
primary school are more risk averse than people that have not and married people are more risk
averse than singles. Some variables also affect the parameter estimates of the pwf. Individuals that
completed the couple tasks first and that have at least finished primary school show more optimism.
On the contrary, older individuals show more pessimism than younger individuals. These results
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Figure 1.11: Prelec PWF and Decision Weights
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Individuals’ and Couples’ Decisions
Next, I analyze whether individual preferences are similar to couple preferences. To analyze the
hypothesis, I pool the decisions of all individuals and all couples and add the variable couple as a
covariate that takes the value of 1 if the decision was done by a couple. The coefficient represents
the effect of being in a couple. I also estimate this effect for real and fake couples, separately.
When comparing all individuals’ decisions with the couples’ decisions using the EUT model
with CRRA utility function, I find that the variable couple increases the relative risk aversion by
0.17 (from 0.34 to 0.51). However, in the best model the variable couple only has a statistically
significant effect in one of the pwf parameters (φ ) but the effect is very small as shown in Figure
1.12 and Table A.5 in Appendix A.
In order to look for differences between real and fake couples, I analyze the sample of real and
fake couples separately. As explained before, a real couple is a married couple or a couple that
cohabits. A fake couple is a group of two people paired up at random that take decisions together
in the session. The sample of real (fake) couples is composed of individual and couple decisions
of real (fake) couples.
In the EUT-CRRA model, real and fake couples show different results. While individuals’
and couples’ preferences of real couples are similar, they differ substantially in the case of fake
couples. However, in the best model the variable couple only affects one of the pwf parameters
in the sample of real couples and the effect is very small. The results are shown in Table A.6 in
Appendix A.
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Figure 1.12: Prelec PWF and Decision Weights for Individuals and Couples
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Table 1.10: Summary of Estimates by Model and Subsample.
Model Individuals Couples
All Real Fake All Real Fake
EUT
r 0.35 0.38 0.31 0.49 0.44 0.55
RDU
r 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.78 0.76 0.80
α -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 -0.24 -0.20 -0.29
η 0.61 0.64 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.60
φ 0.61 0.63 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57
the CRRA coefficient under the EUT framework is 0.35. In the best model, individuals show
DRRA and the Prelec pwf indicates that individuals are optimistic. I analyze the rest of the sub-
samples in the same manner. The results are shown in Table 1.10.
In summary, I do not find significant differences between individuals and couples in either the
fake couples or the real couples.
Bargaining Model
The fact that there is no statistically significant difference between individuals’ and real couples’
preferences in any of the models suggests that real couples’ preferences are a combination of the
spouses’ preferences. I analyze this possibility by eliciting the decision power within the household
under a EUT framework. Interestingly, I find that women are the ones that guide the decision in
situations under uncertainty with a decision weight of 0.92 (Table 1.11).
This result is in line with Carlsson et al. (2013) who also find that individuals and married
couples’ preferences are similar but they find that couples’ preferences are more similar to the
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Table 1.11: Bargaining Power within the Real Couples.
Parameter Point Estimate St. Error p-value 95% Conf. Interval
EUT with CRRA utility function
Log-Likelihoood: -7,230.41 Observations: 11,158
r women 0.50 0.12 0.00 0.26 0.75
r men 0.24 0.25 0.34 -0.25 0.74
weight women 0.92 0.13 0.00 0.66 1.19
µ 0.19 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.21
husbands’, rather than the wifes’ as in my case. This result also explains previous findings in
developing countries that show women in charge of the money related decisions (Collins, Morduch,
Rutherford, & Ruthven, 2009).
1.8.2 Joint Estimation: Time and Risk Preferences
In this section, I estimate the discount rate for individuals and couples. Risk preferences are also
estimated and serve as a robustness check of the previous results. First, I will establish the model
that describes best the data. Then I will analyze the parameters of the different subsamples.
Determination of the Model
In order to determine the best model for the data, I consider four different discounting functions:
the exponential, the Prelec, the Weibull and the Mazur. As in the previous analysis, I also apply the
EUT and the RDU framework. I use the CRRA utility function and two pwfs: the power and the
Prelec8. In any of the models, neither the quasi-hyperbolic nor the Weibull discounting function
8I discarded the inverse-s shaped pwf because in the analysis considering only the risk choices, the inverse-s shaped
pwf was always exceeded by the power or the Prelec-2 pwf. I also consider the expo-power utility function but the
models did not converge.
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show hyperbolic behavior. Moreover, both models show some evidence of the opposite behavior.
Since there is no theoretical framework that supports increasing discount rates over time, I discard
these models. The Mazur discounting function shows slightly decreasing discount rates. I compare
the Mazur discounting function with the exponential discounting function using the statistics for
non-nested models. The results are shown in Table 1.12.
In contrast to the analysis of risk preferences, in this case the Vuong and Clarke statistics show
slightly different results. Using the Vuong statistic, the best model is the exponential discounting
function with a CRRA utility function and the Prelec pwf. With the Clarke statistic, the best model
uses the power pwf instead. Both models show very similar results. However, the hit rate for the
Prelec model is higher than the one for the power model. I will present the results of both models
in Appendix and focus on the results of the Prelec in the explanations. It is important to remark
that the best model is under the RDU framework which supports the results of the analysis of risk
of the previous section.
Individuals’ Decisions
I start with the analysis of the individual decisions. The simplest model is the exponential dis-
counting function. When I assume a linear utility function, the discount rate is 382%. If I consider
the curvature of the utility function and assume a EUT- CRRA utility function, the discount rate
is 39%, far smaller than the discount rate with a linear utility function. The results of the estima-
tion of the different models with the sample of individuals are presented in Table A.7, Table A.8
and Table A.9 in Appendix A. Looking at the heterogeneity of the sample, only education has an
effect on the CRRA coefficient. More educated people are less risk averse. None of the treatment
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Table 1.12: Clarke and Vuong Statistics for Discounting Models.
A B C D E
Mazur Expon. Mazur Expon. Mazur
EUT RDU RDU RDU RDU
Prelec2 Prelec2 Power Power
A. Vuong Statistic
Exp. EUT 7.316 -14.947 -14.351 -14.630 -14.111
0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Mazur EUT -15.404 -14.892 -15.145 -14.701
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Exp. RDU Prelec2 10.142 3.715 5.155
0.000 0.000 0.000
Mazur RDU Prelec2 1.770 3.422
0.038 0.000
Exp. RDU Power 10.299
0.000
B. Clarke Statistic
Exp. EUT 28,828 21,104 24,807 21,455 23,187
0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Mazur EUT 24,641 22,219 23,583 22,551
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Exp. RDU Prelec2 30,864 22,891 26,120
0.000 1.000 1.000
Mazur RDU Prelec2 25,660 24,006
1.000 1.000
Exp. RDU Power 30,033
0.000
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variables have an effect on the CRRA coefficient or the discount rate.
The best model is the exponential discounting function using the RDU framework with CRRA
utility function and Prelec pwf. The value of δ is 29%, and the CRRA estimate is 0.8. The
parameter estimates of the pwf function are η = 0.42 and φ = 0.73 so that individuals are optimistic
which also confirms the results of the risk analysis. It is interesting to notice that the value of
the CRRA coefficient is higher than the value found in the analysis with only risk choices. A
possible explanation for this result is that the time preferences choices only contain information
on the curvature of the utility function or the aversion to variability. Thus, this characteristic of
the intertemporal choices affects the EUT-CRRA estimate in the joint estimation and pushes them
upwards. Figure 1.13 shows the pwf for the best model that is very similar in shape to the power
pwf.
Looking at the effect of socioeconomic and treatment variables in the best model, people that
have finished primary school show lower relative risk aversion and less optimism. Tanaka et al.
(2010) also finds that more educated individuals are less risk averse. The authors do not find
study the relationship with the pwf parameter estimates. These effects are opposite than the ones
found in the analysis with the risk tasks. I prefer the results with the joint estimation because risk
preferences have been estimated with more data. Age has a statistically significant effect on one of
the pwf parameter estimates: older people overweight extreme values more than younger people.
Neither the treatment nor the socioeconomic variables have a statistically significant effect on the
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Figure 1.13: Prelec PWF and Decision Weights in the Discounting Model
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Individuals’ and Couples’ Decisions
Following the risk analysis, I estimate the difference between all individuals and all couples us-
ing the variable couple. I distinguish between real and fake couples by estimating the difference
between individuals and couples in each group. Finally, I estimate the parameters for each sub-
sample.
Considering all individuals and couples choices, the variable couple in the exponential model
using the EUT framework and CRRA utility function increases the discount rate by 18% (from 43%
to 62%). The variable couple also reduces the CRRA coefficient by 0.04. This effect is statistically
significant but small. In the best model, couples have a higher discount rate than individuals by
14% (from 30% to 44%). The variable couple also reduces the CRRA coefficient and reduces one
of the pwf coefficients but the effects are very small. Results are shown in Table A.11 in Appendix
A.
Results for real and fake couples are presented in Table A.12 and Table A.13 in Appendix
A. I will focus only on the results of the best model. Real couples have a discount rate of 46%
that is 14% higher than the one of individuals. Real couples have a lower CRRA coefficient than
individuals but the effect is small, as is the effect on the pwf. I find similar results in the sample
of fake couples but in this case there is a more significant effect on the pwf. Fake couples seem to
be less optimistic that their respective individuals. This result is confirmed in the RDU model with
power pwf.
In Table 1.13, I present the estimates for every subsample. In general, we can see that there
is not much difference between the risk preferences of individuals and couples in the best model.
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Table 1.13: Summary of Estimates by Discounting Model and Subsample.
Model Individuals Couples
All Real Fake All Real Fake
Exponential-EUT
r 0.72 0.68 0.81 0.72 0.68 0.77
δ 0.46 0.53 0.31 0.56 0.66 0.44
Exponential-RDU
r 0.80 0.78 0.81 0.78 0.77 0.79
η 0.41 0.44 0.37 0.45 0.44 0.46
φ 0.73 0.74 0.71 0.64 0.65 0.63
δ 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.41 0.43 0.38
Couples show higher discount rates than individuals both in real and fake couples. These results
confirmed the findings in the descriptive analysis.
1.9 Analysis of Correlations
I analyze the correlations between each of the parameter estimates of risk and time preferences
and the investment in water tank in the structural model. I measure the correlations using the best
model of the joint estimation. As a robustness check, I measure the same correlations with the
second best model.
Only 20% of the real couples in the sample have a water tank. In the couple survey, I asked the
real couples that that have a water tank whether the decision was taken by the couple or by any of
the spouses. In 84% of the cases, the decision was taken by the couple and in 16% the decision was
taken by the head of household. Thus, I expect to find a stronger correlation between real couples’
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Figure 1.14: Prelec PWF and Decision Weights With and Without Tanks
The results using all the real couples’ choices are presented in Table 1.14. Real couples’ relative
risk aversion is the same for couples that have water tanks and couples that do not have water tanks.
However, real couples that have water tanks show less optimism (higher η) than real couples that
do not have water tanks as shown in Figure 1.14. Also, I find that real couples that are less
patient (higher δ ) are less prone to invest in water tanks. However, when I look at the correlation
between head of households preferences and water tank, I do not find any statistically significant
relationship as shown in Table 1.14. Neither find I a statistically significant correlation with the
other spouse’s preferences. As a robustness check, I use the exponential model with RDU power
pwf. I find the same results as shown in Table A.14 in Appendix A.
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Table 1.14: Correlation of Variable Water Tank with Parameter Estimates.
Parameter Variable Point Est. Std. Error p-value 95% Conf. Interval
A. Couples
Log-Likelihoood: -5,996.99 Observations: 9,593
r tank 0.013 0.054 0.805 -0.092 0.118
const 0.778 0.028 0.000 0.723 0.834
η tank 0.264 0.120 0.027 0.030 0.499
const 0.392 0.051 0.000 0.292 0.493
φ tank 0.184 0.177 0.297 -0.162 0.531
const 0.626 0.073 0.000 0.484 0.769
δ tank -0.306 0.151 0.043 -0.602 -0.009
const 0.479 0.106 0.000 0.271 0.687
µr const 0.121 0.008 0.000 0.105 0.138
µd const 2.961 0.886 0.001 1.225 4.697
B. Heads of household
Log-Likelihoood: -6117.90 Observations: 9,515
r tank -0.020 0.055 0.715 -0.128 0.087
const 0.749 0.037 0.000 0.677 0.821
η tank 0.228 0.156 0.145 -0.079 0.534
const 0.390 0.060 0.000 0.272 0.508
φ tank -0.015 0.198 0.939 -0.403 0.373
const 0.716 0.101 0.000 0.518 0.914
δ tank -0.194 0.197 0.325 -0.581 0.192
const 0.480 0.148 0.001 0.190 0.770
µr const 0.160 0.014 0.000 0.133 0.187
µd const 5.435 1.850 0.003 1.809 9.061
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1.10 Discussion of results
In this section, I will compare the results of the structural estimation with the findings of the
literature. Regarding the estimation of the risk preferences, the results with just the risk tasks and
the joint estimation show very similar results which demonstrate the robustness of the estimation
procedure. The best model for individuals and couples in the study site is an RDU model with
Prelec pwf. Applying the joint estimation, I find that the sample shows a CRRA coefficient of 0.8
(0.64 in the estimation with the risk tasks only). This means that people not only are averse to
the variability of final outcomes but also have an attitude towards probabilities. Specifically, the
parameters estimates show that both individuals and couples overweight the objective probability
of the best outcome. Using the risk tasks, I find that individuals overweight the extreme values
with a clear tendency to overweigh more the best outcome. In the joint estimation, the pwf is
more concave and the optimistic behavior is even stronger. This result is confirmed when I applied
the RDU model with power pwf. Moreover, more education reduces the risk aversion and the
optimism. The results differ from the ones found by Harrison et al. (2010) for Uganda, India and
Ethiopia in comparable estimations. The authors find a CRRA coefficient of 0.5 and a convex pwf
when assuming the Prelec pwf and a S-shaped pwf when assuming the Tversky-Kahneman pwf.
The shape of the Prelec pwf indicates that people underweigh the extreme values with a tendency
to overweigh more the worst outcomes. Tanaka et al. (2010) find a CRRA of 0.41 and 0.37 in
the north and south of China, respectively. Liu (2013) elicited risk preferences for individuals in
Vietnam and finds a CRRA coefficient of 0.52. Both studies use the same elicitation procedure and
a one parameter Prelec function. They find individuals overweigh the small probabilities, like an
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inverse-S shaped pwf, but there is no tendency towards optimism or pessimism. Their pwf does
have the flexibility to allow for that.
Using a pool estimation, I do not find a significant difference between individuals and couples
risk preferences. When I estimate the balance of power, I find that on average women carry the
decision of the household with a weight of 0.92. This result is in line with Carlsson et al. (2013)’s
results who finds that couples’ decisions are mostly a combination of the spouses decisions. It
is also in line with Abdellaoui, L’Haridon, and Paraschiv (2013). They differ from Bateman and
Munro (2005) who find that couples are more risk averse than individuals.
I use an exponential discounting model to describe the time preferences of individuals. I have
to emphasize the importance of correcting the estimate with the curvature of the utility function.
Without it, I find a discount rate of 382%, far higher than the 39% considering a EUT-CRRA
framework and the 29% with a RDU-Prelec pwf. I compare my discount rate estimate with the
results of studies that also consider the curvature of the utility function and the EUT framework.
The discount rate is similar to the 25%− 35% discount rate found by Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012) and to the 28% found by Coller et al. (2012) when they assume an exponential discounting
function. The subjects in both studies are american students. My discount rate is higher than
the 9% estimated by Andersen et al. (2014) for the Danish population. This is the first time this
methodology has been applied in a developing country and do not show much difference with other
results found in developed countries.
Contrary to much of the literature but consistent with studies (Andersen et al., 2014; Andreoni
& Sprenger, 2012; Laury, McInnes, & Swarthout, 2012) with better designs and structural models,
I find little evidence of hyperbolic discounting in the individuals and couples’ sample. This is in
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line with results of Carlsson et al. (2012) and contrary to Abdellaoui, L’Haridon, Paraschiv, et al.
(2013).
Using a pool estimation, I find significant differences between individuals’ and couples’ dis-
count rates, in both real and fake couples. Couples show discount rates that are 14% higher than
the ones of individuals. This result contradicts the findings of Carlsson et al. (2012) where the
joint choices are in between the spouses and the results of Abdellaoui, L’Haridon, Paraschiv, et al.
(2013) who find that couples are more patient.
Finally, I estimate the correlation between risk and time preferences and water tanks. Only Liu
(2013) analyzes the relationship between investment in adaptation and risk preferences parameters.
According to a survey undertaken in the site, the decision to buy a water tank is mostly made jointly
by married couples. The correlation between the married couples’ parameter estimates and water
tanks show the expected relationships. However, when I estimate the correlations with only the
heads of household’ preferences, I do not find any statistically significant correlation. I find similar
results using the next best model with power pwf. These results seem to suggest that adaptation
decisions made by married couples are better shaped by the couples’ preferences, as suggested by
Mazzocco (2004) for the case of savings.
I find a negative correlation between the married couples’ discount rates and the adaptation de-
cision, and no correlation between the married couples relative risk aversion coefficient and water
tanks. However, less optimistic married couples invest more in adaptation. Theory is ambigu-
ous about the impact of risk aversion on investment in adaptation. More risk averse subjects are
expected to invest in adaptation because they want to protect themselves against future climate
variability, but more risk averse individuals will invest less in new technologies because they are
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not certain about their efficacy (Koundouri et al., 2006). Theory does not take into account the
attitudes towards probabilities but we could infer that the same forces affect the relationship be-
tween pwf parameter estimates and investment in adaptation. My results show that these opposite
forces countervail each other in the case of risk aversion but the concerns regarding climate change
prevail when considering the attitudes towards probabilities.
1.11 Policy Implications
I have found that individuals in the rural communities in Guanacaste, Costa Rica, are optimistic
and impatient. The optimistic behavior affects the investment in adaptation to climate change.
For instance, consider the case where there are only two possible future scenarios with the same
probability of occurrence, one good where there is no much climate variability and the other where
climate shocks increase substantially. Using the parameter estimates, individuals allocate a weight
of 73% to the best scenario and a weight of 27% to the worst scenario. Thus, the probability of
the best scenario is overweight which dissuades people from investing in adaptation. Moreover,
my results reveal annual constant discount rates of individuals and couples that are very high. For
instance, a one dollar invested today requires a profit in 10 years of 16 dollars for individuals and 36
dollars for real couples. With such discount rates and optimism, private investment is discouraged
as I showed in my results, and policymakers will need to use different strategies to incentivize
it. When possible, policymakers could promote the use of technologies that show benefits in the
short run, even when no drastic weather changes occur. One example of such technologies are
resource-conserving technologies. If other type of products need to be adopted, then policymakers
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could enhance these products with prizes or raffles, like it has been applied in the case of saving
products (Filiz-Ozbay, Guryan, Hyndman, Kearney, & Ozbay, 2015).
Investments in adaptation that involve considerable amounts of money or goods shared by
groups are done by collective entities like households. In this study I analyze the case of private
water tanks that are mainly a household investment. This type of investment (floating houses,
water storages, solar panels) is best explained by the preferences of the married couple, rather the
preferences of the head of household. Thus, policies that want to encourage this type of investment
in adaptation should consider the characteristics of the couples, and not just the characteristics
of the individuals. Moreover, policymakers should target their messages and interventions to the
couple and not necessarily assume that the message that one of the spouses receives is shared with
the other spouse.
1.12 Conclusions
Private investment in adaptation to climate change constitutes a decision to spend money today in
return for uncertain payoffs in the future. Thus, time and risk preferences are important factors that
shape adaptation decisions. This study assesses the characteristics of these preferences for popula-
tions in rural and drought-prone areas of Costa Rica, and connects them to household investments
in water tanks.
My findings paint a gloomy picture: the population tends to be optimistic and exhibits large
discount rates, and both factors correlate significantly with a reduced likelihood to invest in adap-
tation measures. On the other hand, the couples’ (high) level of risk aversion does not appear to
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encourage adaptation investments. As a result, without governmental intervention many house-
holds are unlikely to make significant personal investments in climate change adaptation. This
further highlights the need for policymakers and researchers to design public policies and pro-
grams that encourage private adaptation investments, and it demonstrates that these policies need
to overcome substantial hurdles in the form of personal preferences in order to be effective.
The findings in this study give rise to a range of interesting avenues for continued research.
For instance, my results call into question the existence of present-bias among populations in
developing countries. Prior studies that find evidence for present bias base their conclusion on a
set of questions that could suggest the presence of this feature but that do not allow the elicitation
of discounting functions. More research (using adequate experimental and econometric designs)
is needed to answer this important question conclusively for developing countries.
In addition, the present study focuses on a type of adaptation investment (water tanks) that was
not only familiar to the population, but that households had chosen independently. The correlation
between preferences and adaptation decisions might differ for technologies that are introduced
externally and that have a less foreseeable impact.
Lastly, a common criticism of artefactual field experiments is that, even though they allow us to
obtain rich data to estimate parameter estimates, they do not put the subject in the real context for
which the preferences are estimated. In spite of that, I find intuitive correlations between (regularly
elicited) preferences and household adaptation investments. Nonetheless, in this context a framed
field experiment could provide tremendous additional insight into the mindset of individuals and
couples in view of climate change adaptation decisions.
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Chapter 2
Climate Change Adaptation through Resource-
Conserving Technologies
2.1 Introduction
The promotion of resource-conserving technologies to achieve development and environmental
objectives is widespread across nations and environmental domains. To mitigate climate change
and reduce pollution, environmental scientists and practitioners promote the adoption of energy-
efficient technologies (e.g., Field, Barros, Mach, and Mastrandrea (2014)). To mitigate water
scarcity and facilitate climate change adaptation, they promote the adoption of water-efficient
technologies (e.g., FAO (2014)). To mitigate agriculture’s effects on habitat loss, they promote
the adoption of land-efficient (“land sparing”) technologies (e.g., Balmford, Green, Scharlemann,
et al. (2005)). These technologies are also postulated to improve human welfare by reducing input
costs, particularly in low-income rural areas of developing countries.
Yet the arguments in favor of public programs to encourage the adoption of these resource-
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conserving technologies are based on incomplete models of human behavior. Proponents seem un-
aware that the impacts of adopting these technologies are theoretically ambiguous and empirically
unsupported. Performance, market and behavioral factors can increase or reduce the effect of the
resource conserving technologies on the resource consumption. For instance, the performance of
the technology may differ depending on the characteristics of the resource and the homes. Besides,
the technology reduces the marginal cost of the service which translates into a higher consumption
of the service and of other services that use the same resource. It also leads to a higher income
which in turn affects consumption of all normal goods; the literature calls the market phenomenon
the rebound effect (Chan & Gillingham, 2015). Moreover, individuals may stop using the technol-
ogy. Or they may have a preference for conservation per se and the technology discourages other
water conservation efforts.
Impact estimation of adoption is typically done by natural and physical scientists and engineers
using one of two approaches: (1) a prospective approach that combines assumptions about the per-
formance of the old technology, the performance of the new technology, and the behavior of the
adopters (e.g., EERE (2010)); and (2) a retrospective approach that either uses a non-experimental
before-after estimator (e.g., change in water use after adoption) or a with-without estimator (e.g.,
difference in water use between adopters and non-adopters). In rare cases, they may use a non-
experimental difference-in-difference estimator (e.g., Davis, Fuchs, and Gertler (2014)). Experi-
mental estimators are rare (e.g., Fowlie, Greenstone, and Wolfram (2015)).
A non-experimental before-after approach was applied by the engineers of the Costa Rican
Water Agency “Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados” (AyA) who tested the
effect of some water conserving technologies in the headquarters of the agency. The analysis that
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disregarded standard rules of experimental design and behavioral factors found reductions in water
consumption of around 50%. Based only on these results and because of the drought suffered
in several areas of the country, the Costa Rican government presented a bill early in 2016 aimed
at reducing taxes for water-conserving technologies (Arias, 2016). This is an example of how
engineer estimates currently determine water related public policies.
In this study, I contrast the prospective approach to an analysis based on a randomized con-
trolled trial design (RCT). I also address the “product adoption puzzle,” which posits that con-
sumers fail to adopt products with benefits that exceed their costs. This puzzle has been posed
in a variety of resource-conserving technology contexts, including energy-efficiency (“the energy
efficiency gap”) (Allcott & Greenstone, 2012; Gillingham & Palmer, 2014; Kallbekken, Sælen, &
Hermansen, 2013), water-efficiency (“the water efficiency gap”) (Golin, Cox, Brown, & Thomas,
2015), and improved cook stoves. Whether the lack of widespread adoption is really a puzzle is
the subject of much debate, often because of arguments over the technologies’ impacts, their costs,
and the preferences of consumers (including time and risk preferences and subjective beliefs).
I aim to accomplish two objectives: (1) to assess whether common engineering approaches to
estimating the effect of water-efficient technology adoption are accurate; and (2) to assess whether
there is a “water efficiency gap or paradox,” whereby the subjective marginal benefits from adop-
tion exceed the subjective marginal costs by a large margin, but consumers nevertheless fail to
adopt the technologies. In a drought-prone area of Central America where residents have not
adopted water-efficient technologies, I ran an RCT to test the impact of water-efficient technology
adoption on household water use. I also explore the mechanisms through which observed impacts
differ from engineering predictions and conduct cost-benefit analyses using the experimental esti-
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mator of impact, experimentally elicited measures of time and risk preferences, and detailed field
and survey data.
I find an intent-to-treat effect of 2.69 m3 (10.76%), much higher than a similar RCT done in
the country. Even though a bonus payment discourages dis-adoption, I still find a small percentage
of people that uninstall the technology. Measuring the technology impact for the households that
kept the technology does not have a statistically significant effect in the experimental estimate.
There is an important difference between my experimental estimate and the engineering estimate,
calculated using the realized installation rates and the actual water flows with the old and new
technologies on the field. The fact that some people reported to take more time for showering,
cooking and washing hands and to dislike the flow, leads me to believe that they had a hard time
to adjust to the new flow because of habits or because some activities might need a fixed amount
of water (cooking, for example). This seems to be the main reason to explain the difference in the
estimates, but further research is needed.
The private cost-benefit analysis shows that the technology recovers its costs three years after
installation, even considering the individuals subjective discount rates. The comparison between
the disutility of buying or not buying the technology indicates the preference for the technology,
even considering beliefs about prices and the effectiveness of the technology.
This chapter is organized as followed. In the next section, I explain the theoretical reasons
behind the differences between the standard engineering estimate of water conserving technologies
and the experimental estimate. In the third section, I describe the design of the study. In the fourth
section, I present the results and in the fifth section, I conclude.
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2.2 Reasons for Divergence between Engineering and Experi-
mental Estimates
For resource-conserving technologies, there are a variety of reasons why engineering impact esti-
mates may differ from experimental estimates. I group these reasons into: (1) behavioral reasons,
which emphasize deviations from the behavioral assumptions implicitly made by engineers; and
(2) design reasons, which emphasize deviations from the assumptions made by experimentalists.
2.2.1 Behavioral Reasons
Engineering estimates typically assume that humans do not change their behaviors post-adoption
(e.g., while washing dishes, adopters continue to run the water for the same amount of time as
before adoption) and that they use new technologies under similar conditions to those observed
in the laboratory settings used to rate the technologies’ performance. These assumptions may be
violated in practice.
1. Performance ratings: The performance ratings of resource-conserving technologies are of-
ten generated under carefully controlled laboratory conditions, for appropriate reasons. For
example, in the United States and Canada, the performance standards of plumbing supply
fittings are tested in accordance with procedures set out by the American Society of Me-
chanical Engineers (ASME A112.18.1/CSA B125.1). The maximum flow rate is the highest
value obtained through testing at three water pressures (20, 45 and 80 PSI). Engineers typ-
ically assume that the maximum flow rate measured under laboratory conditions is a good
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approximation for the performance standards observed in the field under both the status quo
and new technologies. But under naturally-occurring circumstances, three variables can af-
fect field performance: (1) water pressure in the home; (2) how far the residents open the
spigots (i.e., do they turn the faucet all the way open or only a fraction?); and (3) the de-
gree to which mineral and other deposits attach to the technologies. Variations in these field
conditions can lead the engineering estimate to be greater than or less than the experimental
estimate. To assess this explanation for a divergence between engineering and experimental
estimates, I calculate an engineering estimate based on the actual change in flow between
old and new technologies in a sample of households from the communities with the spigots
open all the way and with the spigots opened “the way [the residents] normally open it.”
2. Installation success: Engineers typically assume 100% success in swapping old technol-
ogy for new technology. If, for example, the average home in the target population has one
shower, one toilet, three sinks, and one outdoor spigot, the engineering approach typically as-
sumes that one can replace the old technology with a new technology on each water source.
But it often turns out, particularly in older homes, that the newer technologies cannot be
installed without extensive changes to the home. In these homes, full adoption of the tech-
nologies is not feasible. Thus the engineering estimate can overestimate the post-adoption
reduction in water use. To assess this explanation for a divergence between engineering and
experimental estimates, I calculate engineering estimates that are based on a 100% installa-
tion success rate and the realized one.
3. Dis-adoption: There is a growing recognition in the technology adoption literature that dis-
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adoption is a problem (Hanna, Duflo, & Greenstone, 2016). For example, studies have found
that one in four or five adopters of efficient cook stoves dis-adopt the technology within
one year. Engineers, however, typically assume that 100% of adopters continue to use the
technology well after adoption. Thus the engineering approach can overestimate the post-
adoption reduction in resource use. To assess this explanation for a divergence between
engineering and experimental estimates, I conduct an audit of dis-adoption in all treated
households about four months after treatment assignment. Should dis-adoption be an im-
portant issue phenomenon, I will estimate a local average treatment effect for the complier
population. Moreover, to reduce the likelihood of dis-adoption, I randomized a performance
bonus that was conditional on maintaining the technology until a random audit was per-
formed four to six months after installation. If the bonus is effective at eliminating most
dis-adoption, I can re-analyze the data using only the bonus treatment group (acknowledg-
ing that the statistical power will be lower).
4. Conventional rebound (take-back) effect: Resource-conserving technologies lower the ef-
fective price of consuming the services that the resources provide, thus inducing a greater
quantity demanded of the services, and thus the resource (Chan & Gillingham, 2015). En-
gineering estimates typically ignore this effect, and thus can overestimate the post-adoption
reduction in resource use. Measuring rebound effects is difficult without detailed behavioral
data within the household and without an ability to control for changes in other attributes of
the resource-using experience that the new more efficient technology may have changed.
5. Changes in attributes unrelated to efficiency: It is typically difficult to create technology
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that only improves resource use efficiency without changing any other attributes of the use
experience (Gillingham & Palmer, 2014). Changes in water flow, for example, may change
the “feel” of the water and thus the use experience. Engineering estimates typically ignore
these changes, and thus can overestimate or underestimate the post-adoption reduction in
resource use. As an indirect means of assessing this explanation for a divergence between
engineering and experimental estimates, I use survey questions that ask treated households
what they like and dislike about the new technologies and how, if at all, they changed their
behaviors post-treatment assignment.
6. Unconventional rebound (resource-dampening) effect: If pro-social preferences induce re-
source conservation (e.g., via altruism, conformity to social norms, or conditional cooper-
ation), then resource-conserving technologies lower the effective price of expressing pro-
social preferences, thus inducing a greater quantity of conservation “consumed” which
translates into lower resource consumption. This effect is the opposite of the conventional
rebound effect. In other words, once I allow utility to be gained from conservation activities,
then a countervailing effect to the rebound effect exists. Measuring this effect is difficult.
Instead I use survey data collected in 2013 in the same communities (two years before the
experiment) to ascertain whether households were taking conservation actions prior to treat-
ment assignment. If conservation actions were rare, the unconventional rebound effect is
unlikely to be an important explanation for a divergence between engineering and experi-
mental impact estimates.
7. Moral licensing effect: If household members’ identities are linked to resource conservation
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actions (e.g., “I am a good person who contributes to conserving collective resources”), the
adoption of resource-conserving technologies may create licensing effects, whereby adopters
feel they can increase their resource use because they have confirmed their sense of iden-
tity through adoption of the more efficient technology (Miller & Effron, 2010; Tiefenbeck,
Staake, Roth, & Sachs, 2013). Although the mechanism for moral licensing differs from
the mechanism of the rebound effect, the direction of its effect on resource use is similar: it
makes the engineering approach overestimate the technologies’ effect on resource use. Like
with the attempt to measure the unconventional rebound effect, I use survey data collected
in 2013 to ascertain whether households were taking conservation actions prior to treatment
assignment. If such conservation were rare, the moral licensing effect is unlikely to be an
important explanation for a divergence between engineering and experimental impact esti-
mates.
8. Priming (salience) effect: Most resource-conserving technologies are visible whenever the
resource is being used. If the efficiency attribute of the technology is a salient attribute to
the consumers (e.g., the technology was adopted because it uses resources more efficiently),
a visible technology will serve as a reminder to the user about the importance of resource
conservation (for both private and social reasons). This form of priming may lead to other
behavioral conservation actions unrelated to the technology (an alternative causal path from
technology adoption to water use). Engineering approaches do not include such actions, and
thus can underestimate the post-adoption reduction in resource use.
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2.2.2 Design Reasons
1. Engineers estimate a different estimand: Engineering calculations implicitly assume they
are measuring the expected effect of technology adoption for a randomly selected household
from the entire population of targeted water users, also known as the average treatment effect
(ATE). In other words, engineers implicitly assume a regulation or standard that requires
everyone to adopt the technology. But RCTs cannot typically force households to adopt a
technology. They can thus only measure treatment effects on voluntary adopters (compliers),
and the composition of this subgroup may vary depending on the form of the treatment.
I take several actions to ensure compatibility between the engineering estimator and the
experimental estimator: (a) I offer the technology for free to ensure a large complier group;
(b) I only randomize treatment among the group of compliers (i.e., I exclude Never Takers
from the treatment assignment process; no Always Takers exist because the experimenters
control access to the technology); and (c) I calculate the engineering estimate using data
from a sample of households that are willing to adopt the technology when offered for free.
2. Violations of excludability in the experiment: All RCTs impose an excludability assumption
(exclusion restriction): the only relevant causal agent is the receipt of treatment. One poten-
tial violation of excludability comes from the packaging of water-efficient technology with
conservation messages: the technologies are specifically marketed as ways to reduce water
use, which has private and social benefits. Thus in many studies of resource-conserving
technologies, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of technology adoption from the effect of
the resource conservation marketing. I eliminate this exclusion violation by ensuring that all
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households receive the same marketing information about the technology and the benefits of
reducing water use, prior to randomization of the technology. Note, however, that the prim-
ing effect of the technology described above may be strengthened in an experimental design
because the way in which households obtained the technology was unusual (randomization
of free technology by a research group collaborating with your community water associa-
tion). This violation implies that the experimental estimator is biased toward finding a larger
reduction in water use than would be found in a naturally-occurring, non-experimental tech-
nology adoption program.
3. Interference among units in the experiment (Stable Unit Treatment Value violations): If
treated households discuss or show the technology to their untreated neighbors, the control
group may try to acquire the technology on their own and thus may no longer represent the
counterfactual water use of the treated group. Because the technologies are only available
through the experimenters (they are not sold in regional stores), interference of this form
is very unlikely. However, people could get a more efficient technology than their current
appliances (for example, people that shower without a shower head could get one). To
address these concerns, I sampled four untreated households at random five months after
treatment assignment in each of the nine communities to inquire whether they had changed
their water delivery technology since treatment assignment and, if so, how. A few homes
replaced a broken faucet or pipe, but none of them adopted water efficient technologies.
4. Sampling variability: The engineering and experimental estimates may differ or may be
similar simply by chance. To guard against Type 1 and Type 2 errors, I conduct a power
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analysis with the Type 1 error rate set at 5% and the Type 2 error rate set at 20% (see Section
2.3) to determine the experimental sample size. When I report the results, I also report
confidence intervals to better characterize the degree of uncertainty about the difference
between the engineering and experimental estimates.
2.3 Design
2.3.1 Study Site
The study takes place in the western provinces of Guanacaste and Puntarenas, Costa Rica. The
experiment is part of a large Canadian government-funded research project on climate change
adaptation and water scarcity in Central America.
Most communities (85%) in the provinces obtain water from underground sources, which is
pumped to homes by a community system of pipes. In around 50% of the communities, water
is managed by the AyA, while the rest of communities manage their own water systems through
community associations called ASADAS. As part of the climate adaptation project, 82 communi-
ties of this area were randomly chosen, using the criteria explained in Section 1.3. From this set
of 82 communities, I selected communities who met the following conditions: (1) ASADAs use
water meters, (2) ASADAs apply variable rate pricing (so households save money if they reduce
water use), (3) ASADAs have monthly water records of households dating back to 2012, and (4)
ASADAs were interested in collaborating with the team to install water-efficient technology in a
randomly chosen subset of their customers. Ten communities were the first ones to answer to my
request and agree to share their data after several attempts. I chose randomly nine of them to meet
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the sample size requirements (see Section 2.3.3).
2.3.2 Treatments
Based on conversations with water engineers in Costa Rica, I offer two water efficient technologies:
(1) 1.5 gpm (gallon per minute) shower heads; and (2) 1 gpm faucet aerators. Dishwashers are
absent in the study region. Almost all homes have toilets and manual washing machines, but
I excluded these technologies from the study because no engineer believed that they were cost-
effective ways to reducing water use in the region (for either private or social benefits). None of
the selected water conserving technologies is available in hardware stores in rural Central America.
They are not even common in urban areas of Costa Rica, including Guanacaste’s regional capital
of Liberia. I found two retail stores (no wholesale) selling limited amounts of shower heads in San
Jose, the capital of Costa Rica, which is at least five hours away from the study communities. No
home surveyed in the communities had such technologies prior to the experiment.
The experiment has three treatment arms:
1. Control Group: A control group of residents who expressed interest in installing the tech-
nologies when the technology and installation was free to the resident, but who did not
receive the technology.
2. No Bonus Group: A treatment group of residents who expressed interest in installing the
technologies when the technology and installation was free to the resident, and who received
the technology.
3. Bonus Group: A treatment group of residents who expressed interest in installing the tech-
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nologies when the technology and installation was free to the resident, who received the
technology, and who were also offered (after they agreed to install the technology) a per-
formance bonus of USD 20 if, when the team returned unannounced between four and six
months later, they still had all of the technologies installed. A proportional bonus was paid
if some but not all of technologies were still installed.
The main unit of analysis is the household. I cannot use the home as the unit of analysis
because only five out of the nine communities keep home IDs in their water consumption records.
However, results between both estimation strategies should only differ if I have several movers in
the sample. I calculate the number of movers and compare the estimate using the home and the
household as the treated unit in the five communities. I expect results with both strategies to be
similar since people are mostly owners and do not move frequently.
2.3.3 Power Analysis
Engineers in the focus groups estimated that water would decrease by somewhere between 20%
and 35%. Because of the strong beliefs among engineers that the treatment should reduce average
water consumption, I developed a power analysis that could detect a policy-relevant treatment ef-
fect of a 6% reduction (i.e., test of the null of zero average effect). Before the field work started,
I collected consumption data from January 2013 to March 2014, two months prior to treatment
assignment. The objective was to take advantage of the intertemporal correlation in water con-
sumption to calculate the required sample size, and to explain part of the post-treatment water use
variance which will allow us to reduce the sample size. The inter-year correlation between 2013
and 2014 average water use was well over 0.70. I set the Type 1 error rate at 5% and the power at
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80%. The sample size of the treatment group was designed to be twice as large as the control group
because I would split the treatment group into Bonus and No Bonus groups. Based on the mean
(22.5) and standard deviation (13.9) from May through October 2014 and the inter-year correlation
between 2013 and 2014 use during the same months (I use 0.70 to be conservative), I estimated a
sample size of 752 households in the treatment group and 376 households in the control group.
For the test of whether the bonus payment affected dis-adoption rates, I had no guidance from
previous studies. Expert opinion from engineers in the capital and the ASADA committees sug-
gested fewer than 15% of the sample would dis-adopt in the first six months. I undertook a power
calculation with a moderate 25% dis-adoption rate and a difference in proportions of 5% between
the Bonus and No Bonus groups. With these parameters and Type 1 error rate set at 5% and Type
2 error rate set at 20%, I obtained a sample size of around 362 households in each treatment arm,
which is smaller than the 376 estimated group size derived in previous paragraph. Thus I use the
larger sample sizes as my guide.
2.3.4 Experimental Design
In my nine communities, there were 2,246 billed customers in March 2015. Using pre-treatment
billing data, I eliminated any households that had zero consumption for the period December 2014
through March 2015. In April 2015, part of the field team went to each community to confirm
plans for treatment assignment in the subsequent months. In this visit, they created community
maps with the location of each home. They also went to each household with the ASADA plumber
to confirm that the final sample did not include commercial establishments or households that
shared a meter. As a way to ensure measurement fidelity, the team placed identification number
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labels on every water meter in the community that matched my database. Based on billing data
and the field visit, I eliminated 345 customers.
The survey team comprised four Costa Rican interviewers with bachelors’ degrees and survey
experience who were trained to implement the randomization protocol. Interviews were conducted
using a tablet. Each interviewer was accompanied by a plumber to form four installation teams.
Using the community maps, I divided the community into four equally populated sectors and
assigned each team to one of them. If a household did not answer the first time, the team visited it
a second time the next day.
Of the 1901 households on the target list, the team interviewed 1346 heads of households.
Each team interviewer used a standard ethical protocol. They read a short script containing 1)
information about recent and future weather changes in the region, 2) advocating the need to save
water, 3) a description and presentation of the technology with a video, and 4) the offer to install the
water-efficient technologies for free in some of the homes. The script is presented in Appendix B.
Of these 1346 households, 1310 agreed to have the technologies installed should they be selected
to receive the technologies. The interviewers randomized the treatment arms across these 1310
households. Note two key features of the design: (1) I only randomized households into one of
the three treatment arms if a head of household indicates he or she is interested in accepting the
installed technology for free; and (2) all households received the same marketing script, thereby
ensuring any treatment effect I detect is from the technology rather than from the information on
water conservation.
Randomization was done by the resident putting her hand inside an opaque bag with three
colored chips inside (blue, red and white). Each chip assigned the resident to one of the three
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treatment groups. Since I did not know the number of people willing to accept installation of the
technology, in each community every team received a bag of chips in the amount of 50% of the
number of homes per sector. Once teams were done with the initial bag of chips, I gave them
chips in the amount of 50% of the available households. When there were fewer than 9 available
households in the sector, the team receives only 3 chips per load. Thus, randomization was done
within community and team.
This design helps to increase power and ensure roughly equal numbers of households assigned
to each treatment arm: 440 households assigned to the control condition, 432 households assigned
to the technology treatment with no performance bonus, and 438 assigned to the technology treat-
ment with a performance bonus. After the installation, old technologies were taken away in order
to avoid dis-adoption and re-installation of the old technology. In the 870 households selected for
technology installation, the plumber was able to install at least one technology fixture in all but six
households (99+% success). I retain these six households in the analysis. The number of each type
of technology installed appears in Table A.15. Of the 1310 households randomized to treatment,
395 were assigned to treatment in May 2015 and 915 were assigned to treatment in June 2015. The
post-treatment period of analysis is June-September 2015 for the first group and July-September
2015 for the second group.
To provide indirect evidence that the randomization protocol was followed by the field team,
I examine whether treatment assignment predicts water use in the same period in 2014 (see Table
2.3). It does not. The average pre-treatment monthly water use in both treated and untreated groups
was about 23.65 m3.
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2.3.5 Engineering Estimate
Conversations with engineers in the capital city, who based their estimates on rated technology
performance and their experience studying urban and semi-urban residential water use, lead to a
range of estimates of the water use reduction from technology adoption of between 20% and 35%,
with an informal consensus around 25%. However, I calculate my own engineering estimates
and compare it to the experimental estimate. I mainly consider two engineering estimates. To
construct both estimates I include the proportion of water use that came from different exit points
in rural homes of the study area. The first engineering estimate (first column in Table 2.1) is
calculated using the assumptions that I believe are usually considered by engineers, the ones under
ideal conditions. That is I assume the water flow of the new technologies that is described in
the package (1.5 gpm for shower head and 1gpm for faucet aerator); the water flow of the old
technologies when faucet is opened all the way as in laboratory studies; and that the team installs
all the technologies in each house. The second engineering estimate (6th column in Table 2.1)
is closely adjusted to the study area. It is calculated using the actual flow of the old and new
technologies on the field measured by letting individuals open the faucet as for the typical daily
use, and the realized installation rate of shower heads and aerators during the experiment. With
respect to the installation rate, note that the team could not install all the technology fixtures in
all the houses, either because there was no faucet, the plumbing could not be adapted to fit the
technology or the head of household did not allow us to replace it. The first engineering estimate is
24.1%. The second estimate is 20.3%. In Table 2.1 I also include the standard errors and estimates
constructed using different combinations of the assumptions for completeness.
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Table 2.1: Engineering Estimates under Different Flow and Installation Rate Assumptions.
Engineering estimates of water reduction between old and new technology usage, depending on assumed
water flows and installation rates (that is, what share of new technologies could be installed in each house-
hold).
100% installation rate Realized installation rate
Label flow? Maximum† Usual‡ Label flow? Maximum† Usual‡
Mean 24.09% 33.43% 26.69% 18.23% 25.57% 20.34%
Standard Error 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
? Old technology flow: faucet is opened all the way; new technology flow: based on product label.
† Old and new technology flow: faucet is opened all the way.
‡ Old and new technology flow: faucet is opened as for typical daily use.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Dis-adoption
All the results are calculated using the statistical software package Stata. Of the 870 treated homes,
I audited 748 four months after the installation: 82% of the No Bonus group and 89% of the Bonus
group. The attrition group is mainly composed of empty homes (67.2%), absent heads of household
(11.5%) and rejections (5.7%).
Households can uninstall all the technologies or some of them. If I consider complete dis-
adoption, I found that 6.5% of the households without bonus and 3.1% of the households with
bonus uninstalled all the technologies. These percentages differ when I extend the definition of
dis-adoption and include partial dis-adoption: 16.9% for households without bonus and 8.2% for
households with bonus. Under both definitions, the bonus seems to reduce the willingness to dis-
adopt. To further analyze the decision to dis-adopt, I apply a probit estimation to explain complete-
partial and complete dis-adoption in Table 2.2. The explanatory variables are: pre-treatment water
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consumption; technology flow that indicates whether the head of household likes the flow of the
technologies installed in the home; technology appearance that stands for whether the head of
household prefers how the new technologies look like; secondary school equals one if the head
of household has at least finished secondary education; home owner equals one if the head of the
household owns the house; participant in ASADA meetings is equal to one if any member of the
family participated in any of the last two ASADA sessions, and bonus that is equal to one if the
household received a bonus. The results show that people that like the flow of the new technologies
are less likely to dis-adopt them. Having received a bonus and being a home owner also reduce the
likelihood of partial-complete and complete dis-adoption. Other variables that show statistically
significant effect for either of the definitions of dis-adoption are pre-treatment water consumption
and secondary school.
2.4.2 Water Use Impacts: Intent-To-Treat Estimate (ITT)
Table 2.3 presents the engineering and experimental estimates of the effect of the technology adop-
tion on the average monthly water consumption of households interested in the technology. I ig-
nore for now dis-adoption and calculate the intent-to-treat effect (ITT). The post-treatment period
runs from June through September 2015. I have complete post-treatment data for 1294 house-
holds (98.8% of the sample). The control group consumed on average 25.03 m3 of water per
month (standard deviation= 14.80). The engineering estimates are 6.03 m3 (24.09%) and 5.09 m3
(20.34%).
I estimate the treatment effect on average monthly water consumption using an OLS regres-
sion estimator with robust standard errors since the Breusch-Pagan-Cook-Weisberg test implies
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Table 2.2: Average Marginal Effects of Impact on Partial-Complete and Complete Dis-adoption
of Technologies.
Partial-Complete Complete
Technology flow -0.191 -0.083
(0.023)*** (0.017)***
Technology appearance -0.038 0.009
(0.029) (-0.018)
Pre-treatment water consumption (March 2015) 0.001 0.000
(0.001)*** (0.00)
Secondary school -0.019 -0.052
(0.026) (0.024)**
Home owner -0.076 -0.038
(0.032)** (0.022)*




Community Dummy Variables Yes Yes
Interviewer Dummy Variables Yes Yes


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































evidence of heteroskedasticity (chi-square statistic = 5.06). The covariate-adjusted estimator uses
dummy variables for the nine communities and for the interviewers, and monthly pre-treatment
water consumption from February to April 2015 (column 5) to explain the outcome variable and
thus to reduce the variance of the estimator. I lose 16 observations from the experimental sample
because of attrition (1.2%) but the probability of missing is not related to the treatment or other
pre-treatment explanatory variables so that I consider the missing observations random. The ITT
estimation yields a point estimate of -2.69 m3, with a 95% confidence interval of -3.55 m3, -1.84
m3; in percentage terms, a point estimate of 10.8% and a 95% confidence interval of -14.18%,
-7.35%. Technologies reduce monthly water consumption of people that were interested in the
technologies by 10.8%. For comparison with impacts of resource-conserving technologies in other
study sites or domains (e.g., energy), the estimated effect size is 0.18. There is no detectable differ-
ence between the treatment effects of the Bonus and the No Bonus groups. The No Bonus group
experienced an estimated reduction of 2.79 m3 and the Bonus group experienced an estimated
reduction of 2.60 m3.
As mentioned before, the unit of the analysis is the household. I compare the results using the
household as the unit of analysis with the ones using the home as the unit of analysis focusing on
the data of the five communities that keep a home ID (Table A.16 in Appendix A). I obtain similar
results in both analyses mainly because there is not that much rotation: less than 2% of households
share the same home over time. Point estimates are higher than the main estimation but within the
95% confidence interval, so not statistically different.
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2.4.3 Water Use Impacts: Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE)
I can reject the null hypothesis that the ITT is statistically different from zero and different from the
lowest engineering estimate. Hence, the difference between the lowest engineering estimate and
the ITT might come from any of the sources listed in the theoretical section. Consider dis-adoption.
I can approximate the effect of dis-adoption by using the decision to keep the technologies instead
of the assignment to treatment as the treatment variable. As in Section 2.4.1, I consider two defi-
nitions of keeping the technologies: (i) keeping all of them or (ii) keeping at least one. However,
the randomization no longer assures that the new treatment variable is exogenous. Even though
treatment and control groups are similar in terms of the observable variables, there could be some
differences in unobservable variables. Moreover, I only have information about dis-adoption for
86% of the treated group. Thus, I need to instrument the new treatment variable and estimate a
local average treatment effect (LATE) for the set of the complier population. I use two instruments:
the treatment assignment variable and the bonus variable. To deal with the missing observations,
I follow two procedures: (i) I reweight the data using the predicted probability of missing (I ap-
ply the command pweight in Stata), and (ii) I impute the missing observations using the predicted
probability of keeping the technologies (regression imputation). Results with the variable keeping
all technologies appeared in Table 2.4. I present the results with the variable keeping at least one
technology in the Appendix A (Table A.17). The LATE of keeping all the technologies (-3.09,
-3.04) is not statistically different than the ITT effect and it is closer to the lowest engineering
estimate but still lower. This seems to suggest that the difference between the engineering estimate
and the experimental estimate is to a small degree explained by the dis-adoption rate but that there
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Table 2.4: Local Average Treatment Effect of Keeping all the Technologies.
All estimations include community and interviewer dummies and pre-treatment water use variables.
OLS Regression OLS OLS-Reweight OLS-Imputation†
LATE -3.18 -3.03 -3.02
Standard Error (0.41)*** (0.40)*** (0.42)***
Confidence Interval (95%) {-3.98, -2.38} {-3.83, -2.24} {-3.84, -2.19}
Percent Reduction 12.70% 12.11% 12.07%
Observations 1,176 1,175 1,294
R-squared 0.75 0.75 0.72
IV Regression IV IV-Reweight IV-Imputation&
1st Stage
Instrument: Treatment 0.83 0.83 0.83
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
Instrument: Bonus 0.09 0.09 0.09
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
2nd Stage
LATE -3.23 -3.09 -3.04
Standard Error (0.47)*** (0.47)*** (0.50)***
Confidence Interval (95%) {-4.15, -2.31} {-4.01, -2.17} {-4.01, -2.07}
Percent Reduction 12.90% 12.35% 12.15%
Observations 1,176 1,175 1,294
R-squared 0.75 0.75 0.72
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
† I apply Regression Imputation.
are other factors that explain the difference.
2.4.4 Assessing Alternative Explanations for the Difference Between Engi-
neering and Experimental Estimates
According to Section 2.2, other reasons that could explain the positive difference between the
engineering and the experimental estimate are the moral licensing effect, the rebound effect and
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the change in attributes. In order for the moral licensing effect to serve as an explanation for the
divergence between the engineering and the experimental outcomes, people in the study should
have undertaken conservation measures in the past. I look for evidence of conservation behavior in
the 2013 survey that included the nine communities of the study. To the question whether people
had done something to deal with warmer and longer summers in the previous five years, 14%
responded affirmatively and 33% of this subgroup had reduced water consumption. When asked
about the future summers, 60% of the sample believed that summers will be longer and warmer
than in the past and 56% of them planned to reduce water consumption. That is, less than 5% of the
sample in 2013 had undertaken some efforts to reduce their water consumption and 34% planned
to conserve water in the coming years but I do not have evidence whether they have put this plan in
action. Therefore, the percentage of households who had been actively conserving water already
is probably quite small and as a result it seems unlikely that moral licensing can explain the gap in
water consumption; however this warrants further studying.
Another potential source of deviation between the engineering and experimental estimates is
the change in the attributes of the use experience. That is, by changing the efficiency of water
use, it changes the water flow rate which people might like or not. Among the people that the team
audited in November 2015, approximately 85% reported that they liked the water flow with the new
technologies in place. Initially, I expected that people who like the flow with the new shower head
will also take longer showers. However, the correlation coefficient between whether people take
longer showers and whether they like the flow of the shower is negative (-0.30). The same is true
for the kitchen faucet (-0.17) and bathroom faucet (-0.20). While those that reportedly like the new
flow of water largely report that they have not changed the duration of their showers, people who
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dislike the flow might do so because they need to take longer showers than they used to. Consistent
with this hypothesis, I find a small negative correlation (-0.08) between people liking the flow of
water and their post-treatment water consumption. More broadly, these findings suggest that a key
assumption underlying my engineering estimate namely that people will take the same amount
of time to perform the tasks, but with less water may be incorrect. Instead, the new technology
may affect only part of people’s daily water usage, either due to their habits or because they need
a fixed amount of water for certain tasks (e.g., cooking). Understanding what part of water usage
is affected by water-conserving technologies is important to look at in further exploration.
The last potential explanation is the rebound effect. Due to the reduction in the relative cost
of taking a shower, washing hands and cooking, it is conceivable that people might increase the
duration and frequency of these activities (or of other activities that use water as a resource). In
my survey, less than 1% of the people reported an increase in the frequency of using water-related
services. As discussed above, a fair number of people reported that the activities affected by the
technology now take longer; however, the fact that this is positively correlated with their dislike
of the flow leads me to believe that it is the technology itself that causes the extended usage rather
than a voluntarily response of the individuals to the reduction of the cost of water services. I
cannot rule out the presence of rebound effect but it seems likely that the effect of habits and
fixed-amount-of-water activities have a more important role.
2.4.5 Heterogeneity
Until now I have focused on the average treatment effect but it is important to determine if the
technology might be more or less effective for certain groups. First, I analyze if the treatment
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Table 2.5: Quantile Treatment Effect of the ITT.
Quantile
5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Treatment Effect -1.14 -1.97 -2.21 -2.46 -4.03
Standard Error 0.71 (0.31)*** (0.35)*** (0.48)*** (-1.62)*
Percent Reduction† -21% -13% -10% -8% -8%
Observations 1,294 1,294 1,294 1,294 1,294
† In experiment: compared to controls in the quantile.
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
effect differs by the level of water consumption. To calculate the quantile treatment effect, the
rank preservation assumption must hold: the individual’s potential rank must be the same whether
the individual is treated or not (Bitler, Gelbach, & Hoynes, 2008; Djebbari & Smith, 2008). To
test the assumption, I compare the values of pre-treatment variables that explain consumption for
treated and control households in different quantiles of the outcome variable. In only 3 out of 32
comparisons (8 variables times 4 quantiles), I reject the null hypothesis of equal means between
treated and control households at the 5% level, which is evidence in favor of the rank preservation
assumption1. The covariate balance per quantile is presented in Table A.18 in Appendix A.
Assuming rank preservation, I calculate the quantile treatment effect for the 5%, 25%, 50%,
75% and 95% quantiles. As shown in Table 2.5, the size of treatment effect increases as the quantile
goes up. However, the differences are not statistically significant. So, I do not find evidence for
different treatment effects by consumption level.
I also investigate whether the treatment effect differs by other variables that might affect the
effectiveness of the technologies like education, water scarcity in the community, whether the
1This is 9.4% of the cases. Using the same test, Ferraro and Miranda (2013) reject 25% of the cases and Djebbari
and Smith (2008) reject 30% of the cases. In both studies, the rank preservation assumption is assumed to hold.
97
house has the three appliances where technologies were installed, and attendance to the ASADA
meetings. Treatment effect did not vary by any of these factors at a 5% level of significance.
2.4.6 Cost-Benefit Analysis and Cost-Effectiveness
In order to investigate if the technology is a valuable investment for households in rural Costa Rica,
I undertake a private cost-benefit analysis. I also examine whether the technology program is cost
effective for the government.
For the private benefits, I calculate the average household monthly monetary savings generated
by the technology. I use the ITT effect (2.69 m3) and apply the tariffs charged in each community
during 2015. Since most of the communities apply variable pricing, the marginal cost of water
depends on the level of consumption. I approximate the future water consumption using an annual
growth rate of 3.88% based on the water consumption levels since 2013.
To calculate private costs, I assume that people pay for the technology and the installation.
I cannot use the price of the technologies in Costa Rica because they are not sold there. Nor
can I use the price at which I bought the technologies for the experiment because I imported the
technologies from the US at the wholesale price. Instead, I use the Amazon and Home Depot price
of the technologies in the US2. The market price of the technology package that includes a shower
head and two aerators is $8.40. I also take into account the cost of installation. For the cost of
installation I consider the cost of a local plumber and the cost of additional fixtures (new faucets or
adapters, for example) needed to install the resource conserving technologies. The cost per home
2I look for the price of a basic faucet in these online stores and they were similar to the corresponding prices in
Costa Rica so I believe the assumption that the technologies in Costa Rica would cost the same as the products in the
US is feasible. These prices do not take into account transportation costs.
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of a plumber is $2.30 and the cost of the additional fixtures is $10.80 so that the cost of installation
is $13.10. Adding the cost of installation and the price of the technology, I obtain a total cost per
home of $21.50.
In order to compare the private benefits and costs, I need to define a lifespan of the technologies.
According to Costa Rican engineers, the lifespan is highly determined by the effect of the minerals
in the water. Since I do not have this information, I will assume different lifespans, from two years
until five years. This is a conservative assumption since the technology warranty is ten years.
I use two market interest rates to discount the monthly savings: 5% and 10%. The present value
of the cost and benefits are presented in Table 2.6. At these rates, the average household recovers
the investment in the technology in less than two years: in twenty months when the interest rate is
5% and in twenty one months when the rate is 10%.
I also include the individuals’ and married couples’ annual discount rate elicited in Chapter 1
for a sample of 485 individuals from thirty communities of the area of Guanacaste, nine of which
are in this study. The individual discount rate is δ = 0.29 which is similar to the one elicited
in other studies with American students (Andreoni & Sprenger, 2012; Attema, Bleichrodt, Gao,
Huang, & Wakker, 2016; Coller et al., 2012) and higher than the 0.09 elicited by Andersen et al.
(2014) for a representative sample in Denmark. Since the decision to buy the technologies could
be taken by the couple, I also consider couples’ discount rate and compare the results. The present
values calculated with these rates are included in Table 2.6. At these rates, the technology pays
its full cost in three years. At the annual discount rate δ = 0.29, the average household recovers
the cost of the technology in twenty five months, while at δ = 0.43 the cost is recovered in thirty
months.
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Table 2.6: Private Cost-Benefit (in US-$).
Present Value of Costs and Benefits
Annual Interest/ Lifespan of Technology
Discount Rate 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
0.05 Benefit 25.7 37.7 49.5 61.2
Cost (21.5) (21.5) (21.5) (21.5)
Net 4.3 16.3 28.0 39.7
0.10 Benefit 24.5 35.2 45.2 54.6
Cost (21.5) (21.5) (21.5) (21.5)
Net 3.0 13.7 23.7 33.1
0.29 Benefit 20.9 28.0 33.7 38.3
Cost (21.5) (21.5) (21.5) (21.5)
Net (0.6) 6.5 12.2 16.8
0.43 Benefit 18.9 24.4 28.4 31.3
Cost (21.5) (21.5) (21.5) (21.5)
Net (2.6) 2.9 6.9 9.8
Based on the results of Chapter 1 and using the monthly water payments, I compare the dis-
counted disutility of purchasing the technology versus the discounted disutility of not purchasing
the technology using the individuals’ and couples’ annual discount rates and the corresponding
relative risk aversion coefficients (r). The discounted disutility of purchasing the technology is
expressed as: U0Tech = u(P0 +Cost)+∑
T
t=1 dt ∗u(Pt), where P are the monthly water payments,
Cost is the cost of the technology and d is the discount factor. The discounted disutility of not
purchasing the technology is expressed as: U0NoTech = ∑
T
t=0 dt ∗u(Pt). The results are presented in
Table 2.7. Purchasing the technology provides the average household with more utility than not
purchasing it even if I only consider a lifespan of two years.
Until now I have assumed that people believe that prices will not increase in the future and
that the technology will perform as expected. Nevertheless, people might expect that prices will
100
go up in the future or/and that the water savings due to the technology will be lower than what
we advertised. I do not know their beliefs about these potential scenarios so I assume that they
believe they might occur with a 50% probability. Based on the results of Chapter 1, I assume that
people in my sample are optimistic and that they transform the 50% probabilities to 73% for the
good outcome and 27% for the bad outcome. Using this result, I compare the discounted expected
utility with technology and without technology assuming the good scenario where prices stay the
same and technology performs as advertised, and two bad scenarios: (i) prices increase by 10%
(20%,50%) in 2016 and 2018 and (ii) technology reduces water consumption by less than the ITT
result: by 1.345 m3 (0.67m3). In all the cases, the disutility without the technology is higher than
the disutility with technology after two years. This difference (disutility without technology minus
disutility with technology) increases slightly assuming the first bad scenario but reduces to almost
half in the second one. Thus, the belief about higher prices makes the technology more attractive
but the belief about the effectiveness of the technology could discourage take-up, but since people
are optimistic the best outcome results overpower the bad scenario.
In summary, both analyses show that the cost of the technology is recovered three years after
the treatment and that the utility of purchasing the technology is higher than not buying it even
considering only a two year technology lifespan. Moreover, even if I consider expectations about
price increments and lower effectiveness of the technology, buying the technology still provides
more utility than not buying it.
Next, I analyze the program from the government point of view. I will not undertake a public
cost-benefit analysis because I do not know how the government or the communities value water.
Instead, I estimate the cost-effectiveness of a governmental program that provides the technology
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Table 2.7: Discounted Disutility of Payments With and Without the Technology.
Discounted Disutility of Payment
Household Lifespan of Technology
Preferences† 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
0.29/0.80 Without Technology 169.1 223.9 266.7 300.1
With Technology 168.3 222.3 264.5 297.4
Difference‡ 0.8 1.6 2.2 2.7
0.43/0.77 Without Technology 145.5 185.5 213.6 233.5
With Technology 144.9 184.2 211.9 231.4
Difference‡ 0.6 1.3 1.7 2.1
† Annual subjective discount rate (δ ) / Coefficient of relative risk aversion (r).
‡ Denotes the difference between the discounted disutility of payment without and with the technology. A positive
value indicates purchasing the technology increases the utility of the average household.
for free, such as the one in my study. I assume the costs of the program are similar to the costs
in my study and leave aside the costs of interviewers because they are part of the evaluation, not
of the program itself. I include the cost of the technologies and the salaries of the plumber team
and a field work coordinator. Using the water savings from the ITT estimation, I calculate the
cost-effectiveness for four months (post-treatment period) and one year after the installation. Four
months after the installation, every dollar spent saves 0.49 m3. After one year, every dollar spent
saves 1.48 m3. If I assume that people pay for the technologies, the values are 0.83 m3 and 2.49
m3 four months and one year after the program, respectively.
It is difficult to find an appropriate comparison for this result, because there are only a few
studies about programs aimed at reducing water consumption. The most similar is the social norm
message study of Datta et al. (2015) that takes place in urban Costa Rica. Due to their low costs
– Datta et al. (2015) reported that the cost of the program was US$400 –, I calculate a cost-
effectiveness between 6.6 m3 and 10.6 m3 one month after the treatment. This program is more
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cost-effective in the very short term, and the authors do not present estimates for longer periods.
However, both studies should also be compared in terms of their medium and long term effects and
it is expected that the impact of the technologies will last for a few years.
2.5 Conclusion
Resource conserving technologies have been promoted as a measure to conserve and adapt to
climate change. These recommendations are mainly based on engineering estimates that either
under- or overestimate the effect of the technologies because of deficiencies in the study design or
because of ignoring the behavioral factors.
Even though there is a need for experimental studies, these are scarce and there is no experi-
mental study that measures the impact of water conserving technologies. I undertake an RCT to
measure the impact of water conserving technologies and find that the technology program reduces
monthly water consumption for people interested in the technologies by 2.69 m3, which represents
a percent reduction of 10.76%. This result is much higher than the results of two “nudge” type
interventions, Datta et al. (2015) and Jaime and Carlsson (2014), where water consumption was
reduced through social norm messages in urban Costa Rica (between 3.5% and 5.6%) and urban
Colombia (6.8%). This suggest that the adoption of water conserving technologies could be a
better policy in terms of reducing water consumption but the long term effects of both measures
should be compared.
The ITT is much lower than the engineer estimate of AyA (50%). Even though the study by
AyA also included efficient toilets, the engineer estimate seems highly overestimated. This not only
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harms the public planning to face water scarcity in the country, but it also inflates the benefits of the
proposed tax cuts. Engineer estimates can misguide policy makers by not considering experimental
design and behavioral factors as in this case. In other cases proponents of a policy could be guided
by other particular reasons. To mitigate this channel, policy evaluations should be undertaken by
external parties with no conflict of interest.
The ITT is also lower than our lowest engineering estimate (20.3%). If I take into account dis-
adoption and measure the impact in the group of households that kept the technology, the estimated
water reduction (12.15%) is higher but not statistically different than the ITT and still lower than
the engineering estimate.
According to some hypotheses, there are other reasons that could explain the difference be-
tween the engineering and the experimental effect. It is unlikely that moral licensing plays a role
in this context because the 2013 survey suggests that most of the population in these communities
was not accustomed to save water. Nevertheless, the population could have updated their habits
in recent years. I will look further into this channel in future research. My survey suggests that
after installation of the technology people take more time to shower, cook and wash their hands,
and this is correlated with them disliking the new flow. This suggests that the assumption that
people will take the same time but less water to perform their usual activities does not completely
hold. Instead, the new technology may affect only part of people’s daily water usage because of
their habits or the water needs of certain activities. This could explain the difference between the
engineering and the experimental estimate but more research is needed.
The technology recovers its cost three years after the program, even considering very high
discount rates and assuming beliefs about the effectiveness of the technology and changes in prices.
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This evidence suggests that the technology is valuable and households might buy it when offered at
a market price; however, further analysis should offer the technology at different prices and elicit
people’s beliefs. From the government point of view, the program seems expensive in the very
short run if I compare it with the Datta et al. (2015)’s program; but I believe that medium and long
term effects will show the lasting impact of the technology.
In a future study I plan to replicate and extend the experiment. This will allow me to dig
further into the behavioral explanations that affect the impact of the technologies. Moreover, I plan
to offer the technology at the market price to measure adoption and whether the change in water






Table A.1: Best Model Analysis: Parameter Estimates using all the Choices.
Parameter Point Est. Std. Error p-value 95% Conf. Interval
A. EUT with CRRA utility function
Log-Likelihoood: -13,937.67 Observations: 21,324
r 0.42 0.08 0.00 0.26 0.57
µ 0.21 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.23
B. EUT with Expo-Power utility function
Log-Likelihoood: -13,840.94 Observations: 21,324
r 0.59 0.05 0.00 0.49 0.69
α -0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.08 0.00
µ 0.19 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.20
C. RDU with CRRA utility function and Power pwf
Log-Likelihoood: -13,669.61 Observations: 21,324
r 0.78 0.02 0.00 0.73 0.82
γ 0.43 0.03 0.00 0.37 0.50
µ 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.19
D. RDU with CRRA utility function and Inverse-S pwf
Log-Likelihoood: -13,826.26 Observations: 21,324
r 0.18 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.34
γ 0.74 0.02 0.00 0.71 0.77
µ 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.18
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E. RDU with CRRA utility function and Prelec pwf
Log-Likelihoood: -13,586.62 Observations: 21,324
r 0.65 0.02 0.00 0.61 0.70
η 0.51 0.03 0.00 0.45 0.57
φ 0.61 0.03 0.00 0.55 0.68
µ 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.17
F. RDU with Expo-Power utility function and Power pwf
Log-Likelihoood: -13,656.25 Observations: 21,324
r 0.87 0.02 0.00 0.84 0.90
α -0.51 0.08 0.00 -0.66 -0.36
γ 0.46 0.03 0.00 0.39 0.53
µ 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.19
G. RDU with Expo-Power utility function and Inverse-S pwf
Log-Likelihoood: -13,609.72 Observations: 21,324
r 0.51 0.03 0.00 0.45 0.57
α -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.01
γ 0.68 0.02 0.00 0.65 0.71
µ 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.16
H. RDU with Expo-Power utility function and Prelec pwf
Log-Likelihoood: -13,541.45 Observations: 21,324
r 0.75 0.02 0.00 0.71 0.79
α -0.18 0.03 0.00 -0.25 -0.12
η 0.62 0.04 0.00 0.54 0.69
φ 0.59 0.03 0.00 0.53 0.65
µ 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.17
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Table A.2: Parameter Estimates using Individuals’ Choices.
Parameter Point Est. Std. Error p-value 95% Conf. Interval
A. EUT with CRRA utility function
Log-Likelihoood: -9,517.27 Observations: 14,455
r 0.38 0.08 0.00 0.23 0.53
µ 0.23 0.01 0.00 0.21 0.25
B. EUT with Expo-Power utility function
Log-Likelihoood: -9,454.79 Observations: 14,455
r 0.57 0.05 0.00 0.47 0.66
α -0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.01
µ 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.22
C. RDU with CRRA utility function and Power pwf
Log-Likelihoood: -9,361.66 Observations: 14,455
r 0.76 0.02 0.00 0.71 0.81
γ 0.43 0.03 0.00 0.37 0.50
µ 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.21
D. RDU with CRRA utility function and Inverse-S pwf
Log-Likelihoood: -9,457.39 Observations: 14,455
r 0.17 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.32
γ 0.75 0.02 0.00 0.72 0.78
µ 0.19 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.20
E. RDU with CRRA utility function and Prelec pwf
Log-Likelihoood: -9,321.10 Observations: 14,455
r 0.64 0.03 0.00 0.59 0.70
η 0.51 0.03 0.00 0.44 0.58
φ 0.63 0.03 0.00 0.57 0.70
µ 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.19
F. RDU with Expo-Power utility function and Power pwf
Log-Likelihoood: -9,352.12 Observations: 14,455
r 0.85 0.02 0.00 0.82 0.89
α -0.45 0.08 0.00 -0.60 -0.30
γ 0.46 0.03 0.00 0.40 0.53
µ 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.22
G. RDU with Expo-Power utility function and Inverse-S pwf
Log-Likelihoood: -9,329.05 Observations: 14,455
r 0.50 0.03 0.00 0.45 0.56
α -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.01
γ 0.69 0.02 0.00 0.66 0.72
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µ 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.17
H. RDU with Expo-Power utility function and Prelec pwf
Log-Likelihoood: -9,291.87 Observations: 14,455
r 0.74 0.03 0.00 0.69 0.79
α -0.16 0.04 0.00 -0.23 -0.09
η 0.63 0.04 0.00 0.55 0.71
φ 0.61 0.03 0.00 0.55 0.66
µ 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.19
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Table A.3: Marginal and Total Effects Using Individuals’ Choices and EUT
All estimations are calculated using CRRA utility function.
Parameter Point Est. Std. Error p-value 95% C.I.
A. Marginal effects
Log-Likelihoood: -9,235.60 Observations: 14,096
r order 0.10 0.13 0.46 -0.16 0.36
gender 0.08 0.13 0.54 -0.18 0.34
age -0.17 0.16 0.28 -0.47 0.14
primary school 0.55 0.37 0.14 -0.18 1.28
married 0.10 0.14 0.50 -0.18 0.37
income 0.19 0.13 0.14 -0.06 0.44
const -0.22 0.36 0.55 -0.93 0.49
µ const 0.21 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.24
B. Total effects
r order 0.26 0.15 0.08 -0.03 0.56
gender 0.12 0.16 0.45 -0.19 0.44
age -0.30 0.17 0.08 -0.64 0.04
primary school 0.87 0.38 0.02 0.12 1.62
married 0.09 0.16 0.54 -0.21 0.40
income 0.30 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.57
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Table A.4: Marginal Effects using Individuals’ Choices and RDU Prelec pwf
All estimations are calculated using Expo-Power utility function.
Parameter Point Est. Std. Error p-value 95% C.I.
Log-Likelihoood: -9,230.30 Observations: 14,425
r order 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.20
gender -0.11 0.05 0.02 -0.20 -0.02
age -0.28 0.06 0.00 -0.39 -0.17
primary school 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.22
married 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.21
income 0.01 0.04 0.73 -0.06 0.09
const 0.55 0.08 0.00 0.40 0.71
α order 0.00 0.00 0.30 -0.01 0.00
gender 0.01 0.01 0.25 -0.01 0.02
age 0.02 0.02 0.23 -0.01 0.05
primary school 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00
married -0.01 0.01 0.26 -0.02 0.01
income 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.01
const -0.03 0.02 0.19 -0.07 0.01
η order -0.17 0.10 0.08 -0.36 0.02
gender 0.15 0.11 0.18 -0.07 0.37
age 0.39 0.12 0.00 0.14 0.63
primary school -0.21 0.11 0.07 -0.43 0.02
married -0.13 0.10 0.18 -0.32 0.06
income 0.01 0.11 0.90 -0.20 0.22
const 0.86 0.14 0.00 0.59 1.14
φ order -0.02 0.07 0.75 -0.16 0.11
gender -0.06 0.07 0.40 -0.20 0.08
age -0.21 0.06 0.00 -0.33 -0.09
primary school 0.08 0.08 0.36 -0.09 0.24
married -0.06 0.07 0.41 -0.19 0.08
income 0.07 0.08 0.37 -0.08 0.23
const 0.74 0.10 0.00 0.54 0.94
µ const 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.17
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Table A.5: Individuals’ vs. Couples’ Choices.
Parameter Point Est. Std. Error p-value 95% C.I.
A. EUT with CRRA utility function
Log-Likelihoood: -13,457.36 Observations: 20,605
r couple 0.17 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.30
const 0.34 0.10 0.00 0.15 0.53
µ const 0.21 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.22
B. RDU with Expo-Power utility function and Prelec pwf
Log-Likelihoood: -13,059.60 Observations: 20,605
r couple 0.03 0.03 0.30 -0.03 0.10
const 0.74 0.03 0.00 0.67 0.80
α couple -0.04 0.05 0.46 -0.14 0.06
const -0.17 0.05 0.00 -0.26 -0.08
η couple -0.06 0.06 0.31 -0.17 0.05
const 0.64 0.06 0.00 0.53 0.75
φ couple -0.05 0.03 0.09 -0.12 0.01
const 0.61 0.03 0.00 0.55 0.66
µ const 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.17
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Table A.6: Individuals’ vs. Couples’ Decisions of Real and Fake Couples.
Parameter Point Est. Std. Error p-value 95% C.I.
1. Real Couples
A. EUT with CRRA utility function
Log-Likelihoood: -7,232.38 Observations: 11,158
r couple 0.07 0.08 0.34 -0.08 0.22
const 0.37 0.11 0.00 0.15 0.59
µ const 0.19 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.21
B. RDU with Expo-Power utility function and Prelec pwf
Log-Likelihoood: -7,014.35 Observations: 11,158
r couple 0.01 0.04 0.79 -0.07 0.10
const 0.74 0.04 0.00 0.66 0.82
α couple 0.00 0.07 0.99 -0.13 0.13
const -0.17 0.06 0.00 -0.28 -0.06
η couple -0.07 0.08 0.36 -0.23 0.08
const 0.66 0.07 0.00 0.52 0.81
φ couple -0.08 0.04 0.04 -0.15 0.00
const 0.63 0.04 0.00 0.55 0.71
µ const 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.16
2. Fake Couples
A. EUT with CRRA utility function
Log-Likelihoood: -6,218.42 Observations: 9,447
r couple 0.29 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.54
const 0.29 0.17 0.09 -0.04 0.62
µ const 0.23 0.01 0.00 0.20 0.26
B. RDU with Expo-Power utility function and Prelec pwf
Log-Likelihoood: -6,038.50 Observations: 9,447
r couple 0.06 0.06 0.29 -0.05 0.17
const 0.73 0.06 0.00 0.62 0.84
α couple -0.09 0.09 0.31 -0.25 0.08
const -0.16 0.08 0.03 -0.31 -0.01
η couple -0.04 0.09 0.69 -0.21 0.13
const 0.61 0.09 0.00 0.44 0.78
φ couple -0.03 0.05 0.61 -0.13 0.08
const 0.58 0.04 0.00 0.49 0.66
µ const 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.19
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Table A.7: Joint Estimation using Individuals’ Choices and EUT
All estimations are calculated using CRRA utility function.
Parameter Point Est. Std. Error p-value 95% C.I.
A. Exponential discounting function
Log-Likelihoood: -24,640.65 Observations: 37,587
r 0.75 0.05 0.00 0.65 0.85
δ 0.39 0.11 0.00 0.17 0.60
µr 0.28 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.33
µd 5.75 2.86 0.05 0.14 11.37
B. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting function
Log-Likelihoood: -24,546.42 Observations: 37,587
r 0.70 0.05 0.00 0.61 0.80
δ 0.60 0.15 0.00 0.30 0.90
β 1.06 0.02 0.00 1.01 1.11
µr 0.27 0.02 0.00 0.23 0.31
µd 9.40 4.60 0.04 0.39 18.41
C. Mazur discounting function
Log-Likelihoood: -24,652.85 Observations: 37,587
r 0.79 0.06 0.00 0.68 0.90
K 0.28 0.09 0.00 0.11 0.46
µr 0.79 0.06 0.00 0.68 0.90
µd 0.28 0.09 0.00 0.11 0.46
D. Weibull discounting function
Log-Likelihoood: -24,580.84 Observations: 37,587
r 0.71 0.05 0.00 0.61 0.81
rwei 0.67 0.15 0.00 0.37 0.96
swei 0.55 0.06 0.00 0.45 0.66
µr 0.27 0.02 0.00 0.23 0.31
µd 8.51 4.10 0.04 0.47 16.54
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Table A.8: Joint Estimation using Individuals’ Choices and RDU with Prelec Pwf
All estimations are calculated using CRRA utility function.
Parameter Point Est. Std. Error p-value 95% C.I.
A. Exponential discounting function
Log-Likelihoood: -24,387.51 Observations: 37,587
r 0.80 0.02 0.00 0.77 0.84
η 0.42 0.03 0.00 0.36 0.48
φ 0.73 0.05 0.00 0.63 0.83
δ 0.29 0.05 0.00 0.20 0.38
µr 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.20
µd 3.43 0.68 0.00 2.11 4.75
B. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting function
Log-Likelihoood: -24,296.52 Observations: 37,587
r 0.79 0.02 0.00 0.75 0.82
η 0.43 0.03 0.00 0.37 0.48
φ 0.71 0.05 0.00 0.62 0.81
δ 0.39 0.06 0.00 0.28 0.51
β 1.04 0.01 0.00 1.01 1.06
µr 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.20
µd 4.17 0.84 0.00 2.51 5.82
C. Mazur discounting function
Log-Likelihoood: -24,398.21 Observations: 37,587
r 0.82 0.02 0.00 0.78 0.85
η 0.41 0.03 0.00 0.35 0.47
φ 0.74 0.06 0.00 0.63 0.85
K 0.25 0.04 0.00 0.17 0.32
µr 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.20
µd 3.08 0.61 0.00 1.88 4.29
D. Weibull discounting function
Log-Likelihoood: -24,330.45 Observations: 37,587
r 0.79 0.02 0.00 0.75 0.83
η 0.43 0.03 0.00 0.37 0.48
φ 0.72 0.05 0.00 0.62 0.81
rwei 0.46 0.06 0.00 0.34 0.58
swei 0.57 0.06 0.00 0.46 0.68
µr 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.20
µd 3.94 0.79 0.00 2.40 5.48
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Table A.9: Joint Estimation using Individuals’ Choices and RDU with Power Pwf.
All estimations are calculated using CRRA utility function.
Parameter Point Est. Std. Error p-value 95% C.I.
A. Exponential discounting function
Log-Likelihoood: -24,400.11 Observations: 37,587
r 0.86 0.02 0.00 0.83 0.89
γ 0.38 0.03 0.00 0.33 0.44
δ 0.20 0.03 0.00 0.13 0.26
µr 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.21
µd 1.98 0.35 0.00 1.29 2.68
B. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting function
Log-Likelihoood: -24,311.79 Observations: 37,587
r 0.85 0.02 0.00 0.82 0.88
γ 0.39 0.03 0.00 0.33 0.44
δ 0.26 0.04 0.00 0.18 0.34
β 1.03 0.01 0.00 1.01 1.04
µr 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.21
µd 2.27 0.42 0.00 1.45 3.09
C. Mazur discounting function
Log-Likelihoood: -24,408.81 Observations: 37,587
r 0.87 0.02 0.00 0.84 0.90
γ 0.38 0.03 0.00 0.32 0.43
K 0.17 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.23
µr 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.21
µd 1.86 0.33 0.00 1.21 2.50
D. Weibull discounting function
Log-Likelihoood: -24,345.36 Observations: 37,587
r 0.85 0.02 0.00 0.82 0.89
γ 0.39 0.03 0.00 0.33 0.44
rwei 0.31 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.41
swei 0.58 0.06 0.00 0.47 0.70
µr 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.21
µd 2.17 0.39 0.00 1.40 2.95
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Table A.10: Marginal Effects of Treatment and Socioeconomic Variables in the Joint Estimation.
All estimations are calculated using exponential discounting function and RDU with CRRA utility function
and Prelec pwf.
Parameter Point Est. Std. Error p-value 95% C.I.
Log-Likelihoood: -23,547.06 Observations: 36,652
r order -0.01 0.02 0.49 -0.05 0.02
gender 0.00 0.02 0.95 -0.03 0.04
age 0.02 0.02 0.18 -0.01 0.05
primary school -0.06 0.03 0.04 -0.12 0.00
married 0.01 0.02 0.44 -0.02 0.04
income -0.03 0.02 0.23 -0.07 0.02
const 0.85 0.04 0.00 0.78 0.92
η order 0.00 0.04 0.98 -0.08 0.08
gender 0.00 0.04 0.95 -0.09 0.08
age -0.06 0.04 0.12 -0.15 0.02
primary school 0.21 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.39
married -0.02 0.04 0.62 -0.10 0.06
income 0.10 0.06 0.11 -0.02 0.21
const 0.30 0.07 0.00 0.16 0.44
φ order -0.10 0.15 0.50 -0.40 0.19
gender -0.11 0.16 0.51 -0.43 0.21
age -0.34 0.17 0.04 -0.66 -0.01
primary school -0.07 0.21 0.74 -0.48 0.34
married -0.17 0.15 0.25 -0.47 0.12
income 0.07 0.17 0.67 -0.27 0.42
const 1.10 0.25 0.00 0.60 1.59
δ order 0.01 0.04 0.90 -0.07 0.08
FED 0.15 0.10 0.13 -0.05 0.35
ascendant -0.07 0.05 0.16 -0.18 0.03
gender -0.03 0.04 0.35 -0.11 0.04
age 0.00 0.04 0.91 -0.09 0.08
primary school 0.18 0.16 0.26 -0.13 0.49
married 0.00 0.04 0.91 -0.08 0.07
income 0.05 0.09 0.60 -0.13 0.23
const 0.17 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.33
µr const 0.18 0.01 20.43 0.00 0.16
µd const 3.07 0.71 4.31 0.00 1.67
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Table A.11: Joint Estimation using Couples’ Choices.
Parameter Point Est. Std. Error p-value 95% C.I.
A. Exponential discounting function and EUT with CRRA utility function
Log-Likelihoood: -34,829.60 Observations: 53,575
r couple -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.02
const 0.74 0.05 0.00 0.65 0.83
δ couple 0.18 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.30
const 0.43 0.12 0.00 0.20 0.66
µr const 0.25 0.02 0.00 0.21 0.29
µd const 6.21 2.86 0.03 0.60 11.82
B. Exponential discounting function and RDU with CRRA utility function and Prelec pwf
Log-Likelihoood: -34,829.60 Observations: 53,575
r couple -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.02
const 0.81 0.02 0.00 0.77 0.84
η couple 0.04 0.03 0.14 -0.01 0.10
const 0.41 0.03 0.00 0.35 0.47
φ couple -0.10 0.05 0.03 -0.19 -0.01
const 0.72 0.05 0.00 0.62 0.82
δ couple 0.14 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.21
const 0.30 0.05 0.00 0.20 0.40
µr const 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.17
µd const 3.30 0.60 0.00 2.12 4.47
C. Exponential discounting function and RDU with CRRA utility function and Power pwf
Log-Likelihoood: -34,422.22 Observations: 53,575
r couple -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.02
const 0.87 0.02 0.00 0.84 0.90
γ couple 0.05 0.03 0.15 -0.02 0.11
const 0.36 0.03 0.00 0.31 0.42
δ couple 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.15
const 0.19 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.26
µr const 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.19
µd const 1.73 0.30 0.00 1.14 2.32
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Table A.12: Joint Estimation using Real Couples’ Choices.
Parameter Point Est. Std. Error p-value 95% C.I.
A. Exponential discounting function and EUT with CRRA utility function
Log-Likelihoood: -18,791.04 Observations: 29,013
r couple -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.01
const 0.69 0.06 0.00 0.58 0.80
δ couple 0.22 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.40
const 0.50 0.15 0.00 0.21 0.79
µr const 0.22 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.26
µd const 9.39 4.74 0.05 0.10 18.69
B. Exponential discounting function and RDU with CRRA utility function and Prelec pwf
Log-Likelihoood: -18,545.94 Observations: 29,013
r couple -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.01
const 0.79 0.02 0.00 0.74 0.83
η couple -0.01 0.04 0.86 -0.08 0.07
const 0.44 0.05 0.00 0.35 0.53
φ couple -0.10 0.06 0.07 -0.22 0.01
const 0.74 0.07 0.00 0.60 0.87
δ couple 0.14 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.24
const 0.31 0.07 0.00 0.17 0.46
µr const 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.17
µd const 3.68 0.88 0.00 1.95 5.41
C. Exponential discounting function and RDU with CRRA utility function and Power pwf
Log-Likelihoood: -18,565.51 Observations: 29,013
r couple -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.01
const 0.85 0.02 0.00 0.81 0.89
γ couple -0.01 0.04 0.88 -0.09 0.08
const 0.40 0.05 0.00 0.31 0.49
δ couple 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.16
const 0.20 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.29
µr const 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.18
µd const 1.93 0.38 0.00 1.20 2.67
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Table A.13: Joint Estimation using Fake Couples’ Choices.
Parameter Point Est. Std. Error p-value 95% C.I.
A. Exponential discounting function and EUT with CRRA utility function
Log-Likelihoood: -16,024.59 Observations: 24,562
r couple -0.053 0.014 0.000 -0.080 -0.025
const 0.815 0.093 0.000 0.633 0.997
δ couple 0.149 0.062 0.017 0.027 0.272
const 0.307 0.197 0.119 -0.079 0.692
µr const 0.301 0.042 0.000 0.219 0.383
µd const 3.180 2.910 0.274 -2.523 8.884
B. Exponential discounting function and RDU with CRRA utility function and Prelec pwf
Log-Likelihoood: -15,826.45 Observations: 24,562
r couple -0.054 0.014 0.000 -0.081 -0.027
const 0.825 0.023 0.000 0.779 0.871
η couple 0.099 0.042 0.020 0.016 0.182
const 0.368 0.041 0.000 0.288 0.449
φ couple -0.097 0.075 0.196 -0.245 0.050
const 0.703 0.080 0.000 0.546 0.859
δ couple 0.148 0.041 0.000 0.068 0.228
const 0.286 0.074 0.000 0.140 0.432
µr const 0.173 0.011 0.000 0.151 0.195
µd const 2.898 0.808 0.000 1.315 4.481
C. Exponential discounting function and RDU with CRRA utility function and Power pwf
Log-Likelihoood: -15,843.17 Observations: 24,562
r couple -0.051 0.013 0.000 -0.077 -0.025
const 0.891 0.027 0.000 0.837 0.945
γ couple 0.112 0.050 0.026 0.013 0.210
const 0.325 0.039 0.000 0.248 0.402
δ couple 0.115 0.030 0.000 0.056 0.175
const 0.167 0.056 0.003 0.058 0.276
µr const 0.189 0.013 0.000 0.163 0.215
µd const 1.530 0.466 0.001 0.617 2.444
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Table A.14: Correlation of Variable Tank using RDU with Power pwf
All estimations are calculated using CRRA utility function.
Parameter Point Est. Std. Error p-value 95% C.I.
A. Couples
Log-Likelihoood: -6,008.77 Observations: 9,593
r tank 0.008 0.051 0.873 -0.091 0.108
const 0.855 0.025 0.000 0.806 0.904
γ tank 0.297 0.133 0.025 0.037 0.557
const 0.340 0.051 0.000 0.240 0.439
δ tank -0.173 0.097 0.073 -0.363 0.016
const 0.287 0.065 0.000 0.159 0.414
µr const 0.133 0.010 0.000 0.113 0.152
µd const 1.451 0.354 0.000 0.757 2.145
A. Heads of Household
Log-Likelihoood: -6,123.22 Observations: 9,515
r tank -0.021 0.054 0.701 -0.127 0.085
const 0.813 0.031 0.000 0.751 0.874
γ tank 0.267 0.192 0.165 -0.110 0.644
const 0.342 0.056 0.000 0.232 0.452
δ tank -0.123 0.139 0.376 -0.396 0.150
const 0.334 0.094 0.000 0.150 0.519
µr const 0.173 0.016 0.000 0.141 0.204
µd const 2.974 0.820 0.000 1.368 4.581
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Table A.15: Installation of Technologies.
Shower head Kitchen aerator Bathroom aerator
Units available 0 27 215 403
1 791 639 426
2 52 16 41
Units installed 0 72 284 467
1 760 575 383
2 38 11 20
Installation success rate 93% 89% 83%
At least one in each home 92% 67% 46%
Table A.16: Experimental Estimates using Household and Home ID for Five Communities.
Experimental Estimates
Post-Treatment 2015 (June-Sept)
Household ID Home ID
Treatment Effect† -3.30 -3.27
Standard Error (0.59)*** (0.59)***
Confidence Interval (95%) {-4.47, -2.14} {-4.44, -2.11}
Percent Reduction‡ 12.37% 12.62%
Effect Size? 0.21 0.22
Community Dummy Variables Yes Yes
Interviewer Dummy Variables Yes Yes
Pre-treatment Water Use Variables Yes Yes
Robust Standard Errors Yes Yes
Observations 836 843
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
† Technology Adoption Treatment Effect (in m3 water/month).
‡ Percent Reduction (in experiment, compared to controls).
? Effect Size=(treatment effect)/(standard deviation of control group); i.e. mean reduction in use divided by SD of the
counterfactual water use.
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Table A.17: Local Average Treatment Effect of Keeping At Least One Technology.
All estimations include community and interviewer dummies and pre-treatment water use variables.
OLS Regression OLS OLS-Reweight OLS-Imputation
LATE -3.07 -2.91 -2.92
Standard Error (0.41)*** (0.41)*** (0.43)***
Confidence Interval (95%) {-3.88, -2.26} {-3.71, -2.11} {-3.76, -2.08}
Percent Reduction 12.27% 11.63% 11.67%
Observations 1,176 1,175 1,294
R-squared 0.75 0.75 0.72
IV Regression IV IV-Reweight IV-Imputation
1st Stage
Instrument: Treatment 0.93 0.93 0.93
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Instrument: Bonus 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)***
2nd Stage
LATE -2.98 -2.85 -2.82
Standard Error (0.43)*** (0.43)*** (0.46)***
Confidence Interval (95%) {-3.83, -2.13} {-3.70, -2.00} {-3.71, -1.92}
Percent Reduction 11.91% 11.39% 11.27%
Observations 1,176 1,175 1,294
R-squared 0.75 0.75 0.72
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
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Table A.18: Experimental Estimates of Impact on Water Consumption using Household and
Home ID for Five Communities.
Variable Quantile Control Treated P-value
Pre-Treatment Water Consumption
June-Sept 2014 0% – 25% 10.46 11.69 0.10
25% – 50% 17.85 18.59 0.37
50% – 75% 25.83 26.08 0.83
75% – 100% 38.43 39.40 0.57
Feb 2015 0% – 25% 13.94 13.02 0.53
25% – 50% 20.32 20.26 0.95
50% – 75% 28.55 28.57 0.98
75% – 100% 43.80 43.95 0.94
March 2015 0% – 25% 12.97 12.91 0.95
25% – 50% 20.67 21.36 0.43
50% – 75% 29.58 29.27 0.78
75% – 100% 48.20 45.91 0.36
April 2015 0% – 25% 12.38 13.80 0.09
25% – 50% 21.24 23.61 0.01
50% – 75% 31.66 31.69 0.97
75% – 100% 48.38 47.93 0.84
Secondary school 0% – 25% 0.29 0.29 1.00
25% – 50% 0.24 0.24 0.91
50% – 75% 0.28 0.27 0.86
75% – 100% 0.28 0.28 0.99
Participate in ASADA meetings 0% – 25% 0.38 0.37 0.86
25% – 50% 0.39 0.33 0.26
50% – 75% 0.45 0.43 0.74
75% – 100% 0.39 0.42 0.71
Years living in home 0% – 25% 19.01 16.09 0.16
25% – 50% 16.99 16.14 0.64
50% – 75% 18.03 19.15 0.52
75% – 100% 20.71 22.37 0.36
Household members 0% – 25% 2.34 2.63 0.05
25% – 50% 3.12 3.48 0.01
50% – 75% 4.16 3.97 0.34
75% – 100% 4.70 4.63 0.75
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Appendix B
Supplementary Documents to Chapter 1
B.1 Script of Time and Risk Experiment
[Se dice el script mientras se muestra una presentacin de power point.]
• Bienvenidos! Muchas gracias por venir y participar en este taller.
• Mi nombre es y yo voy a estar a cargo de este taller organizado por CATIE, la
universidad de Turrialba. Me acompan˜an mis compan˜eros Melissa, Luis Fernando, Rodrigo,
Eugenia y Germa´n.
• El taller de hoy es parte del proyecto de agua de CATIE para el que ustedes fueron en-
cuestados el an˜o pasado. Cuando el proyecto termine, las conclusiones del mismo sera´n
presentadas en algunas comunidades de la zona.
• El dı´a de hoy, ustedes van a tomar decisiones muy simples, que se parecen a las decisiones
que ustedes toman dı´a a dı´a.
• Usted ha recibido una tarjeta con su co´digo de individuo y su co´digo de pareja. La tarjeta es
muy importante para realizar los pagos. Entonces, no pierda el papel, mante´ngalo siempre
con usted.
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• Antes de empezar, quisiera pedirle su permiso para participar en este taller.
• Usted tambie´n ha recibido una carta de consentimiento y una copia. La carta de consen-
timiento es un permiso que ustedes firman si quieren y pueden participar del taller.
• Yo voy a leer la carta.
• [Luego de leer la carta.] En resumen, la carta dice que el taller dura 3 horas y van a tomar
decisiones. No hay ningu´n riesgo en el taller. Sus nombres no aparecera´n cuando se presen-
ten los datos del estudio. Si tiene alguna queja (que no la van a tener), los datos de contacto
aparecen en la carta. Firme, por favor, con lapicero si puede y quiere participar en el taller.
Inicio
• En el taller vamos a tener parejas reales y parejas formadas en el taller. Es decir, todos tienen
una pareja.
• Las parejas reales y las formadas en el taller tienen el mismo co´digo de pareja.
• Algunas parejas van a empezar tomando las decisiones individualmente. El resto empieza
tomando las decisiones en parejas.
• La sesio´n esta´ dividida en 4 Dina´micas y una encuesta corta al final. [Mostrar dina´micas]
• En cada Dina´mica, ustedes van a tomar varias decisiones donde elige entre 2 alternativas: A
y B.
• Al final voy a elegir a la suerte 4 decisiones, una de cada dina´mica.
• Usted va a recibir su pago por su respuesta en so´lo una de esas decisiones. Usted podra´ retirar
este dinero del Banco Nacional con la presentacio´n de su ce´dula. Las ganancias pueden ser
entre 0 y 50 000 colones, y en algunos casos ma´s.
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• Ahorita usted no sabe que´ decisio´n le va a tocar para su pago. Por eso, usted debe pensar
bien cada decisio´n que tome porque le puede tocar cualquiera.
• Adema´s, usted recibira´ al final 5000 colones en efectivo s’olo por quedarse durante todo el
taller.
• Para que este taller salga bien y podamos hacer un buen estudio, es muy importante que nos
demos a entender y que ustedes piensen bien cada decisio´n. Por eso, les pedimos que por
favor sigan las instrucciones y hagan preguntas si algo no esta´ claro.
• ¿Tiene alguna pregunta? ¿Seguros?
• Si alguien necesita usar el ban˜o ahorita, puede ir y los esperamos antes de empezar.
• Ahora les pedimos que guarden sus celulares y lo pongan en modo vibrador. No pueden usar
sus celulares durante el taller para evitar distracciones. Gracias.
Dina´mica 1
• Empecemos con la Dina´mica 1.
• En esta dina´mica usted debe tomar decisiones en las que tiene que elegir entre dos opciones:
A y B. En la opcio´n A usted recibe la plata man˜ana y en la opcio´n B usted recibe ma´s plata
pero en el futuro. Yo quiero saber que´ opcio´n prefiere en cada decisio´n: A o B.
• Ahora vamos a hacer ejemplos para entender mejor la Dina´mica 1.
Dina´mica 1 - Ejemplos
• El primer y segundo ejemplo los hacemos juntos. El tercer ejemplo lo van a hacer ustedes
solos y los asistentes van a pasar por sus asientos para contestar preguntas y ver si todos
hemos entendido, ok?
• Empecemos con el primer ejemplo. Mire la pantalla.
128
• Vamos a tomar 8 decisiones independientes. Cada fila es una decisio´n: decisio´n 1, decisio´n
2, decisio´n 3, etc.
• Cada decisio´n tiene dos opciones: A y B. En la opcio´n A usted recibe 2000 colones man˜ana
y en la opcio´n B usted recibe ma´s plata en 15 dı´as.
• En la primera decisio´n, en la opcio´n A usted recibe 2 000 colones man˜ana y en la opcio´n B
usted recibe 2 038 colones en 15 dı´as. ¿Que´ opcio´n prefiere? Si prefiere recibir 2000 colones
man˜ana, marca la opcio´n A. Pero si usted prefiere recibir 2 038 colones en 15 dı´as, marca la
opcio´n B. Supongamos que usted prefiere recibir 2 000 colones man˜ana. En ese caso, usted
marca la opcio´n A. Haga la marca bien clarita para que se pueda leer.
• En la segunda decisio´n, tambie´n hay 2 opciones: A y B. En la opcio´n A usted recibe 2000
colones man˜ana y en la opcio´n B usted recibe 2057 colones en 15 dı´as. ¿Que´ opcio´n prefiere?
Supongamos que usted prefiere recibir 2000 colones man˜ana. Entonces, usted marca la
opcio´n A.
• En la tercera decisio´n, en la opcio´n A usted recibe 2000 colones man˜ana y en la opcio´n B
usted recibe 2076 colones en 15 dı´as. ¿Que´ opcio´n prefiere? Supongamos que usted tambie´n
prefiere recibir 2000 colones man˜ana. Entonces, marca la opcio´n A.
• En la cuarta decisio´n, en la opcio´n A usted recibe 2000 colones man˜ana y en la opcio´n B
usted recibe 2 113 colones en 15 dı´as. Supongamos que usted tambie´n prefiere recibir 2000
colones man˜ana. Entonces, marca la opcio´n A.
• Fı´jese que la plata en A siempre es la misma, 2000 colones, pero la plata de B va aumentando
en cada decisio´n.
• En la quinta decisio´n, en la opcio´n A usted recibe 2000 colones man˜ana y en la opcio´n B
usted recibe 2 219 colones en 15 dı´as. ¿Que´ opcio´n prefiere? Supongamos que ahora sı´ usted
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prefiere la opcio´n B. Es decir, por 2219 colones usted sı´ puede esperar 15 dı´as. Entonces,
marca la opcio´n B.
• Fı´jese que en el resto de decisiones, la plata de la opcio´n B sigue aumentando, 2320 colones,
2417 colones, 2538 colones. Entonces, una vez que usted elija la opcio´n B por primera vez,
tiene sentido que usted elija B en el resto de decisiones de la tabla, porque si usted prefiere
esperar 15 dı´as por 2219 colones, con mayor razo´n prefiere esperar 15 dı´as si el monto es
mayor.
• Ası´ analiza usted todas las decisiones.
• Al final de la tabla usted debe tener 8 marcas, una en cada fila.
• ¿Tiene alguna pregunta? ¿Seguro?
• Veamos el ejemplo 2 en la pantalla. Es una tabla con 8 decisiones independientes. Cada
decisio´n tiene 2 opciones: A y B.
• En la opcio´n A, usted recibe el dinero man˜ana pero en la opcio´n B usted recibe el dinero en
2 meses.
• En la primera decisio´n, en la opcio´n A usted recibe 2000 colones y en la opcio´n B usted
recibe 2170 colones pero en 2 meses. ¿Que´ opcio´n prefiere? Supongamos que usted prefiere
recibir 2000 colones man˜ana. Entonces, usted marca la opcio´n A y pasa a la siguiente
decisio´n.
• En la segunda decisio´n, en la opcio´n A usted recibe 2000 colones y en la opcio´n B usted
recibe 2347 colones en 2 meses. ¿Que´ opcio´n prefiere? Supongamos que ahora sı´ usted
prefiere la opcio´n B. Es decir, por 2347 colones usted sı´ puede esperar 2 meses. Entonces,
marca la opcio´n B.
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• Fı´jese que en el resto de decisiones el monto en B sigue aumentando (2531, 2722, 2920,
3125, etc). Entonces, una vez que usted marque la opcio´n B por primera vez, tiene sentido
que usted elija la opcio´n B en el resto de decisiones de la tabla porque si prefirio´ esperar 2
meses por 2258 colones, con mayor razo´n prefiere esperar 2 meses si el monto es mayor.
• Entonces, al final de la tabla usted debe tener 8 marcas, una en cada fila.
• Recuerde que so´lo una decisio´n de todas las que tome se considera para su pago. Si la
decisio´n elegida es la decisio´n 3, vemos su respuesta en la decisio´n 3. La decisio´n fue la
opcio´n B. Entonces, usted gana 2531 colones que puede retirar en 2 meses en cualquier
ventanilla del Banco Nacional.
• ¿Tiene alguna pregunta? ¿Seguro?
• Ahora es el turno de ustedes de hacer el ejemplo 3.
• Mis compan˜eros le esta´n repartiendo el ejemplo. [Esperar].
• En cada decisio´n usted elige entre 2 opciones A o B. En la opcio´n A usted recibe 3000
colones man˜ana y en la opcio´n B usted recibe ma´s plata en 1 mes.
• Por favor, complete todas las 8 decisiones.
• Piense bien cada decisio´n, como si e´sa fuese la u´nica de su pago.
• [Luego de unos minutos] Supongamos que la u´nica decisio´n elegida para el pago del sr.
es la decisio´n [saco de bolsa]. En la decisio´n el sen˜or marco´
. Entonces, e´l podrı´a retirar colones del Banco Nacional man˜ana (en 1
mes). Pero este so´lo es un ejemplo.
Inicio Dina´mica 1
• En un momento usted empezara´ la Dina´mica 1.
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• [Al lado A]: Este lado va a tomar las decisiones en parejas. Ustedes van a recibir el folleto
Dina´mica 1 por pareja. Escriban el co´digo de pareja en cada hoja. Piensen primero y luego
escuchen la opinio´n de su pareja. Ambos deben estar de acuerdo con las elecciones que
hacen. No hablen muy alto por favor.
• [Al lado B]: Este lado va a tomar las decisiones individualmente. Cada uno de ustedes va a
recibir el folleto Dina´mica 1. Escriba su co´digo de individuo en cada hoja.
• En cada hoja del folleto hay 8 decisiones como las del ejemplo pero con pagos reales en
colones que usted podra´ retirar del Banco Nacional.
• Lo u´nico que cambia en cada tabla es la fecha en la que se realizan los pagos y los montos
de los pagos.
• En todas las hojas, en la opcio´n A usted recibe la plata man˜ana. En la primera hoja, en la
opcio´n B usted recibe el dinero en 4 dı´as. En la segunda hoja, en la opcio´n B usted recibe el
dinero en 8 dı´as. En la tercera hoja, en la opcio´n B usted recibe el dinero en 15 dı´as. En la
cuarta hoja, en la opcio´n B usted recibe el dinero en 1 mes. En la quinta hoja, en la opcio´n
B usted recibe el dinero en 3 meses. En la sexta hoja, en la opcio´n B usted recibe el dinero
en 6 meses.
• Por favor, empiece con la primera tabla y luego continu´e con el resto en orden. No se saltee
hojas.
• Analice cada decisio´n como si esa fuese la u´nica decisio´n que vale para su pago.
• En cada hoja debe escribir 8 marcas, una marca por fila.
• Por favor, empiece. Cuando acabe cada hoja, pasa a la siguiente. Cuando acabe, por favor
voltee el folleto. Gracias!
• [Luego de que todas han terminado, se recogen los folletos.]
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Dina´mica 2
• Ahora veamos la Dina´mica 2.
• Esta Dina´mica es totalmente diferente a la anterior. En cada decisio´n, hay 2 opciones: A y
B. Los pagos de cada opcio´n se hacen en el mismo momento, man˜ana.
• Cada opcio´n tiene 20 fichas con 3 colores diferentes y 3 valores diferentes en una bolsa.
Saco una ficha de cada opcio´n y el valor de la ficha es el premio de esa opcio´n.
Dina´mica 2 - Ejemplos
• Vamos a hacer 3 ejemplos. El primero lo hago yo y los otros dos los hacen ustedes solos.
• En el ejemplo uno, en la opcio´n A, cada ficha amarilla vale 1 000 colones y hay 3 fichas
amarillas. Cada ficha azul vale 6 000 colones y hay 17 fichas azules.
• En la opcio´n B cada ficha verde vale 2 000 colones y hay 5 fichas verdes, y cada ficha azul
vale 6 000 colones y hay 15 fichas de color azul.
• Usted debe elegir si prefiere la opcio´n A o la opcio´n B.
• Note que es ma´s probable que la ficha de un color salga cuando hay ma´s fichas de ese color.
• Supongamos que usted prefiere la opcio´n A. Entonces, marca A bien clarito.
• Luego se saca las fichas ganadoras de cada opcio´n. Saco una ficha sin ver de la opcio´n A. La
ficha es de color que vale . Luego, saco una ficha sin ver de la opcio´n
B. La ficha es de color que vale . Como usted eligio´ A, usted gana
.
• Ahora le toca a ustedes.
• Mis compan˜eros le esta´n entregando el folleto con 2 ejemplos.
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• En cada decisio´n usted elige entre 2 opciones: A o B. En el primer ejemplo, en la opcio´n A
la ficha amarilla vale 1000 colones y hay 6 fichas amarillas. La ficha azul vale 6 000 colones
y hay 14 fichas azules. En la opcio´n B, la ficha amarilla vale 1000 colones y hay 3 fichas
amarillas, la ficha verde vale 2000 colones y hay 5 fichas verdes, y la ficha azul vale 6000
colones y hay 12 fichas azules. ¿Cua´l prefiere A o B?
• Hace el mismo ana´lisis en el ejemplo 2.
• ¿Tiene alguna pregunta? ¿Seguro?
• Por favor, hago los 2 ejemplos.
• Los asistentes pasaran por sus asientos para responder preguntas y revisar que todos hayamos
entendido.
• [Luego de unos minutos] Supongamos que la decisio´n elegida para su pago es la decisio´n
2. [Juego ambas opciones]. La opcio´n A es que vale . La opcio´n
B es y paga . Entonces, si el sen˜or recibe pago por esta
Dina´mica, se le pregunta su respuesta en la decisio´n 2. Su respuesta es . Y se le
entrega colones.
Inicio Dina´mica 2
• En un momento usted empezara´ la Dina´mica 2.
• [Al lado A]: Este lado va a tomar las decisiones en parejas. Se juntan las parejas. Ustedes
van a recibir el folleto Dina´mica 2 por pareja. Escriban el co´digo de pareja en cada hoja.
Piensen primero y luego escuchen la opinio´n de su pareja. Ambos deben estar de acuerdo
con las elecciones que hacen. No hablen muy alto por favor.
• [Al lado B]: Este lado va a tomar las decisiones individualmente. Cada uno de ustedes va a
recibir un folleto Dina´mica 2. Escriba su co´digo de individuo en cada hoja.
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• En esta Dina´mica, usted debe realizar 30 decisiones similares a las que realizo´ en los ejem-
plos anteriores. En cada decisio´n, los valores de las fichas pueden variar.
• Recuerde que usted recibe pago so´lo por una decisio´n. Por eso, analice cada decisio´n como
si esa fuese la de su pago.
• Tome el tiempo que necesite.
• Si tienen alguna duda, levanten la mano y nos acercamos a su silla.
• Cuando acabe, por favor voltee el folleto. Por favor, empiece.
• BREAK: Pasamos ahora a una pausa de unos minutos para comer y tomar algo. Luego
regresan por favor a sus sitios. (Acomodar sillas).
• Ok, regresemos por favor a nuestros sitios.
Segunda parte
• Todos han terminado la primera parte de la sesio´n. ¡Muy bien! Vamos a empezar la segunda
parte del taller.
• Ustedes ya saben de que´ se tratan las Dina´micas 1 y 2, verdad? Ahora vamos a tomar las
mismas decisiones pero la gente que tomo´ las decisiones en parejas va a tomar las decisiones
individualmente. Las personas que tomaron las decisiones individualmente van a tomar las
decisiones en parejas.
• Empecemos con la Dina´mica 3.
• [Al lado A]: Este lado va a tomar las decisiones individualmente. Cada uno de ustedes va a
recibir el folleto Dina´mica 3. Escriba su co´digo de individuo.
• [Al lado B]: Este lado va a tomar las decisiones en parejas, es decir con sus vecinos. Verifique
que ambos tienen el mismo co´digo de pareja. Ustedes van a recibir el folleto Dina´mica 3
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por pareja. Escriban el co´digo de pareja. Piensen primero y luego escuchen la opinio´n de
su pareja. Ambos deben estar de acuerdo con las elecciones que hacen. No hablen muy alto
por favor.
• La Dina´mica 3 tiene las mismas decisiones que la Dina´mica 1.
• Recuerde que usted recibe pago so´lo por una decisio´n. Por eso, analice cada decisio´n como
si esa fuese la de su pago.
• Una vez que acabe, por favor voltee el folleto. Empiece.
• Ok, todos hemos terminado la Dina´mica 3. Continuemos con la Dina´mica 4.
• [Al lado A]: Este lado va a tomar las decisiones en parejas. Ustedes van a recibir el folleto
Dina´mica 4 por pareja.
• [Al lado B]: Este lado va a tomar las decisiones individualmente. Cada uno de ustedes va a
recibir el folleto Dina´mica 4. Escriba su co´digo de individuo en cada hoja.
• La Dina´mica 4 tiene las mismas decisiones que la Dina´mica 2.
• Cuando termine, voltee el folleto. Empiece.
Encuesta y Pago
• Antes de pasar al pago, les pido que por favor contesten esta breve encuesta. Les ruego que
sean lo ma´s exactos posibles en sus respuestas para tener la mejor informacio´n. Si alguno
necesita ayuda para llenar el cuestionario levanta la mano y vamos a su sitio.
• Las parejas casadas deben responder algunas preguntas adicionales como pareja. Cuando
terminen, por favor levanten la mano para recibir las encuestas individuales.
• [Los asistentes caminan entre los participantes y verificar que todos este´n completando la
encuesta sin problemas.]
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• [Cuando terminan] Ahora voy a seleccionar las decisiones que sera´n pagadas.
• Necesito un notario por favor.
• Primero empiezo con las Dina´micas 1 y 3.
• Para la Dina´mica 1, la decisio´n es : [saco ficha de bolsa con 48 decisiones]
• Para la Dina´mica 3, la decisio´n es : [saco ficha de bolsa con 48 decisiones]
• Para la Dina´mica 2, la decisio´n es : [saco ficha de bolsa con 30 decisiones]. El
premio de la opcio´n A es y el premio de la opcio´n B es .
• Para la Dina´mica 4, la decisio´n es [saco ficha de bolsa con 30 decisiones]. El
premio de la opcio´n A es y el premio de la opcio´n B es .
• Hay N personas en el taller. N/4 reciben pago por la Dina´mica 1. Los co´digos de individuo
son: [listar IDs]. N/4 reciben pago por la Dina´mica 2. Los co´digos de individuo son: [listar
IDs]. N/4 reciben pago por la Dina´mica 3. Los co´digos de individuo son: [listar IDs]. N/4
reciben pago por la Dina´mica 4. Los co´digos de individuo son: [listar IDs].
• Ahora jugamos las loterı´as. En la Dinamica 2, el premio de la opcio´n A es y
el premio de la opcio´n B es . En la Dina´mica 4, el premio de la opcio´n A es
y el premio de la opcio´n B es .
• Ahora los llamo a cada uno para pagarles por su participacio´n y darles informacio´n sobre su
pago. Espere por favor a que lo llame. Muchas gracias a todos por su participacio´n.
[Se llama a cada uno en privado para realizar el pago. Se paga el monto por participacio´n. Para el
resto del dinero se le dice que cuide la promesa de pago y que la presente al banco con su ce´dula.]
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B.2 Informed Consent Form
1  
Consentimiento Informado  
Título del proyecto:   Preferencias de riesgo y tiempo  Investigador Principal:  Paul Ferraro, Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Georgia State (GSU) Estudiante Investigador Principal:  Maria Bernedo, Departamento de Economía, GSU Patrocinador:    Centro Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y Enseñanza (CATIE)   I. Propósito 
Usted ha sido invitado a participar en un estudio. El propósito del estudio es investigar cómo la gente toma decisiones sobre el dinero. Usted es invitado a participar porque usted o su esposa(o) es el (la) jefe de familia y fue entrevistado por CATIE en el 2013. 800 personas van a participar en este estudio. La participación no tomará más de tres horas de su tiempo el día de hoy.  
II. Procedimientos 
Si usted decide participar, usted va a recibir indicaciones y va a tener muchas oportunidades de hacer preguntas y ser ayudado.  Con lápiz y papel, usted va luego a tomar decisiones sobre si prefiere un pago hoy o un pago mayor en el futuro. Usted también va a tomar decisiones en donde la cantidad de dinero que gana es incierta. Usted va a tomar las decisiones individualmente y también en parejas. Al final, usted completará una encuesta. 
Por su participación de hoy, nosotros le daremos ₡5 000 en efectivo al final. Además, usted podrá ganar más dinero según sus decisiones. Usted podrá retirar este dinero adicional de cualquier oficina del Banco Nacional, presentando su cédula de identidad o su pasaporte. Las ganancias totales de los participantes son usualmente entre ₡5 000 y ₡50 000, pero algunas veces más. Usted recibirá la información sobre su pago hoy en privado. 
III. Riesgos 
En este estudio, usted no tendrá ningún riesgo mayor al que tendría en cualquier día normal.  
IV. Beneficios 
Usted no tendrá ningún beneficio directo por participar en este estudio. Sin embargo, su participación nos ayudará a aprender más sobre cómo la gente toma decisiones sobre el dinero. 
V. Participación voluntaria y retiro 




VI. Confidencialidad  
Sólo María Bernedo tendrá acceso a la información que usted nos dé hoy. La información también puede ser compartida con quienes se aseguran que el estudio se realice correctamente (Junta Revisora Institucional de GSU, la oficina de Protección de Investigación Humana (OHRP), y CATIE). Usaremos un código individual en vez de su nombre en los registros de este estudio. No hay conexión entre su nombre y este código. La información que usted nos dé será guardada en computadores protegidas con contraseña y con controles de acceso y en archivadores con llave. Su nombre y otros datos que puedan identificarlo no aparecerán cuando presentemos los resultados del estudio. Los resultados serán resumidos y reportados como grupo. Usted no será identificado personalmente.  
VII. Personas de contacto 
Si usted tiene preguntas, inquietudes o quejas sobre este estudio por favor contacte al Dr. Francisco Alpízar en el CATIE (Cartago, Turrialba 30501, 2558-2215; falpizar@catie.ac.cr) o a Paul Ferraro en GSU (Atlanta, GA, EE.UU.; 1-404-413-0201; pferrarogsu@gmail.com). También puede comunicarse por teléfono si piensa que ha sido perjudicado por el estudio.  Llame a Susan Vogtner a la Oficina de Integridad de Investigación de GSU al número 1-404-413-3513, o por correo electrónico a 
svogtner1@gsu.edu, si desea hablar con alguien que no es parte del equipo de este estudio. Usted puede hablar sobre preguntas, inquietudes o sugerencias acerca del estudio. También puede llamar a Susan Vogtner si tiene preguntas o inquietudes acerca de sus derechos en este estudio.  VIII. Copia del consentimiento informado 
Le daremos una copia de este consentimiento para que se la quede.  
Si usted está dispuesto a ser voluntario en este estudio, por favor firme abajo.  
X___________________________________________________________  ______________  
Participante            Fecha 
 ____________________________________________________________   ______________ Investigador principal o Investigador quien obtiene el consentimiento    Fecha  
 
Versión del Consentimiento Informado: 06/03/2014 
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B.3 Lotteries in Risk Aversion Tasks
Código Individuo: _________
Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡12,000 10 de 20 ₡12,000 10 de 20
# ₡8,000 10 de 20 ₡4,000 2 de 20
# ₡0 0 de 20 ₡10,000 8 de 20
ri_ 1
Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡4,000 20 de 20 ₡4,000 10 de 20
# ₡0 0 de 20 ₡0 2 de 20





Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡4,000 20 de 20 ₡4,000 10 de 20
# ₡0 0 de 20 ₡0 2 de 20
# ₡0 0 de 20 ₡6,000 8 de 20
ri_ 2
Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡19,000 14 de 20 ₡19,000 14 de 20
# ₡11,000 2 de 20 ₡7,000 2 de 20





Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡0 16 de 20 ₡0 12 de 20
# ₡70,000 4 de 20 ₡35,000 4 de 20
# ₡0 0 de 20 ₡175,000 4 de 20
ri_ 3
Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡13,000 11 de 20 ₡13,000 11 de 20
# ₡12,000 5 de 20 ₡9,000 5 de 20





Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡16,000 8 de 20 ₡16,000 8 de 20
# ₡5,000 8 de 20 ₡3,000 8 de 20
# ₡12,000 4 de 20 ₡15,000 4 de 20
ri_ 4
Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡6,000 8 de 20 ₡6,000 8 de 20
# ₡5,000 8 de 20 ₡3,000 8 de 20





Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡26,000 14 de 20 ₡26,000 14 de 20
# ₡11,000 2 de 20 ₡7,000 2 de 20
# ₡21,000 4 de 20 ₡25,000 4 de 20
ri_ 5
Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡13,000 13 de 20 ₡13,000 13 de 20
# ₡7,000 4 de 20 ₡6,000 4 de 20





Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡8,000 20 de 20 ₡8,000 10 de 20
# ₡0 0 de 20 ₡4,000 2 de 20
# ₡0 0 de 20 ₡10,000 8 de 20
ri_ 6
Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡12,000 14 de 20 ₡12,000 14 de 20
# ₡11,000 2 de 20 ₡7,000 2 de 20





Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡9,000 13 de 20 ₡9,000 13 de 20
# ₡7,000 4 de 20 ₡6,000 4 de 20
# ₡11,000 3 de 20 ₡12,000 3 de 20
ri_ 7
Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡7,000 11 de 20 ₡7,000 11 de 20
# ₡12,000 5 de 20 ₡9,000 5 de 20





Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡12,000 10 de 20 ₡12,000 10 de 20
# ₡4,000 10 de 20 ₡0 2 de 20
# ₡0 0 de 20 ₡6,000 8 de 20
ri_ 8
Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡1,000 12 de 20 ₡1,000 7 de 20
# ₡2,000 8 de 20 ₡3,000 8 de 20





Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡1,000 20 de 20 ₡1,000 4 de 20
# ₡0 0 de 20 ₡0 4 de 20
# ₡0 0 de 20 ₡4,000 12 de 20
ri_ 9
Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡16,000 10 de 20 ₡16,000 10 de 20
# ₡8,000 10 de 20 ₡4,000 2 de 20





Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡3,000 10 de 20 ₡0 12 de 20
# ₡5,000 10 de 20 ₡6,000 8 de 20
# ₡0 0 de 20 ₡0 0 de 20
ri_ 10
Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡11,000 8 de 20 ₡11,000 8 de 20
# ₡5,000 8 de 20 ₡3,000 8 de 20





Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡0 10 de 20 ₡0 12 de 20
# ₡4,000 10 de 20 ₡6,000 8 de 20
# ₡0 0 de 20 ₡0 0 de 20
ri_ 11
Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡5,000 13 de 20 ₡5,000 13 de 20
# ₡7,000 4 de 20 ₡6,000 4 de 20





Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡5,000 14 de 20 ₡5,000 14 de 20
# ₡11,000 2 de 20 ₡7,000 2 de 20
# ₡21,000 4 de 20 ₡25,000 4 de 20
ri_ 12
Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡2,000 4 de 20 ₡2,000 2 de 20
# ₡4,000 16 de 20 ₡0 16 de 20





Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡1,000 11 de 20 ₡1,000 11 de 20
# ₡12,000 5 de 20 ₡9,000 5 de 20
# ₡14,000 4 de 20 ₡18,000 4 de 20
ri_ 13
Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡19,000 11 de 20 ₡19,000 11 de 20
# ₡12,000 5 de 20 ₡9,000 5 de 20





Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡1,000 8 de 20 ₡1,000 8 de 20
# ₡5,000 8 de 20 ₡3,000 8 de 20
# ₡12,000 4 de 20 ₡15,000 4 de 20
ri_ 14
Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡4,000 10 de 20 ₡4,000 12 de 20
# ₡8,000 10 de 20 ₡10,000 8 de 20





Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡1,000 13 de 20 ₡1,000 13 de 20
# ₡7,000 4 de 20 ₡6,000 4 de 20
# ₡11,000 3 de 20 ₡12,000 3 de 20
ri_ 15
Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas Valor de Ficha Número de Fichas
# ₡8,000 10 de 20 ₡8,000 10 de 20
# ₡4,000 10 de 20 ₡0 2 de 20





































































































B.5 Survey for Time and Risk Experiment
B.5.1 Survey for Individuals in Fake Couples
Código Individuo: _____________ Encuesta Individuo 1   












3 . ¿Hasta qué edad cree usted que va a vivir? años
4 . ¿Cuántos hijos tiene? hijos
5 . ¿A qué edad tuvo su primer hijo? años
6 .
Mamografía Sí No




Sí No (Si su respuesta es "No", pase a pregunta 12) 
¿Usted visitó al médico en el último año para hacerse una revisión o chequeo médico general de prevención, no por sentir alguna molestia?
SOLO MUJERES: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿se hizo usted alguno de los siguientes exámenes?
En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tomado usted algún préstamo del banco, cooperativa, grupo local, prestamista,de un amigo u otra fuente?
SOLO CASADOS O EN UNION LIBRE: ¿Usted y su pareja deciden juntos cómo y dónde ahorrar dinero?
p. FET    
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9 . SOLO CASADOS O EN UNIÓN LIBRE: ¿Usted y su pareja tienen ahorros de dinero juntos?
Sí No (Si su respuesta es "No", pase a pregunta 12) 
10 .
1 Banco o Cooperativa
2 Empresa de crédito comunal/ bancomunal
3 En casa
4 Otros
5 No tienen ahorros
11 .
1 Más de 0 y menos de 10 000 colones
2 De 10 000 a menos de 50 000 colones
3 De 50 000 a menos de 100 000 colones
4 De 100 000 a menos de 200 000 colones
5 De 200 000 a menos de 500 000 colones
6 Más de 500 000 colones
7 No saben
8 No tienen ahorros
12 . Aparte de los ahorros con su pareja, ¿tiene usted sus propios ahorros de dinero?
Sí No (Si su respuesta es "No", pase a pregunta 15) 
13 . ¿Cómo y dónde guarda usted sus propios ahorros ? Marque una o más opciones.
1 Banco o Cooperativa
2 Empresa de crédito comunal/ bancomunal
3 En casa
4 Otros
5 No tiene ahorros propios
SOLO CASADOS O EN UNION LIBRE: ¿Cómo y dónde guardan usted y su pareja los ahorros 
que tienen juntos? Marque una o más opciones.
SOLO CASADOS O EN UNION LIBRE: ¿Cuánto dinero tienen usted y su pareja ahorrado juntos?
p. FET    
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3    
14 . ¿Cuánto dinero tiene en sus ahorros propios?
1 Más de 0 y menos de 10 000 colones
2 De 10 000 a menos de 50 000 colones
3 De 50 000 a menos de 100 000 colones
4 De 100 000 a menos de 200 000 colones
5 De 200 000 a menos de 500 000 colones
6 Más de 500 000 colones
7 No sabe
8 No tiene ahorros propios
15 .
Menores Iguales Mayores No sabe
16 . SOLO SI USTED TRABAJA: ¿Hasta qué edad piensa usted trabajar? años
17 .
18 .
Nada probable Poco probable Muy probable Va a ocurrir
19 . ¿Almacenan ustedes agua en su casa? Sí
No
20 . ¿Cuidan ustedes la cantidad de agua que se usa en casa? Sí
No
¿Cómo cubrirá sus gastos después que usted y su pareja dejen de trabajar? Marque una o más opciones.
¿Esta semana tienen usted y su familia mayores o menores gastos que lo acostumbrado?
1. Ahorros propios
3. Dinero de hijos/familiares/pareja
4. Planeo trabajar hasta que muera
5. Ayuda del gobierno
6. Otros
7. No sabe
¿Qué tan probable es que los próximos 5 veranos sean más fuertes que el verano 2014? 
2. Pensión de vejez de la CCSS (usted cotiza)
p. FET    
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21 . ¿Tiene usted un tanque de agua en su casa? Sí
No
22 .
más de 103 colones




… MÁS cosas que las que puede comprar hoy?
… MENOS cosas que las que puede comprar hoy?
… LA MISMA CANTIDAD DE COSAS que las que puede comprar hoy?
No sabe
24 .
1 Más de 0 y menos de 75 000 colones
2 De 75 000 a menos de 150 000 colones
3 De 150 000 a menos de 250 000 colones
4 De 250 000 a menos de 450 000 colones
5 De 450 000 a menos de 650 000 colones
6 De 650 000 a menos de 850 000 colones
7 Más de 850 000 colones
8 No tiene ingresos
¿Me podría indicar su ingreso mensual aproximado? (Considere todo tipo de ingreso:  sueldo, pensión, transferencias de familiares/amigos, transferencias del gobierno, becas y otros.)
Suponga que usted toma un préstamo de 100 colones con una tasa de interés mensual de 3%. Si usted no hace ningún pago de la deuda, después de tres meses usted debe:
Suponga que usted pone hoy 1000 colones en una cuenta de ahorro por un año. El banco le paga una tasa de interés anual de 1%. Además, los precios de las cosas que usted compra crecen un 2% en un año. Después de 1 año, ¿el dinero en su cuenta de ahorro le permite comprar ...
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25 . ¿Cuántas personas hay en su hogar? personas
26 .
1 Más de 0 y menos de 75 000 colones
2 De 75 000 a menos de 150 000 colones
3 De 150 000 a menos de 250 000 colones
4 De 250 000 a menos de 450 000 colones
5 De 450 000 a menos de 650 000 colones
6 De 650 000 a menos de 850 000 colones
7 Más de 850 000 colones
Muchas gracias!
¿Me podría indicar aproximadamente el ingreso mensual total de todos los miembros de su hogar? (Considere todo tipo de ingreso:  sueldo, pensión, transferencias de familiares/amigos, transferencias del gobierno, becas y otros.)
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B.5.2 Survey for Individuals in Real Couples
Código Individuo: _____________ Encuesta Individuo 1      












3 . ¿Hasta qué edad cree usted que va a vivir? años
4 . ¿Cuántos hijos tiene? hijos
5 . ¿A qué edad tuvo su primer hijo? años
6 .
Mamografía Sí No
Examen de Pap (Papanicolaou) Sí No
7 .
Nada probable Poco probable Muy probable Va a ocurrir
¿Qué tan probable es que los próximos 5 veranos sean más fuertes que el verano 2014? 
¿Usted visitó al médico en el último año para hacerse una revisión o chequeo médico general de prevención, no por sentir alguna molestia?
SOLO MUJERES: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿se hizo usted alguno de los siguientes exámenes?





9 . Aparte de los ahorros con su pareja, ¿tiene usted sus propios ahorros de dinero?
Sí No (Si su respuesta es "No", pase a pregunta 12) 
10 . ¿Cómo y dónde guarda usted sus propios ahorros? Marque una o más opciones.
1 Banco o Cooperativa
2 Empresa de crédito comunal/ bancomunal
3 En casa
4 Otros
5 No tiene ahorros propios
11 . ¿Cuánto dinero tiene usted en sus ahorros propios?
1 Más de 0 y menos de 10 000 colones
2 De 10 000 a menos de 50 000 colones
3 De 50 000 a menos de 100 000 colones
4 De 100 000 a menos de 200 000 colones
5 De 200 000 a menos de 500 000 colones
6 Más de 500 000 colones
7 No sabe
8 No tiene ahorros propios
12 . SOLO SI USTED TRABAJA: ¿Hasta qué edad piensa usted trabajar? años
13 .
2. Pensión de vejez de la CCSS (usted cotiza)
En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tomado usted algún préstamo del banco, cooperativa, grupo local, prestamista,de un amigo u otra fuente?
¿Cómo cubrirá sus gastos después de que usted y su pareja dejen de trabajar? Marque una o más opciones.




3. Dinero de hijos/familiares/pareja
4. Planeo trabajar hasta que muera




más de 103 colones




… MÁS cosas que las que puede comprar hoy?
… MENOS cosas que las que puede comprar hoy?
… LA MISMA CANTIDAD DE COSAS que las que puede comprar hoy?
No sabe
16 .
1 Más de 0 y menos de 75 000 colones
2 De 75 000 a menos de 150 000 colones
3 De 150 000 a menos de 250 000 colones
4 De 250 000 a menos de 450 000 colones
5 De 450 000 a menos de 650 000 colones
6 De 650 000 a menos de 850 000 colones
7 Más de 850 000 colones
8 No tiene ingresos
Muchas gracias!
¿Me podría indicar su ingreso mensual aproximado? (Considere todo tipo de ingreso:  sueldo, pensión, transferencias de familiares/amigos, transferencias del gobierno, becas y otros.)
Suponga que usted toma un préstamo de 100 colones con una tasa de interés mensual de 3%. Si usted no hace ningún pago de la deuda, después de tres meses usted debe:
Suponga que usted pone hoy 1000 colones en una cuenta de ahorro por un año. El banco le paga una tasa de interés anual de 1%. Además, los precios de las cosas que usted compra crecen un 2% en un año. Después de 1 año, ¿el dinero en su cuenta de ahorro le permite comprar ...
 P. Real 
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B.5.3 Survey for Real Couples
Código Pareja:__________ Encuesta Pareja 1  
1 . ¿Desde hace cuánto tiempo viven ustedes juntos?
2 . ¿Usted y su esposa deciden juntos cómo y dónde ahorrar dinero?
Sí No (Si su respuesta es "No", pase a pregunta 6) 
3 . ¿Usted y su esposa tienen ahorros de dinero juntos?
Sí No (Si su respuesta es "No", pase a pregunta 6) 
4 . ¿Cómo y dónde guardan ustedes los ahorros que tienen juntos? Marque una o más opciones.
1 Banco o Cooperativa
2 Empresa de crédito comunal/ bancomunal
3 En casa
4 Otros
5 No tienen ahorros
5 . ¿Cuánto dinero tienen ustedes ahorrado juntos?
1 Más de 0 y menos de 10 000 colones
2 De 10 000 a menos de 50 000 colones
3 De 50 000 a menos de 100 000 colones
4 De 100 000 a menos de 200 000 colones
5 De 200 000 a menos de 500 000 colones
6 Más de 500 000 colones
7 No saben
8 No tienen ahorros
6 .
Menores Iguales Mayores No sabe




7 . ¿Almacenan ustedes agua en su casa? Sí
No
8 . ¿Cuidan ustedes la cantidad de agua que se usa en casa? Sí
No
9 . ¿Tienen ustedes un tanque de agua en su casa? Sí
No




Ninguno de los dos decidió
No tengo tanque
11 . ¿Cuántas personas hay en su hogar? personas
12 .
1 Más de 0 y menos de 75 000 colones
2 De 75 000 a menos de 150 000 colones
3 De 150 000 a menos de 250 000 colones
4 De 250 000 a menos de 450 000 colones
5 De 450 000 a menos de 650 000 colones
6 De 650 000 a menos de 850 000 colones
7 Más de 850 000 colones
Muchas gracias!




Supplementary Documents to Chapter 2
C.1 Script of Installation of Water-Conserving Technologies
[Toda la informacio´n se completa usando la tablet. Las preguntas esta´n enumeradas y en negrita, y
esa informacio´n se registra. El script del entrevistador esta´ en vin˜etas y las notas para el entrevis-




• Buenos dı´as/tardes, mi nombre es y soy representante de la universi-
dad CATIE en Turrialba. [Mostrar ce´dula y membrete]
• El CATIE les habı´a informado mediante un boletı´n que iba a visitar sus hogares.
4. ¿Les llego´ esta informacio´n? Sı´ No
5. ¿Podemos conversar con alguno de los jefes de hogar? Sı´ No Regresar
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• [Si Regresar] Ok, ¿cua´ndo podemos encontrar a alguno de los jefes de hogar? Regresare-
mos a esa hora. Buenas tardes.
• [Si No] Ok, no hay problema. Gracias por recibirnos. Buenas tardes. [Fin de la encuesta]
• [Una vez que los jefes de hogar acepten participar, empieza la entrevista.]
• La visita de hoy no tomara´ mucho tiempo. Es para conversar sobre la importancia de
ahorrar agua. Le haremos una pequen˜a encuesta y vamos a regalar tecnologı´as a algunos
hogares seleccionados.
• Para nosotros es importante asegurarles que todas sus respuestas sera´n totalmente con-
fidenciales y sera´n utilizadas u´nicamente para este proyecto. Por ejemplo, necesitamos
preguntarle su nombre completo pero este dato sera´ manejado u´nicamente por el jefe del
estudio.
6. ¿Podemos continuar? Sı´ No
• [Si Sı´, continuar]
• [Si No, fin de la encuesta]
• Empecemos, si le parece, con algunas preguntas sobre su hogar y su consumo de agua.
• ¿Me podrı´a dar su nombre completo, por favor?
7. Nombre del jefe de hogar:
8. Apellidos del jefe de hogar:
• ¿A nombre de quie´n salen los recibos de la ASADA?
9. Nombre del abonado:
10. Apellidos del abonado:
11. ¿Vivı´a esta familia en esta casa en mayo del 2014? Sı´ No
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a. [Si Sı´] ¿Cua´ntos an˜os ha vivido la familia en esta casa? an˜os
b. [Si No] ¿Cua´ndo se mudo´ la familia a esta casa? Mes An˜o









13. ¿Cua´ntas personas viven en esta casa al menos 7 meses del an˜o? personas
14. ¿Esta vivienda es ? [Leer opciones]
a. Propia totalmente pagada
b. Propia pagando a plazos
c. Alquilada
d. Prestada
15. El servicio de agua en el hogar es :
a. So´lo para esta vivienda
b. Para e´sta y otras viviendas
16. ¿Me podrı´a decir cua´ntas unidades de estas tecnologı´as tiene en casa? [Leer opciones]
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Nu´mero
a. Ducha con so´lo tubo
b. Ducha simple
c. Termoducha
d. Inodoro o servicio sanitario
e. Lavamanos de ban˜o
f. Llave de cocina
g. Llave de cuarto de pila
h. Lavadora automa´tica
i. Lavadora semiautoma´tica
17. Adema´s del agua, ¿que´ otros de los siguientes aparatos tiene en su hogar? [Leer opciones]
a. Radio o equipo de sonido
b. Lı´nea telefo´nica fija
c. Pantalla de tv (plasma, LCD o LED)
d. Televisor convencional
e. Televisio´n por cable o por satelite
f. Sistema de agua caliente para toda la casa
g. Tanque de almacenamiento de agua




18. ¿Usted u otro miembro de su familia ha participado en alguna de las u´ltimas dos Asambleas
Generales que convoco´ la ASADA? Sı´ No
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19. ¿Es usted o alguna persona de su familia miembro de alguna organizacio´n comunal? Sı´
No
• Gracias por sus respuestas. Continuemos.
• Como usted habra´ notado, en los u´ltimos dos an˜os la cantidad de lluvia se ha reducido
con respecto a an˜os anteriores en toda Costa Rica, y Guanacaste y Puntarenas no son la
excepcio´n. El an˜o 2013 fue un an˜o difı´cil y el an˜o 2014 fue un an˜o au´n ma´s seco. Estudios
muestran que en promedio la temperatura va a aumentar y la lluvia se va a reducir en esta
zona. Debido a esto, la universidad CATIE aconseja que los hogares deben empezar a
reducir el consumo de agua. Actualmente muchos hogares utilizan muchı´sima agua al
ducharse, al lavarse las manos, al lavar los platos.
• La tecnologı´a puede ayudarnos a reducir este consumo de agua.
• Hoy hemos venido a ofrecerle la instalacio´n sin costo alguno para usted, de estos dispos-
itivos para la ducha y llaves de su casa [Mostrar dispositivos]. En el caso de la ducha, se
trata de una cabeza de ducha. Estos aparatos reducen la cantidad de agua que sale de la
ducha y de la llave pero el chorro de agua es mucho ma´s agradable, segu´n la opinio´n de
muchas personas. Adema´s, al gastar menos agua, con esta tecnologı´a usted ahorra plata.
Aproximadamente usted puede ahorrar 17 000 colones al an˜o.
• Tomamos estos videos de los grifos y ducha con los nuevos dispositivos en una casa en
Guanacaste. Ası´ se ve el chorro de agua. [Mostrar videos de cada dispositivo.]
• La tecnologı´a y la instalacio´n es gratuita y nos llevarı´amos la pieza vieja que sacamos y
que ya no va a utilizar.
• Desafortunadamente, no podemos instalar esta tecnologı´a en todos los hogares porque no
nos alcanza la plata. Si su hogar fuera seleccionado por sorteo para recibir esta tecnologı´a,
¿estarı´a usted de acuerdo en que instalemos estos aparatos en su hogar el dı´a de hoy?
Como le dije, todo es gratis. Adema´s, la instalacio´n es muy sencilla y no causara´ ningu´n
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problema. Si usted acepta que realicemos la instalacio´n, lo visitarı´amos dentro de los
pro´ximos 6 meses para revisar las instalaciones y saber su opinio´n sobre los productos.
20. Entonces, ¿le gustarı´a que instalemos estos aparatos en su hogar el dı´a de hoy? Sı´
No
• [Si Sı´] Ok, vamos a ver co´mo esta´ su suerte el dı´a de hoy.
• [If No] Ok, no hay problema. Antes de terminar con la entrevista, quisiera hacerle una
u´ltima pregunta sobre su hogar. [Pase a la pregunta 22].
• Vamos a hacer el sorteo usando fichas de 3 colores que se encuentran en esta bolsa: rojas,
azules y blancas. Si sale una ficha roja o azul, usted recibe la tecnologı´a. Si sale la ficha
blanca, lamentablemente no podrı´amos instalarle la tecnologı´a. Elija por favor una ficha
de la bolsa.




• [Si ROJA] Usted ha salido beneficiado para la instalacio´n. Felicitaciones. La instalacio´n
tomara´ 30 minutos como ma´ximo. Adema´s, nosotros LE DAREMOS 20 000 COLONES
en nuestra pro´xima visita si usted no quita las tecnologı´as que le instalaremos hoy. Esta
visita se realizarı´a dentro de los siguientes seis meses. Si no encontramos a nadie en casa
en la primera visita, usted tiene una segunda oportunidad. Antes de pasar a la instalacio´n,
quisiera hacerle una u´ltima pregunta sobre su hogar.
• [Si AZUL] Usted ha salido beneficiado para la instalacio´n. Felicitaciones. La instalacio´n
tomara´ 30 minutos como ma´ximo. Dentro de los siguientes seis meses, nosotros estare-
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mos pasando por su casa para ver co´mo le ha ido con la tecnologı´a. Antes de pasar a la
instalacio´n, quisiera hacerle una u´ltima pregunta sobre su hogar.
• [Si Blanca] Lamentablemente usted no salio´ favorecido para la instalacio´n. Por razones
presupuestarias no podemos instalar la tecnologı´a a todas las casas que visitamos. Sin
embargo, para nosotros es muy importante completar esta encuesta. Antes de terminar
con la entrevista, quisiera hacerle una u´ltima pregunta sobre su hogar.
22. Quisiera pedirle que por favor escoja en la siguiente tabla el rango de ingreso mensual de todos
los miembros de su hogar. Recuerde que toda la informacio´n que nos de´ es confidencial. Con-
sidere todo tipo de ingreso: sueldo, pensio´n, transferencias de familiares/amigos, transferencias
del gobierno, becas y otros.
a. Ma´s de 0 y menos de 75 000 colones
b. De 75 000 a menos de 125 000 colones
c. De 125 000 a menos de 250 000 colones
d. De 250 000 a menos de 450 000 colones
e. Ma´s de 450 000 colones
f. No sabe/no responde
23. ¿Esta´ conforme con la medicio´n de consumo de agua en su casa? Sı´ No
• [Si ROJO o AZUL] Ok, muchas gracias por la informacio´n. Ahora podemos pasar a la
instalacio´n. El sr. es uno de los plomeros contratados por CATIE
para ayudarnos a hacer las instalaciones.
• [Si no quiso la tecnologı´a o ficha BLANCA] Ok, muchas gracias por la informacio´n. Eso
serı´a todo por ahora. Muchas gracias por su tiempo y toda su atencio´n. Buenas tardes.
[Fin de la encuesta]
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• [[Entrevistador permanece en la casa durante la instalacio´n de las tecnologı´as para anotar
que´ instalaciones se realizara´n.]
24. Resumen Instalacio´n de Aireadores de Cocina
• [Recordatorio: El nu´mero de aireadores de cocina instalados es: ]
24.1 ¿Cua´ntas unidades de aireadores de cocina se instalaron?









• [Recordatorio: La cantidad de aireadores no instalados en la cocina es: ]
24.4 El nu´mero de unidades no instaladas es:
24.5 ¿Por que´ no se instalo´ el aireador de cocina?
a. No se pudo
b. No quiso
25. Resumen Instalacio´n de Aireadores de Lavamanos
• [Recordatorio: El nu´mero de aireadores de lavamanos instalados es: ]
25.1 ¿Cua´ntas unidades de aireadores de lavamanos se instalaron?
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• [Recordatorio: La cantidad de aireadores de lavamanos no instalados es: ]
25.4 El nu´mero de unidades no instaladas es:
25.5 ¿Por que´ no se instalo´ el aireador de lavamanos?
a. No se pudo
b. No quiso
26. Resumen Instalacio´n de Duchas Eficientes
• [Recordatorio: El nu´mero de duchas instaladas es: ]
26.1 ¿Cua´ntas unidades de duchas eficientes se instalaron?
26.2 ¿Algu´n problema en la instalacio´n de duchas eficientes?
a. Ninguno
b. Otro:
26.3 ¿Que´ tecnologı´a se retiro´?
a. Nada
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b. Ducha simple vieja
c. Termoducha vieja
• [Recordatorio: La cantidad de duchas no instalados es: ]
26.4 El nu´mero de unidades no instaladas es:
26.5 ¿Por que´ no se instalo´ la ducha?
a. No se pudo
b. No quiso
• [Si ROJA] Dentro de 6 meses lo visitaremos para saber su opinio´n sobre las tecnologı´as.
Recuerde que USTED RECIBIRA´ 20 000 COLONES si en nuestra pro´xima visita nosotros
encontramos las tecnologı´as instaladas. Sin embargo, si usted tiene un problema con
LOS NUEVOS DISPOSITIVOS Y NECESITA DESINSTALAR ALGUNO, por favor
lla´menos a este nu´mero: 8922-8839. [Entregar nota ROJA].
• [Si AZUL] Dentro de 6 meses lo visitaremos para saber su opinio´n de las tecnologı´as. Si
usted tiene un problema con LOS NUEVOS DISPOSITIVOS Y NECESITA DESINSTA-
LAR ALGUNO, por favor lla´menos a este nu´mero:8922-8839. [Entregar nota AZUL].
27. Material predominante en las paredes exteriores
a. Block o ladrillo





g. Fibras naturales (bambu´, can˜a, chonta)
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h. Otro
28. Material predominante en el techo
a. La´mina de metal o zinc
b. Fibrocemento
c. Entrepiso
d. Fibras naturales (bambu´,can˜a, chonta)
e. Otro
29. Material predominante en el piso
a. Mosaico, cera´mica, terrazo
b. Cemento (lujado o no)
c. Madera
d. Material natural (bambu´, can˜a, chonta)
e. Otro
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C.2 Script of Technology Audit
[Se entrevista a todos los hogares que recibieron tecnologı´a y se revisan las instalaciones. Al grupo





4. Tipo de tratamiento: (tecnologı´a o tecnologı´a+bono)
Preguntas para todos:
• Buenos dı´as/ tardes. Mi nombre es y vengo en representacio´n de
CATIE, la universidad de Turrialba. [Mostrar ce´dula y membrete de CATIE].
• Nosotros estuvimos por aquı´ el para hablar sobre la importancia de ahorrar
agua e hicimos unas instalaciones en las llaves de agua. Ese dı´a fuimos atendidos por el
(la) Sr(a): .
5. ¿Podemos conversar con e´l(ella) u otro jefe de hogar?
• [Si Sı´] Gracias
• [Si NO] Ok, no hay problema. Gracias por recibirnos.
• [Si jefe no esta´]: ¿A que´ hora podemos regresar?
• En esta oportunidad quisie´ramos pedirle su permiso para hacerle una entrevista muy breve
y revisar las instalaciones de agua.
6. ¿Podrı´a usted participar?
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• [ Si Sı´]: Gracias.
• [ Si No]: No hay problema. Gracias. Buenas tardes. [Fin de la encuesta]
• [ So´lo Grupo B]: Adema´s algunas casas en su comunidad han sido seleccionadas a la
suerte para realizar aforos, es decir, mediciones del flujo de agua en algunos puntos de
su casa: ducha, cocina, llave de bao. Queremos saber si la tecnologı´a funciona como se
espera. Esta medicio´n no tomara´ ma´s de 10 minutos de su tiempo.
7. [ So´lo Grupo B]: ¿Podemos realizar la medicio´n?
• [ Si Sı´]: Ok, empecemos.
• [Si No]: No hay problema. Entonces, haremos so´lo la entrevista.
8. ¿Nos podrı´a dar por favor su nombre completo?:
9. ¿Desde cua´ndo vive esta familia en esta casa? Mes An˜o
• ¿Cua´l es el nombre que aparece en los recibos de agua?
10. [Pregunta para el Entrevistador]: ¿Es el mismo abonado? Sı´ No
10.1 [Si No]: Nombre abonado:
10.2 [Si No]: ¿Por que´ cambio´ el nombre?
• En nuestra visita anterior nosotros instalamos algunas tecnologı´as.
• [Recordatorio:
– Nu´mero de duchas eficientes: X
– Nu´mero de aireadores de llaves de lavamanos: X
– Nu´mero de aireadores de llaves de cocina: X ]
• ¿Podemos pasar a revisar las instalaciones? [Hacer check si tecnologı´a esta´ instalada y
sale agua de la llave.]
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12. Instalaciones de aireadores de cocina
12.1 Aireador de cocina 1:
12.2 Aireador de cocina 2:
12.3 Aireador de cocina 3:
13. Instalaciones de aireadores de lavamanos
13.1 Aireador de lavamanos 1:
13.2 Aireador de lavamanos 2:
13.3 Aireador de lavamanos 3:
14. Sobre las duchas eficientes que no esta´n en uso
14.1 ¿Cua´ntas llaves con el dispositivo se dejaron de usar totalmente?
14.2 ¿En que´ mes se dejo´ de usar? [Recordatorio: Mes de instalacio´n es: ]
14.3 ¿En cua´ntas se desinstalo´ el dispositivo?
14.4 ¿En que´ mes desinstalo´ el dispositivo? [Recordatorio: Mes de instalacio´n es: ]
14.5 ¿Por que´ lo desinstalo´? [No leer opciones]
(a) El aireador se tapo´.
(b) Poca agua. No me agrada el chorro de agua.
(c) Otro:
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14.6 ¿Co´mo quedo´ la salida de agua despue´s de que desinstalo´? [No leer opciones]
(a) Compraron otra cachera.
(b) Dejaron el tubo sin cachera.
15. Sobre los aireadores de cocina que no esta´n en uso
15.1 ¿Cua´ntas llaves con el dispositivo se dejaron de usar totalmente?
15.2 ¿En que´ mes se dejo´ de usar? [Recordatorio: Mes de instalacio´n es: ]
15.3 ¿En cua´ntas se desinstalo´ el dispositivo?
15.4 ¿En que´ mes desinstalo´ el dispositivo? [Recordatorio: Mes de instalacio´n es: ]
15.5 ¿Por que´ lo desinstalo´? [No leer opciones]
(a) El aireador se tapo´.
(b) Poca agua. No me agrada el chorro de agua.
(c) La llave se dan˜o´.
(d) Otro:
16. Sobre los aireadores de lavamanos que no esta´n en uso
16.1 ¿Cua´ntas llaves con el dispositivo se dejaron de usar totalmente?
16.2 ¿En que´ mes se dejo´ de usar? [Recordatorio: Mes de instalacio´n es: ]
16.3 ¿En cua´ntas se desinstalo´ el dispositivo?
16.4 ¿En que´ mes desinstalo´ el dispositivo? [Recordatorio: Mes de instalacio´n es: ]
16.5 ¿Por que´ lo desinstalo´? [No leer opciones]
(a) El aireador se tapo´.
(b) Poca agua. No me agrada el chorro de agua.
(c) La llave se dan˜o´.
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(d) Otro:
17. ¿ Desconecto´ usted o alguien de la familia las tecnologı´as por algu´n periodo de tiempo? Sı´
No
17.1 ¿Desconecto´ usted o alguien de la familia la ducha eficiente? Sı´ No
17.2 ¿Cua´l fue la razo´n? [No leer opciones]
(a) Para limpiar filtro.
(b) A una persona de la casa no le gusta usar la tecnologı´a y la retira.
(c) Otro:
17.3 ¿Desconecto´ usted o alguien de la familia el filtro de la llave de cocina? Sı´ No
17.4 ¿Cua´l fue la razo´n? [No leer opciones]
(a) Para limpiar filtro.
(b) A una persona de la casa no le gusta usar la tecnologı´a y la retira.
(c) Otro:
17.5 ¿Desconecto´ usted o alguien de la familia el filtro de la llave de cocina? Sı´ No
17.6 ¿Cua´l fue la razo´n? [No leer opciones]
(a) Para limpiar filtro.
(b) A una persona de la casa no le gusta usar la tecnologı´a y la retira.
(c) Otro:
18. ¿Cree usted que ahora que tiene las tecnologı´as ... [Leer opciones]





18.2 el nu´mero de veces que se ducha ?
(a) ha aumentado
(b) ha disminuido
(c) no ha cambiado




18.4 el nu´mero de veces que se lava las manos, la cara o los dientes ?
(a) ha aumentado
(b) ha disminuido
(c) no ha cambiado




18.6 el nu´mero de veces que jala la cadena del servicio ?
(a) ha aumentado
(b) ha disminuido
(c) no ha cambiado




(c) no ha cambiado
18.8 el nu´mero de veces que lava la ropa ?
(a) ha aumentado
(b) ha disminuido
(c) no ha cambiado
18.9 el nu´mero de veces que limpia la casa ?
(a) ha aumentado
(b) ha disminuido
(c) no ha cambiado
19. Sobre el chorro de agua
19.1 ¿Prefiere usted el actual chorro de la ducha que el chorro anterior? Sı´ No
19.2 ¿Prefiere usted el actual chorro de la llave de la cocina que el chorro anterior? Sı´
No
19.3 ¿Prefiere usted el actual chorro de la llave de lavamanos que el chorro anterior? Sı´
No
20. Sobre la apariencia
19.1 La apariencia de la nueva ducha es:
(a) mejor que lo que tenı´a antes
(b) peor que lo que tenı´a antes
(c) igual que lo que tenı´a antes
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19.2 La apariencia de la llave de cocina es:
(a) mejor que lo que tenı´a antes
(b) peor que lo que tenı´a antes
(c) igual que lo que tenı´a antes
19.3 La apariencia de la llave de lavamanos es:
(a) mejor que lo que tenı´a antes
(b) peor que lo que tenı´a antes
(c) igual que lo que tenı´a antes
21. ¿Piensa usted mantener instaladas las tecnologı´as en el futuro?
21.1 ¿Por que´? Digame por favor todas las razones.
(a) Ahorro plata.
(b) Ahorro agua.
(c) Me gusta el chorro de agua.
(d) Otro:
21.2 ¿Desea retirar la ducha? Sı´ No
21.3 ¿Por que´? Digame por favor todas las razones.
(a) No me gusta el chorro de agua.
(b) El filtro se obstruye con frecuencia.
(c) Otro:
21.4 ¿Desea retirar el filtro de la llave de lavamanos? Sı´ No
21.5 ¿Por que´? Digame por favor todas las razones.
(a) No me gusta el chorro de agua.
(b) El filtro se obstruye con frecuencia.
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(c) Otro:
21.6 ¿Desea retirar el filtro de la llave de cocina? Sı´ No
21.7 ¿Por que´? Digame por favor todas las razones.
(a) No me gusta el chorro de agua.
(b) El filtro se obstruye con frecuencia.
(c) Otro:
• Como usted habra´ notado, en los u´ltimos dos aos la cantidad de lluvia se ha reducido con
respecto a aos anteriores en toda Costa Rica. Estudios muestran que en promedio la tem-
peratura va a aumentar y la lluvia se va a reducir en la zona de Guanacaste y Puntarenas.
Debido a esto, los hogares deben empezar a reducir el consumo de agua. Actualmente
muchos hogares utilizan muchı´sima agua al ducharse, al lavarse las manos, al lavar los
platos.La tecnologı´a puede ayudarnos a reducir el consumo de agua.
• Desde hace algunos meses usted tiene instalada en su casa una ducha eficiente.Esta ducha
reduce el consumo de agua para baarse pero el chorro de agua es mucho ma´s agradable,
segu´n la opinio´n de muchas personas. Adema´s, al gastar menos agua, usted puede ahor-
rar plata cada mes. Supongamos que usted no tiene la ducha eficiente y hoy vengo a
ofrece´rsela. Tomando en cuenta su experiencia con la tecnologı´a en estos meses,
22. ¿Estarı´a usted dispuesto a pagar por una ducha eficiente? Sı´ No
• Yo le voy a sugerir un monto y le voy a preguntar si usted esta´ dispuesto a pagar ese monto
por la ducha.
• Pero antes de responder le pido pensar cuidadosamente su respuesta. Muchas veces la
gente responde esta pregunta sin prestarle mucha atencio´n, pero para las ASADAS en
Guanacaste es muy importante tener una respuesta real, que tome en cuenta su experiencia
con la tecnologı´a y el impacto del pago sobre las cuentas de la casa.
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23. ¿Entonces, pagarı´a usted price colones por la ducha? Sı´ No
24. [Encuestador: Es posible que algunas personas le pidan retirar las technologı´as. Si ese es el
caso, preguntar por que´. No retirar y decir que no tienen el equipo para retirarlas.]
24.1 ¿El jefe de hogar solicito´ retirar la ducha? Sı´ No
24.2 ¿Cua´l fue la razo´n?
(a) Problema te´cnico
(b) Gusto
24.3 ¿El jefe de hogar solicito´ retirar el aireador de cocina? Sı´ No
24.4 ¿Cua´l fue la razo´n?
(a) Problema te´cnico
(b) Gusto
24.5 ¿El jefe de hogar solicito´ retirar el aireador de lavamanos? Sı´ No
24.6 ¿Cua´l fue la razo´n?
(a) Problema te´cnico
(b) Gusto
• Ahora le pido que por favor me acompan˜e a realizar el aforo. Si es tan amable, abra la
llave de la cocina (lavamanos, ducha) como normalmente lo hace. Yo voy a apuntar el
tiempo que toma llenar el recipiente. [ Aforar so´lo las llaves y duchas con tecnologı´a.]
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